PETITIONER:
NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LIMITED
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SHRI SHRI KISHAN BHAGERIA & OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT11/11/1987
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
OZA, G.L. (J)
CITATION:
1988 AIR 329 1988 SCR (1) 985
1988 SCC Supl. 82 JT 1987 (4) 569
1987 SCALE (2)1301
ACT:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: Section 2(s)-'Workman'-
who is-Internal Auditor in Company-Not doing supervisory
work-only checking up on behalf of employer-No independent
authority or right to take decision-Such employee held
'workman'-I. D. Act not repugnant to Rajasthan Shops and
Commercial Establishments Act 1958.
Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishments Act,
1958: Sections 28A and 37-Whether repugnant to Industrial
Disputes Act 1947-Employee's petition against dismissal-
Dismissed on ground of limitation-Relief through petition
under I. D. Act 1947-Whether barred.
HEADNOTE:
%
The Ist respondent was working in the appellant-company
as an Internal Auditor on a monthly salary of Rs.1186-60P
per month. The appellant alleged that the respondent started
absenting himself from 28th January, 1978 and as such was
not entitled to any salary for any period beyond the said
date. The respondent was thereafter placed under suspension
on 30th March, 1978.
On 4th May, 1978 the respondent filed an application
under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
claiming a total sum of Rs.4746-40p on account of salary
from Ist January, 1978 to 30th April, 1978. The appellant
objected on the ground that the respondent was not a
'workman'. On 9th November, 1978 there was an order
dismissing the respondent from service.
On 2nd January, 1979 the respondent filed an
application under section 28A of the Rajasthan Shops and
Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 which was dismissed on
31st July, 1979 on the ground of limitation.
On the 2nd August, 1979 the Labour Court held that the
respondent was doing clerical duties and as such was a
'workman' under the Industrial Disputes Act and he was
entitled to Rs.2060-98p as salary
986
from 9th March, 1978 to 30th April, 1978. There was also a
reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 on 8th August, 1960 arising out of the dismissal of the
respondent. The appellant filed a writ petition challenging
this order.
All the aforesaid writ petitions were disposed of by a
Single Judge of the High Court on 16th March, 1982 holding
that the respondent was not a 'workman'.
Division Bench of the High Court, however reversed the
aforesaid judgment and held that the respondent was a
'workman'. The two writ petitions of the appellant were
dismissed, while the writ petition of the respondent was
allowed.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders the appellant
appealed to this Court. On the questions: (1) whether the
respondent was a 'workman' or not within the definition of
section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and (2)
whether the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or the Rajasthan
Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 would apply.
Dismissing the appeals,
^
HELD: 1.(a) Whether a person was performing supervisory
or managerial work is a question of fact. One must,
therefore, look into the main work and that must be found
out from the main duties. A supervisor has to take some kind
of decision on behalf of the company. One who was reporting
merely as to the affairs of the company and making
assessment for the purpose of reporting is not supervisor.
[992A-B]
(b) There is no controversy in the instant case, that
the respondent is not employed in any managerial or
administrative capacity. Distribution of work may easily be
the work of a manager or an administrator but "checking" the
work so distributed or "keeping an eye" over it is certainly
supervision. A manager or administrator's work may easily
include supervision but that does not mean that supervision
is the only function of a manager or an administrator. Where
there is a power of assigning duties and distribution of
work there is supervision. [990C,991A-B,991D]
Mcleod and Co. v. Sixth Industrial Tribunal West Bengal
and others, A.I.R. 1958 Calcutta 273; All India Reserve Bank
Employees Association v. Reserve Bank of India, [1966] 1
S.C.R. 25; Llyods Bank
987
Ltd. v. Pannalal Gupta, [1961] 1 L.L.J. 18; Burmah Shell Oil
Storage & Distribution Co. Of India. v. Burmah Shell
Management Staff Association & Ors. [1971] 2 S.C.R. 758; The
Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. R.S. Bhatia (dead) through
Lrs, [1975] 4 S.C.C. 696; Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration
JUDGMENT:
Delton Cable India (P) Ltd., [1984] 2 S.C.C. 569 and Hind
Construction and Engineering Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen,
[1965] 1 L.L.J. 462 referred to.
