JUDGMENT
S.K. Chawla, J.
1. Appellant Mohammad Salam challenges his conviction under Section 302, I.P.C. and sentence of imprisonment for life inflicted thereunder.
2. The prosecution case was that on 8-11-1983 at about 11.15 p.m., deceased Kallu Lal Jain, a Cloth Merchant of Jabalpur, went along with his brother Mulayamchand Jain (P.W.-9) to the house of one Islam for dunning for credit money of Rs. 35/-, being the unpaid price of cloth due from Islam. Two brothers of Islam named Jannu and Salam (appellant herein) were found standing at the door of the house. When the deceased asked them about whereabouts of Islam, appellant Salam replied that he was sleeping inside the house. The deceased insisted upon Islam being woken up because he urgently wanted money from Islam. At that stage Islam showed himself up and stood behind appellant Salam. While the conversation was going on, appellant Salam got down from the doorsill, of his house and reaching up to the place where the deceased was standing on the road, plunged a dagger into the abdomen of the deceased. After inflicting that injury, the appellant took to his heels. The deceased was found to have sustained an incised wound 1″ x 1/2″ x. cavity deep on the right side of the chest at the lower part of the stenum; vide injury report Ex. P-25. Deceased Kallu Lal succumbed to his injury on 16-11-1983 in Victoria Hospital, Jabalpur. The cause of death was peritonitis due to injury; vide postmortem report Ex. P-15.
3. The prosecution case depended for its proof on the evidence of eye-witness Mulayamchand Jain (P.W.-9), dying declaration of the deceased (Ex. P-19) recorded on 9-11-1983 by Naib Tahsildar Shri Hara (P.W. 12) and recovery of a dagger on the information and at the instance of the appellant, which was found to be bloodstained; vide the report of F.S.L., Sagar Ex. P-23. The said evidence satisfactorily proved the prosecution case. It is true that death of the deceased had resulted not directly from the injury sustained by him but from peritonitis, which was the supervening cause. Where the supervening cause is the direct result of the injury, the person inflicting the injury is as much liable for causing death even though the death was not the direct result of the injury. The case of Salebhai Kadarali v. Emperor AIR 1949 Nagpur 19 : 1948 (49) Cri L.J 647, is in point. It was a case of abdominal stab wound which was viscera deep. The death had taken place due to gangrene and paralysis of the intestines resulting from the abdominal wound. It was held that the supervening cause of death being the result of the wound, the offender was responsible for causing the death.
4. The only point seriously urged by Shri Rajendra Singh, learned Counsel for the appellant, was that the only offence brought home to the appellant was the reduced offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304, I.P.C. and not the offence of murder under Section 302, I.P.C. of which the appellant was convicted by the learned trial Judge. The nature of the injury sustained by the deceased was described by Dr. S. K. Nema (P.W. 6), who had assisted Senior Doctor Shri Shrivastava (P.W. 16) in performing operation on the injury. Dr. Nema deposed that the stab injury was situated over the lower part of the sternum and went downwards in the abdominal cavity. Exploratory leprotomy was done for operation. There were two perforations measuring 1/2 cm. x 1/4 cm. each through and through over the pyloric part of the stomach, which were repaired by operation. The deceased however developed peritonitis and septicaemia which resulted in his death. Dr. R. D. Sharma (P.W. 16) deposed that the injury sustained by the deceased was likely to cause death.
5. The learned trial Judge found that the appellant had time, however little, for meditation when the deceased was engaged in conversation with him and his brother; that the appellant had thereafter purposely got down from the door-still of his house and after reaching up to the place where the deceased was standing, had plunged a dangerous weapon like the dagger in question into the abdomen of the deceased which was a vital part of the body. On the basis of these circumstances, it was inferred that the intention of the appellant was to kill the deceased. In other words, the act of the appellant fell within the clause 1stly of Section 300, I.P.C., and thereby he committed the offence of murder punishable under Section 302, I.P.C. To the circumstances listed by the trial Court may be added the further circumstances that infliction of dagger blow by the appellant was not preceded by any kind of grappling between the deceased and the appellant to render it likely that aiming could not, be, or was not, done by the appellant, that the deceased had come with the legitimate object of demanding his outstanding dues and that the deceased was not proved to have offered any kind of provocation. But at the same time, it is obvious that before an inference about intention to cause death is drawn, no other inference should reasonably be possible from the circumstances of the assault. The circumstances which contra-indicated such an intention in the present case were that the appellant dealt but one blow with his dagger. It is understandable that if a single injury instantaneously causing death, for instance chopping off the neck or a piercing injury through and through on the left side of the chest, is inflicted by an assailant he may not deal a second blow being unnecessary. In that situation, the assailant may be credited with the intention to kill though he may have inflicted a single injury only. But such was not the case here. The appellant in the instant case after causing single injury, instead of persisting and inflicting more injuries, suddenly took to his heels. Moreover, the dagger blow was not dealt with such a degree of force as to cause an injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The injury caused was only such which was likely to cause death. The death occurred 8 days after the event. For aught one knows, the death might not have occurred had peritonitis not supervened. The only reasonable inference that followed from the entirety of the circumstances was that intention of the appellant was to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. It was wrong to infer therefrom that intention of the appellant was to kill the deceased. The case of the appellant fell within 2nd part of Section 299, I.P.C. and not within clause 1stly of Section 300 ibid. The appellant had committed the offence of culpable homicide punishable under Section 304, Part-I, I.P.C. and not the offence of murder punishable under Section 302, I.P.C. The appellant has been in jail since November, 1983, i.e. for the last 7 years and 10 months. The sentence already undergone by him meets the requirements of justice.
6. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the appellant is altered from Section 302, I.P.C. to Section 304, Part-I, I.P.C. and he is sentenced to the period of imprisonment already undergone by him. He shall be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case.