ORDER
S.P. Khare, J.
1. This is a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order dated 3-6-2002 of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act in Case No. 4/P.W. Act/2001 by which the earlier Case No. 19/P.W. Act/99 has been restored to its original number and it has been fixed for recording the evidence.
2. Respondent No. 1 Ram Prakash Dubey submitted an application under Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Act’) before the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act for a direction to the non-applicant Maharishi Vidya Mandir to pay his salary for the months of April and May, 1999. According to the applicant he was reinstated in service by the Labour Court, Sagar by award dated 16-2-1999 in Case No. 41/97/LD.R. Notice of this application was issued to the non-applicant. In the reply it has been stated by the non-applicant that he has submitted an application under Order 9 Rule 13, CPC for setting aside the ex pane award. The authority by order dated 31-7-2001 rejected the application on the ground that the certified copy of the award dated 16-2-1999 was not produced before it. The applicant then submitted another application describing it to be an application for “review” under Order 47 Rule 1, CPC. The reply to this application was also submitted. After hearing both the sides the authority by the impugned order held that the application under Section 15(2) of the Act was wrongly rejected for non-submission of the certified copy of the award and, therefore, restored the earlier case for fresh decision.
3. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that there is no provision in the Act for review of any order by the authority and, therefore, the impugned order is not according to law. On the other hand it is submitted that the authority has the jurisdiction to pass the impugned order in the interest of justice.
4. The learned Counsel for both the sides have been heard. It is true that the applicant submitted the application describing it to be under Order 47 Rule 1, CPC. This provision by its own force is not applicable for review by the authority. But in the opinion of this Court, the authority did not commit any grave error in restoring the earlier application and, therefore, the impugned is not liable to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, The authority under the Payment of Wages Act has not been clothed specifically with the power to review its own order, but it can always correct its error in the interest of justice. The authority could have given an opportunity to the applicant to produce the certified copy of the award instead of dismissing the application on that ground alone. The officer exercising the powers as an authority under the Payment of Wages Act is same who presided over the Labour Court by which the award in question was passed. Therefore, the authority could have verified from its own record whether the award, as stated by the applicant, was in reality passed or not. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in P.N. Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273, in which it has been held that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. This dictum has been followed in several subsequent decisions. But in Grindlays Bank v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1981 SC 606, a distinction has been drawn between (a) procedural review and (b) review on merits. It has been held that the expression ‘review’ is used in two distinct senses, namely, (1) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a Court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the letter sense that the Court in Narshi Thekershi’s case held that no review lies on merits unless a statute specifically provides for it, obviously when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every Court or Tribunal.
5. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd., referred above, this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lachhi Bai, 1996 JLJ 546, has held that “a review application is maintainable when it is sought due to a procedural defect, or inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal, to prevent abuse of its process. Such power inheres in the Tribunal. The contention of the learned Counsel for the non-applicant can not be accepted that power of review is not provided by the statute, therefore, it can not review its own order. As considered by me earlier, wide powers are vested with the Tribunal under Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore, review on limited grounds as mentioned above is permissible. In the result, the order of the Claims Tribunal holding that it has no power to review the award is therefore, set aside and the case is remanded to it for deciding the application for review on merits in accordance with law.”
6. Present case is covered by the category of “procedural review”. The authority had dismissed the application under Section 15(2) of the Act on the sole ground that the applicant had not produced the certified copy of the award before it. As already stated the authority could give an opportunity to the applicant to produce the certified copy. Therefore, the dismissal of the application was not proper and the authority by the subsequent order which has been impugned in this petition rightly restored the earlier case in the interest of justice. This Court can not quash the order passed by the authority which has been passed in the interest of justice.
7. The petition is dismissed.