(c) A checker on behalf of the management or employer
is not a supervisor. [993E]
In the instant case, the nature of duties performed by
Respondent No. 1 were mainly reporting and checking up on
behalf of the management. A reporter or a checking clerk is
not a supervisor. The respondent does not appear to be doing
any kind of supervisory work. He was undoubtedly checking up
on behalf of the employer but he had no independent right or
authority to take decision and his decision did not bind the
company. The Division Bench came to the conclusion that the
respondent was a ‘workman’ within the meaning of section
2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 taking into
consideration the evidence recorded before the Labour Court
that the respondent is a workman and not a supervisor. That
conclusion on the appreciation of evidence cannot be
interfered with under Article 136 of the Constitution.
[993A-C]
2.(a) In order to raise the question of repugnancy two
conditions must be fulfilled. The State law and the Union
law must operate in the same field and one must be repugnant
or inconsistent with the other. These are two cumulative
conditions which are required to be fulfilled. [995E]
Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others,
[1959] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 8 and M/s. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals
Ltd. and others v. State of Bihar and others, [1983] 4
S.C.C. 45 at page 87 referred to.
(b) In this case there is a good deal of justification
to hold that these laws, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
and the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishments Act,
1985 tread on the same field and both laws deal with the
rights of a dismissed workman or employee. But these two
laws are not inconsistent or repugnant to each other. The
basic test of repugnancy is that if one prevails the other
cannot prevail. That is not the position in this case.
[995F-G]
988
(c) The application under section 28A of the Rajasthan
Act was dismissed not on merits but on limitation. There is
a period of limitation provided under the Rajasthan Act and
it may be extended for reasonable cause. But there is no
period of limitation as such provided under the Industrial
Disputes Act. Therefore, that will be curtailment of the
rights of the workmen or employees under the Industrial
Disputes Act. In that situation section 37 declares that law
should not be construed to curtail any of the rights of the
workmen. [996A-B]
(d) Social Welfare and labour welfare broadens from
legislation to legislation in India. It will be a well
settled principle of interpretation to proceed on that
assumption and section 37 of the Rajasthan Act must be so
construed. In no way the Rajasthan Act could be construed to
curtail the rights of the workman to seek any relief or to
go in for adjudication in case of the termination of the
employment. [996C]
(e) There is, therefore, no conflict between the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Rajasthan Shops and
Commercial Establishments Act, 1985 and there is no question
of repugnancy. These two Acts are supplemental to each
other. [994G-H; 996D]
3. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that
Respondent No. 1 was a ‘workman’ and in granting relief on
that basis. [996E]
&
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.3521-
3523 of 1987.
From the Judgment and order dated 17.10. 1986 of the
Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Civil Special (Writ) Appeals
Nos. 27,28 of 1983 and 224 of 1982.
Dr. Shankar Ghosh, N.C. Shah and Praveen Kumar for the
Appellant.
Tapas Ray, S.K. Jain, Mrs. P.Jain and S. Atreya for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. After hearing parties and after
considering the relevant documents, additional as well as
original, we grant leave to appeal in these matters. The
appeals are disposed of by the judgment herein.
989
Since prior to Ist of January, 1978 the respondent No.
1 Shri Kishan Bhageria was working under the appellant-
company as an Internal Auditor on a monthly salary of
Rs.1186.60 per month. The appellant alleged that the
respondent started absenting himself from 28.1.78 and as
such was not entitled to any salary for any period beyond
28.1.78 The said respondent was thereafter placed under
suspension on 30th of March, 1978. The respondent on 4th of
May, 1978 filed an application under section 33C(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called ‘the Act’)
claiming the total sum of Rs.4,746.40 on account of salary
from Ist of January, 1978 to 30th of April, 1978 at the rate
of Rs.11,86.60 per month. The appellant company objected.
