High Court Madhya Pradesh High Court

Manohar Singh vs District Superintendent Of … on 27 April, 2001

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Manohar Singh vs District Superintendent Of … on 27 April, 2001
Author: D Misra
Bench: D Misra


ORDER

Dipak Misra, J.

1. Occasions are not rare when ex facie innocuous petition preferred invoking the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India .encompass enormous and eloquent controversy expositing the proclivity to settle scores in a Court of law which sometimes gets reflected in course of hearing of a petition and sometimes the litigant makes a further innocent prayer seeking withdrawal of the petition on the plea of lack of knowledge or information at the time of presentation of the writ petition or maybe in an adroit design which the law immediately does not verify and grant the permission of withdrawal. The purpose of saying the aforesaid is that the petitioner Manohar Singh s/o Phool Singh Thakur being personally present sought leave of this Court to withdraw the petition on the ground which I shall advert to later on.

2. Mr. Radhey Lal Gupta, learned counsel rose to canvass the case of Manohar Singh seeking withdrawal of the present writ petition but he fairly conceded that he has not obtained any consent or no objection from the counsel who had been earlier engaged and on a query being made whether he could be able to address the Court without the consent of the learned counsel who had been earlier engaged, he fairly stated that without obtaining no objection from the previous counsel, he cannot canvass the cause of the petitioner. However, he has argued by submitting that, petitioner sought consent from the counsel but the same was refused and hence, having no other option he has stood up on behalf of the petitioner to seek withdrawal of the petition. The question that falis for consideration at this juncture whether the petitioner should be granted liberty to withdraw the petition. Ordinarily such orders are passed without much deliberation but occasions do warrant when withdrawal sought for by the litigant may be refused so that he cannot choose to approach the Court whenever he desires and take leave to withdraw as his proclivity commands. A litigant is expected to remember that Court of law is riot a laboratory where children come to play. It is also not a closed room where he can afford to play a game of chess. Both the contingencies are not countenanced in a Court of law and are scrupulously ostracised. As the factual scenario exposits a different picture altogether and an attempt has been made to waste the time of this Court without having any thought to understand the process of law and approach has been made with a determined intention to drag people to Court of law to get publicity I am not inclined to grant any permission or leave to the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition. Hence, I proceed to deal with the matter on the merits of the case.

3. Sans unnecessary details the facts which are essential for disposal of the writ petition are that the petitioner is a resident of village Khattadih, Tah & Distt. Mahasamund in the State of Chhattisgarh. He has lodged an F.I.R. as contained in Annexure P-2 before the S.P. Shahdol and Station House Officer, Shahdol purported to be under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) that the respondent No. 3, Shrj Ajit Jogi, has obtained a forged certificate from the Nayab Tahsil-dar, Pendra on 6-6-97 to the effect that he belongs to Scheduled Tribe and is utilising the same at various levels including contesting in the election. The
grievance is that such an FIR has been lodged making out cognizable offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code (in short the ‘IPC’) but no investigation has been done and the respondent 2 has given the FIR a decent burial contrary to the mandate of the law. It has been placed on record that the petitioner got knowledge about such aspect from one pamphlet recently published which has been brought on record. I refrain myself from referring to the aforesaid pamphlet because the same does not require to be stated for the purpose of adjudication of this case.

4. It has been said by Sir Edward Coke “The king is under no man, but under God and the law.”

It has also been said that fraud vitiates every act, be it celestial or mundane. Ordinarily when an FIR has been lodged investigation is warranted by the investigating agency, keeping in view the parameters of law but, a significant but, which cannot be lost sight of is that it is not disputed by Mr. Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that such a certificate was obtained from the Nayab Tahsildar, Pendra which is presently situated in the State of Chhatlisgarh. It is also not disputed by him that the certificate was obtained in the year 1967, almost 34 years back. The matter does not end here. Mr. Vivek Tankha, learned Advocate General for the State of M.P. has brought to the notice of this Court that the present FIR relates to the fact that the respondent No. 3 had contested in the election in the year 1997 and had lost and he had contested in the aforesaid election on the basis of the certificate granted by the Nayab Tahsildar, Pendra that he belongs to Scheduled Tribe. If the respondent No. 3 would not have been granted such a certificate he would not have been eligible to contest in the election. Submission of Mr. Tankha is that a person named Dalpat Singh, a Member of Parliament of Shahdol Constituency and one Mr. Laloo an Ex-member of Legislative Assembly of said constituency, had instituted a complaint petition under the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Court of C. J.M. Shahdol who had directed the investigating agency in exercise of powers enjoined on him under Section 156(3) of the Code to conduct an investigation and submit a report and accordingly the matter was inquired into and a final form was filed before the Court. Submission of Mr. Tankha is that after the FIR was received by the Shahdol police they have observed that investigation in relation to similar nature of allegations cannot be allowed to be conducted from time to time on the basis of reports lodged by differeni individuals.

5. Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned Advocate General for the State of Chhattisgarh has also raised certain preliminary objections, namely, the petitioner comes from Mahasamund which is in the State of Chhattisgarh and, therefore, he could not have filed an FIR at Shahdol, more so, when he is not a voter of the said constituency. As per the admission made in the petition certificate was granted which falls within the jurisdiction of Chhattisgarh State
and, therefore, if any FIR was to be lodged challenging the aforesaid certification it could have been filed at Pendra at Bilaspur; and lastly that there had
been adjudication in this regard by a Division Bench of High Court of M.P. (Indore Bench) No. 1417/88 wherein this controversy was put to rest. The learned A.G. has also pointed out that the counsel Mr. Manohar Dalai who has filed his vakalatnama in the present case had also represented the petitioner in the writ petition before the Indore Bench and, therefore, he was very well aware of the proceedings before the Indore Bench and in any case he could not have signed th” vakalatnama to appear on behalf of the petitions here.

6. To appreciate the submissions raised at the Bar it is apposite to refer to Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It reads as under:–

“156. Police Officer’s power to investigate cognizable case.-

(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XII.

(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this Section to investigate.

(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such
an investigation as above mentioned.”

On a bare reading of the aforesaid provision it becomes crystal clear that the Magistrate is empowered to direct an investigation and the same had been taken place and final form was submitted at one point of time in the year 1999. Once the investigating agency had finalised the matter, I am of the considered opinion a second complaint by another individual would not lie at the same police station as that would amount to carrying on a litigation adinfinitum which clearly exposits a malacious attitude. At this juncture, I think it apposite to refer to the order passed by the Indore Bench. It reads as under :–

“Heard Shri M. Dalai, counsel for the petitioners, on the question
of admission.

Eversince the filing of this petition in December, 1988, the
petitioners sought time for filing certain documents or prayed for
time, it constituted today.

Shri Dalai argued on the question of admission. His prayer in this petition is that the State respondent No. 1 be directed to produce the complete record relating to the benefits earned by respondent No. 2, as belonging to Scheduled Tribe. Referring to various documents filed by the petitioners, it was contended that Shri Ajit Jogi does not belong to a Scheduled Tribe. These are all disputed questions of facts, which cannot be gone into in a writ petition. There is no such document, which can legally be said to be binding on the respondent No.2 . An admission made or declaration given
by someone from his family, would not be binding on the respondent No. 2. There is not such documents prima facie reliable on record to show that if the documents goes unchallenged it would dislodge the legal character, which the respondent No. 2 had been claiming for almost about two decades.

In the circumstances, the petition is summarily dismissed without notice to the other side.”

7. On a fair reading of the aforesaid order it becomes luminously clear that the Division Bench has categorically observed that an admission made or declaration given by someone for him from the family of the respondent No. 2 would not be binding on the said respondent. They have also observed that there is no such document on record which is prima facie reliable to show that if the documents go unchallenged, it would dislodge the legal character which the respondent No. 2 had been claiming for almost about two decades. The present respondent No. 3 was the respondent No. 2 in the aforesaid case and the challenge was to his legal status that he did not belong to Scheduled Tribe. This Court while refusing to interfere dismissed the case in limine. It is urged by Mr. Shrivastava that their Lordships did not decide the lis on merits. I am not inclined to accept the same. Quite apart from the above as submitted by Mr. Tankha, a final form had already been submitted before the Court of C.J.M. Shahdol. Once an investigation has been done a second investigation in respect of a cause of action which had arisen in 1967 at Pendra, in my considered opinion is not permissible. That apart, undisputedly the certificate was granted by a Nayab Tahsildar of an area which is presently in the State of Chhattisgarh. Without commenting on the locus standi of the petitioner it can irrefragably be stated that an FIR could not have been lodged at Shahdol in praesenti inasmuch as the challenge is to the grant of certificate by an authority which is within the jurisdiction of State of Chhattisgarh. At this stage, I may also refer to Section 157(1)(b) which reads as under :–

“157(1) (b). If it appears to the officer in charge of a police station that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the case.”

8. Submission of Mr. Shrivastava, learned A.G. for the State of Chhattisgarh it is not incumbent on the officer incharge of the police station if he does not find sufficient ground to proceed with investigation. It is submitted by him as there was an investigation at one point of time and the matter related to jurisdiction of another State and further it also relates to grant of caste certificate which was given in the year 1967, inaction by the officer incharge cannot be found fault with. The aforesaid submission has substantial force in the obtaining factual matrix.

9. By filing of such a writ petition the other needy litigations are kept at bay and the judicial process has been abused. The petitioner never bothered to find out what had happened in last thirty four years and tried to set the criminal law in motion and after realising the mistake and his misadventure he
wanted to withdraw the writ petition. The attempt as has been put by Mr. Shrivastava, learned A.G. for the State of Chhattisgarh, was to get publicity and affect the image of the respondent No. 3. This type of conduct cannot be countenanced by a Court of law.

10. In view of the aforesaid premises, I did not find any substance in the writ petition and the same stands dismissed with costs of Rs. 10,000/-.