Delhi High Court
Narinder Pal Kaur Chawla vs Setia Builwell Pvt Ltd. & Anr. on 11 November, 2008
i.1
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CMI 5/2008
% Date of order: 11.11.2008
NARINDER PAL KAUR CHAWLA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. M.C.Dhingra, Adv. with
Petitioner in person
versus
SETIA BUILDWELL PVT LTD & ANR ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Ehtesham Hashmi, Adv. for
Mr. Saleem Ahmed, Adv. for R-2
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.R.MIDHA
1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed
to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3. Whether judgment should be reported in Digest?
: PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J.(Oral)
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
2. On 4.11.2008 Trial Court Record was requisitioned
through a special messenger.
3. The Trial Court Record is available and the same has
been perused by us.
4. It is urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that
the petitioner challenges the impugned judgment and decree
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dated 15.7.2007 limited to the relief of injunction granted
against the petitioner restraining her from blocking the passage
leading to the first floor of property bearing No.A-447, Defence
Colony, New Delhi and the terrace of the second floor above.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner concedes that the
petitioner is not in possession of the said portion of the property
in question in respect whereof injunction has been issued
against her, but states that after the plaintiff obtained an interim
injunction in the suit on 14.11.2007, under the garb of the
interim order, the plaintiff dispossessed the petitioner from the
portions of the property in question in respect whereof
injunction has been granted against her.
6. It is urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that
the petitioner was in possession of the entire first floor as also
the terrace of the second floor of property No.A-447, Defence
Colony, New Delhi when the suit was filed by respondent No.1.
7. Relevant facts are that property No.A-447, Defence
Colony, New Delhi was a plot of land owned by the L & DO.
Perpetual lease hold rights were granted by L & DO in favour of
one Prem Chander Chawla who sold the same to Gurbachan
Singh Chawla vide sale deed dated 7.12.1958. Pursuant to the
sale deed, mutation was effected in the record of L & DO
recording that perpetual lease hold rights were transferred in
favour of Gurbachan Singh Chawla. Gurbachan Singh Chawla is
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none else other than the late father-in-law of the petitioner.
8. The petitioner is the second wife of the son of
Gurbachan Singh Chawla and his wife Joginder Kaur.
9. The petitioner and the son of Joginder Kaur and Late
Gurbachan Singh Chawla are involved in a matrimonial litigation
which appears to be extremely emotive and acrimonious.
10. On the death of Gurbachan Singh Chawla, his legal
heirs i.e. his wife, his son and two daughters joined in an action
before the L & DO which resulted in L & DO accepting Joginder
Kaur to be the surviving legal heir of the deceased under a will
dated 28.4.1973 stated to have been executed by Gurbachan
Singh Chawla.
11. Vide sale deed Ex.PW-1/2 dated 16.5.2007, Joginder
Kaur sold the property in question to respondent No.1 i.e. the
plaintiff of the suit, recording therein that a two and a half
storey building was constructed on the plot and that physical
possession of the garage on the ground floor, the first floor and
the terrace on the second floor was handed over to the
purchaser i.e. the plaintiff.
12. Suit was filed by the purchaser as plaintiff, who, after
narrating the aforesaid facts in the plaint, pleaded that the
petitioner was occupying the second floor of the property in
question and she attempted to obstruct the egress and ingress
of its tenant by locking the common passage where-from entry
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was effected into the first floor of the property as also the
terrace of the second floor.
13. A decree of injunction was prayed for to restrain the
petitioner from putting a lock on the common passage leading
to the first floor and the terrace of the second floor.
14. The petitioner filed a written statement stating that
she was in occupation of the first floor as also the terrace on the
second floor. She alleged that the sale of the property by her
mother-in-law was a deep-rooted conspiracy.
15. On the pleadings of the parties various issues were
framed; the main issue being whether the petitioner had a right
to lock the common passage and prevent/block ingress of the
plaintiff to the suit property. Other issues were technical issues
and in respect thereof learned counsel for the petitioner has not
questioned the legality of the decree against the petitioner.
16. In view of the fact that Gurbachan Singh Chawla had
title to the suit property under the sale deed dated 7.12.1958
and the fact that on his death his legal heirs consented to his
wife being accepted as the perpetual lessee by L & DO, the
obvious finding had to be that Joginder Kaur W/o Late
Gurbachan Singh Chawla was competent to execute the sale
deed Ex.PW-1/2. We note that the petitioner did not seriously
question the execution of the sale deed and fought the battle on
the issue of possession of the first floor and the terrace of the
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second floor.
17. On the evidence on record the learned Trial Judge
has returned a finding in favour of the plaintiff.
18. The evidence of the plaintiff on the issue of
possession was the testimony of Mr. Surender Kumar Setia a
Director of the plaintiff. The evidence of the petitioner was her
testimony and the testimony of Narender Vats, Ahlmad from the
Court of a learned Metropolitan Magistrate in Delhi and the
evidence of a police official pertaining to DD Entry No.23-A
dated 9.7.2007.
19. The evidence of the witness of the plaintiff and that
of the petitioner is nothing but a word of mouth versus a word of
mouth. Each reiterating their version.
20. The record of learned Metropolitan Magistrate and
DD Entry aforenoted merely shows a dispute on possession and
hence nothing of substance turns on the said evidence.
21. But, what breaks the deadlock in favour of the
respondent i.e. the plaintiff and against the petitioner is an order
dated 21.4.2004 (at page No.741-743 of the Trial Court Record)
passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.2606/2004
recording as under:-
"As the legal right of the second wife to claim
maintenance under the Act and its quantum are hotly
contested issues in the main case, we refrain from
expressing any opinion on merit of the claims and
contentions of the parties. For the purpose of fixing
appropriate amount of interim maintenance, we may
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assume that the financial position of husband is such
that he can easily pay a sum of Rs.1,500/- per month
as interim maintenance without disturbing the right of
separate residence provided to the wife at the second
floor of the husband's premises.
The appeal, therefore, is partly allowed by increasing
the amount of interim maintenance to Rs.1,500/- per
month which shall be payable at the above rate from
the month of May, 2004 until decision of the main case
pending under the Act on the original side of the High
Court. It is made clear that the High Court shall decide
the main case on merits uninfluenced by orders passed
for fixing interim maintenance."
22. The order afore noted clearly records the admitted
position that towards her right of residence, the petitioner was
in occupation of the second floor of the husband's premises. We
note that the husband's premises referred to his none else other
than property No.A-447, Defence Colony, New Delhi. The same
has been broadly referred to as the husband's premises though
really speaking the same belongs to the mother of the husband
of the petitioner.
23. No worthwhile contention has been urged at the
hearing today. We note that repeatedly learned counsel for the
petitioner is being hampered by the petitioner in making
submissions because the petitioner keeps on speaking and
insisting that the sale was an act of fraud to defeat her rights.
In this connection we may note that the learned Trial Judge has
taken the precaution to direct the plaintiff not to eject the
petitioner or take possession of the second floor of the property
from her without following the due process of law.
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24. We find no merits in the appeal.
25. The appeal is dismissed.
26. No costs.
PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J.
J.R.MIDHA, J.
NOVEMBER 11, 2008
mm
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