The main ground of objections was that the respondent was
not a workman. On or about 9th of November, 1978 there was
an order dismissing the respondent from service. The
respondent thereafter on 2nd of January, 1979 filed an
application under section 28A of the Rajasthan Shops &
Establishments Act, 1958 (hereinafter called ‘the Rajasthan
Act’). The said application was dismissed on 31st of July
1979 on the ground of limitation. The Labour Court on 2nd of
August, 1979 held that the respondent was doing clerical
duties and as such was a workman under the Act and he was
entitled to Rs.2,060 as salary from 1.1.78 to 9.3.78. The
appellant filed Writ Petition No. 765 of 1979 in the
Rajasthan High Court against the order of the Labour Court
allowing the said salary. The respondent also filed another
writ petition being writ petition No. 1091 of 1979 for
declaration that he was entitled to receive Rs.2,066.98 as
salary from 9.3.78 to 30.4.78. There was thereafter a
reference under section 10 of the Act on 8.8.80 arising out
of the dismissal of the respondent. The appellant filed
another writ petition being Writ Petition No. 1623 of 1980
challenging the order of reference. All these aforesaid writ
petitions were disposed of by the learned Single Judge of
the Rajasthan High Court on 16.3.82 holding that the
respondent was not a workman. The other contentions urged
before the leaned Single Judge were not considered by the
Division Bench in the view it took later on. On 17th of
October, 1986 the Division Bench reversed the judgment of
the learned Single Judge and held that the respondent was a
workman. Two writ petitions of the appellant were dismissed
and the writ petition of the respondent was allowed.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders the appellant has come up
in these appeals before this Court.
The main question which requires consideration in these
appeals is whether the respondent was a workman or not. For
the determination of this question it is necessary to refer
to section 2(s) of the Act which defines “workman” and
states that it means any person emp-
990
loyed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled,
technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for
hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express
or implied, and includes any such person who has been
dismissed discharged or retrenched in connection with or as
a consequence of any dispute. But sub-clause (iii) does not
include any person who is employed mainly in a managerial or
administrative capacity and sub-clause (iv) does not include
any person who being employed in a supervisory capacity
draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per
month or duties attached to the office or by reason of the
powers vested in him, discharges functions mainly of a
managerial nature. In view of the said definition, we are
concerned here with the question whether the respondent was
a workman as not being employed in any supervisory capacity.
There is no controversy that the said respondent is not
employed in any managerial or administrative capacity.
In this case before we deal with the facts and the
relevant authorities of this Court it may be appropriate to
refer to a decision of P.B. Mukharji, J. Of the Calcutta
High Court as the learned Chief Justice then was in Mcleod
and Co. v. Sixth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and
others, A.I.R. 1958 Calcutta 273. There the learned Judge
observed that whether a person was a workman within the
definition of the Industrial Disputes Act was the very
foundation of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal.
The Court further observed that in order to determine the
categories of service indicated by the use of different
words like “supervisory”, “managerial”, “administrative”, it
was necessary not to import the notions of one into the
interpretation of the other. The words such as supervisory,
managerial and administrative are advisedly loose
expressions with no rigid frontiers and too much subtlety
should not be used in trying to precisely define where
supervision ends and management begins or administration
starts. For that would be theoretical and not practical. It
has to be broadly interpreted from a common sense point of
view where tests will be simple both in theory and in their
application. The learned Judge further observed that a
supervisor need not be a manager or an administrator and a
supervisor can be a workman so long as he did not exceed the
monetary limitation indicated in the section and a
supervisor irrespective of his salary is not a workman who
has to discharge functions mainly of managerial nature by
reasons of the duties attached to his office or of the
powers vested in him. In that case the learned Judge further
held that a person in charge of a Department could not
ordinarily be a clerk even though he may not have power to
take disciplinary action or even though he may have another
superior
991
officer above him. It was further observed that distribution
of work may easily be the work of a manager or an
administrator but “checking” the work so distributed or
“keeping an eye” over it is certainly supervision. It is
reiterated that a manager or administrator’s work may easily
include supervision but that does not mean that supervision
is the only function of a manager or an administrator.
Bearing in mind the aforesaid indication, it would be
necessary to discuss some decisions of this Court. In All
India Reserve Bank Employees Association v. Reserve Bank of
India, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 25, this Court dealing with certain
types of employees observed “These employees distribute
work, detect faults, report for penalty, make arrangements
for filling vacancies, to mention only a few of the duties
which are supervisory and not merely clerical.” At page 46
of the report Hidayatullah, J. as the learned Chief Justice
then was observed that the work in a Bank involved layer
upon layer of checkers and checking is hardly supervision
but where there is a power of assigning duties and
distribution of work there is supervision, (emphasis
supplied). There the Court referred to a previous decision
in Llyods Bank Ltd. v. Pannalal Gupta, [1961] 1 L.L.J. 18,
where the finding of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was
reversed because the legal inference from proved facts was
wrongly drawn and it was reiterated that before a clerk
could claim a special allowance payable to a supervisor, he
must prove that he supervises the work of some others who
are in a sense below him. It was pointed out by
Hidayatullah, J. that mere checking of the work of others is
not enough because this checking was a part of accounting
and not of supervision and the work done in the audit
department of a bank was not supervision. (emphasis
supplied).
In Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distribution Co. Of
India. v. Burmah Shell Management Staff Association & Ors.,
[1971] 2 S.C.R. 758, this Court observed that a workman must
be held to be employed to do that work which is the main
work he is required to do, even though he may be
incidentally doing other types of work. Therefore, in
determining which of the employees in the various categories
are covered by the definition of ‘workman’ one has to see
what is the main or substantial work which he is employed to
do. In The Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. R.S. Bhatia
(dead) through Lrs., [1975] 4 S.C.C. 696 it was held that
the accountant was supposed to sign the salary bills of the
staff even while performing the duties of a clerk. That did
not make the respondent employed in a managerial or
administrative capacity. The workman was, therefore, in that
context rightly held as a clerk.
992
In P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration & Ors., [1983]
3 S.C.R. 949 the question whether a person was performing
supervisory or managerial work was the question of fact to
be decided bearing in mind the correct principle. The
principle therefore is, one must look into the main work and
that must be found out from the main duties. A supervisor
was one who could bind the company to take some kind of
decision on behalf of the company. One who was reporting
merely as to the affairs of the company and making
assessment for the purpose of reporting was not a
supervisor. See in this connection Black’s Law Dictionary,
Special Deluxe, Fifth Edition. At page 1290, “Supervisor”
has been described, inter alia, as follows:
“In a broad sense, one having authority over
others, to superintend and direct.
The term ‘supervisor’ means any individual having
authority, in the interest of the employer, to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to
adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if in connection with the
foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of
a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires
the use of independent judgment.”
Reference may be made to the observations of this Court
in Ved Prakash Gupta v. M/s. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd.,
[1984] 2 S.C.C. 569. There on facts a Security Inspector was
held to be a workman. At page 575 of the report this Court
referred to the decision in Llyods Bank Ltd. v. Panna Lal
Gupta, (supra) and also the observations of this Court in
Hind Construction and Engineering Company Ltd. v. Their
Workmen, [1965] 1 L.L.J. 462. In that case the nature of the
duties performed by the appellant showed that the
substantial part of the work of the appellant consisted of
looking after the security of the factory and its property
by deputing the watchmen working under him to work at the
factory gate or sending them to watch-towers or around the
factory or to accompany visitors to the factory and making
entries in the visitors’ register as regards the visitors
and in the concerned registers as regards materials entering
into or going out of the premises of the factory. There it
was found that he had no power to appoint.
In the instant case the evidence have been summarised
by the Division Bench. Reference may be made to pages 65,
73, 80, 84 to 94,
993
95, 96 and 97 of the Paper Book which indicate the nature of
duties performed by the respondent No. 1 herein. His duties
were mainly, reporting and checking up on behalf of the
management. A reporter or a checking clerk is not a
supervisor. The respondent herein does not appear to us
doing any kind of supervisory work. He was undoubtedly
checking up on behalf of the employer but he had no
independent right or authority to take decision and his
decision did not bind the company. In that view of the
matter keeping the correct principle of law in mind the
Division Bench has come to the conclusion taking into
consideration the evidence recorded before the Labour Court
that the respondent is a workman and not a supervisor. That
conclusion arrived at in the manner indicated above cannot,
in our opinion, be interfered with under Article 136 of the
Constitution. It is not necessary for our present purpose to
set out in extenso the evidence on record as discussed by
the Division Bench. Our attention was, however, drawn by the
counsel for the respondent to certain correspondence, for
instance the letter at page 65 of the paper book bearing the
date 14th of May, 1976 where the respondent reported that
certain materials were lying in stores deptt. in absence of
any decision. It was further reiterated that on inspection
of the pieces that those pieces were found cracked.
Similarly, our attention was drawn to several other letters
and we have perused these letters. We are of the opinion
that the Division Bench was right that these letters only
indicated that the report was being made of the checking
done by the respondent. A checker on behalf of the
management or employer is not a supervisor.
In the aforesaid view of the matter the conclusion of
the Division Bench that respondent No. 1 is a workman has to
be sustained. We do so accordingly.
The next question that arises in this case is whether
Act would apply or the Rajasthan Act would apply. In this
connection section 28A of the Rajasthan Act is material. It
enjoins that no employer shall dismiss or discharge from his
employment any employee who has been in such employment
continuously for a period of not less than 6 months except
for a reasonable cause and after giving such employee at
least one month’s prior notice or on paying him one month’s
wages in lieu of such notice. Sub-section (2) of section 28A
gives every employee, so dismissed or discharged, right to
make a complaint in writing in the prescribed manner to a
prescribed authority within 30 days of the receipt of the
order of dismissal or discharge. Sub-section (3) of section
28A provides that the prescribed authority shall cause a
notice to be served on the employer relating to the said
complaint, record
994
briefly the evidence produced by the parties, hear them and
make such enquiry as it might consider necessary and
thereafter pass orders in writing giving reasons therefor.
Section 37 of the Rajasthan Act reads as follows:
“37. Saving of certain rights and privileges.-
Nothing in this Act shall affect any rights or
privileges which an employee in any establishment
is entitled to on the date this Act comes into
force under any other law, contract, custom or
usage applicable to such establishment or any
award, settlement or agreement binding on the
employer and the employee in such establishment,
if such rights or privileges are more favourable
to him than those to which he would be entitled
under this Act.”
It has to be borne in mind that section 2A of the Act
was amended to permit individual workman to ask for a
reference in the case of individual dispute. This amendment
was assented to by the President on 1st of December, 1965.
The Rajasthan Act received the assent of the President on
14th of July, 1958. On 8th March, 1972 Chapter 6A including
section 28A was inserted in the Rajasthan Act. Therefore the
material provision of the Rajasthan Act is the subsequent
law. Under Article 254(2) of the Constitution if there was
any law by the State which had been reserved for the assent
of the President and has received the assent of the
President, the State law would prevail in that State even if
there is an earlier law by the Parliament on a subject in
the Concurrent List. It appears that both of these Acts
tread the same field and if there was any conflict with each
other, then section 28A of Rajasthan Act would apply being a
later law. We find, however, that there is no conflict. The
learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court in Poonam
Talkies, Dausa v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court,
Jaipur, (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1206/85 decided on
9.6.1986) so. That decision has been upheld by the Division
Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Writ Appeal No. 231/86.
The Division Bench of the High Court in the instant appeal
relying on the said decision held that there was no scope
for any repugnancy. It appears to us that it cannot be said
that these two Acts do not tread the same field. Both these
Acts deal with the rights of the workman or employee to get
redressal and damages in case of dismissal or discharge, but
there is no repugnancy because there is no conflict between
these two Acts, in pith and substance. There is no
inconsistency between these two acts. These two Acts, in our
opinion, are supplemental to each other.
995
In Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others,
[1959] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 8, Subba Rao, J., as the learned
Chief Justice then was observed that the result of the
authorities indicated was as follows:
“Nicholas in his Australian Constitution, 2nd
Edition, p. 303, refers to three tests of
inconsistency or repugnancy:
1. There may be inconsistency in the actual
terms of the competing statutes;
2. Though there may be no direct conflict,
a State law may be inoperative because
the Commonwealth Code is intended to be
a complete exhaustive code; and
3. Even in the absence of intention, a
conflict may arise when both State and
Commonwealth seek to exercise their
powers over the same subject matter.”
Quoting the aforesaid observations, this Court in M/s.
Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and others v. State of Bihar
and others, [1983] 4 S.C.C. 45 at page 87 where A.P. Sen, J.
exhaustively dealt with the principles of repugnancy and
observed that one of the occasions where inconsistency or
repugnancy arose was when on the same subject matter, one
law would be repugnant to the other. Therefore, in order to
raise a question of repugnancy two conditions must be
fulfilled. The State law and the Union law must operate on
the same field and one must be repugnant or inconsistent
with the other. These are two conditions which are required
to be fulfilled. These are cumulative conditions. Therefore,
these laws must tread on the same field and these must be
repugnant or inconsistent with each other. In our opinion,
in this case there is a good deal of justification to hold
that these laws, the Industrial Disputes Act and the
Rajasthan Act tread on the same field and both laws deal
with the rights of dismissed workman or employee. But these
two laws are not inconsistent or repugnant to each other.
The basic test of repugnancy is that if one prevails the
other cannot prevail. That is not the position in this case.
Learned counsel on behalf of the appellant, however,
contended that in this case, there had been an application
as indicated above under section 28A of the Rajasthan Act
and which was dismissed on ground of limitation. Sree
Shankar Ghosh tried to submit that there would be
inconsistency or repugnancy between the two decisions, one
given on limitation and the other if any
996
relief is given under the Act. We are unable to accept this
position, because the application under Section 28A of the
Rajasthan Act was dismissed not on merit but on limitation.
There is a period of limitation provided under the Rajasthan
Act of six months and it may be extended for reasonable
cause. But there is no period of limitation provided under
the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, that will be
curtailment of the rights of the workmen or employees under
the Industrial Disputes Act. In the situation section 37
declares that law should not be construed to curtail any of
the rights of the workmen. As Poet Tennyson observed-
“freedom broadens from precedent to precedent” so also it is
correct to state that social welfare and labour welfare
broadens from legislation to legislation in India. It will
be a well-settled principle of interpretation to proceed on
that assumption and section 37 of the Rajasthan Act must be
so construed. Therefore in no way the Rajasthan Act could be
construed to curtail the rights of the workman to seek any
relief or to go in for an adjudication in case of the
termination of the employment. If that is the position in
view of the provisions 6 months’ time in section 28A of the
Rajasthan Act has to be ignored and that cannot have any
binding effect inasmuch as it curtails the rights of the
workman under the Industrial Disputes Act and that Act must
prevail. In the premises, there is no conflict between the
two Acts and there is no question of repugnancy.
The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that
the respondent was workman and in granting relief on that
basis. Before we conclude we note that our attention was
drawn to certain observations of this Court that
interference by the High Court in these matters at the
initial stage protracts adjudication and defeats justice.
Reference was made to certain observations in P. Maheshwari
v. Delhi Admn. & Ors., (supra). But as mentioned
hereinbefore in this case, the interference was made by the
High Court not at the initial stage.
In the premises, we are of the opinion that the High
Court was right in the view it took. These appeals,
therefore, fail and are accordingly dismissed. There will,
however, be no order as to costs. The reference before the
Tribunal should proceed as expeditiously as possible.
N.V.K. Appeals dismissed.
997