ORDER
S.P. Srivastava, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, Gwalior, rejecting the application of the defendant-applicant praying for the rejection of the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has now approached this Court by means of the present revision under section 23-E of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, seeking redress praying for the reversal of the impugned order.
2. I have heard the learned counsel for the applicant as well as learned counsel representing the respondents-landlords and have also carefully perused the record.
3. The facts in brief, shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this case lie in a narrow compass. An application under section 23-A of the aforesaid Act which is to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Act as if it was a plaint, was filed by the plaintiff-landlord, Dwarika Prasad Singhal seeking eviction of the defendant, National Insurance Company Ltd. from the accommodation in dispute, which had been let out to it, on the grounds contemplated under section 23-A(b) of the aforesaid Act to the effect that the accommodation was “bona fide” required by the landlord for the purpose of starting his business. The plaintiff-applicant claimed the benefits made available under section 23-J of the Act which secured a right to the specified landlords enumerated therein to maintain such an application and as provided under section 23-D of the Act the Rent Controlling Authority was required to decide the same as far as may be within six months of the order of the grant of leave to the tenant to contest the application following as far as practicable the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence under the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887, requiring further the said Authority to proceed as far as possible with the hearing of the application from day to day.
4. In the aforesaid application filed by Dwarika Prasad Singhal, it had been asserted that the house of which the accommodation in dispute formed part was registered in the name of his wife, Smt. Kiran Singhal, who had died on 2-3-1996, whereupon the applicant had become its owner. The applicant had retired from Government service on 31-12-1996 and wanted to establish his own business in cloth in the accommodation in dispute and the need for the same was genuine and bona fide. The aforesaid application was filed on 2-1-1997.
5. During the pendency of the suit, the defendant-tenant filed an application that since the plaintiff-applicant had filed the application under section 23-A of the aforesaid Act within one year of the date of death of Smt. Kiran Singhal, the previous owner-landlord, claiming to have acquired the ownership of the premises in dispute, as her successor-in-interest, his application filed on 2-1-1997 was liable to be dismissed being premature and not maintainable; in view of the statutory restriction envisaged under the proviso to section 23-A of the Act.
6. The Rent Controlling Authority placing reliance upon a decision of this Court in the case of Indu Singh v. Leelawati, 1988 MPLJ 682 = 1988 (II) RCJ 284 held that since the applicant-landlord had acquired the ownership by way of inheritance the proviso relied upon by the defendant-tenant could not be taken to have been attracted, rejected the application filed by the defendant.
7. Learned counsel for the defendant-applicant has strenuously contended that on the own-showing of the landlord he had acquired the interest in the accommodation only on 2-3-1996 and as such since this acquisition of interest had to the taken under the law to be an acquisition of interest by transfer, the application for eviction was clearly not maintainable as not only the cause of action was deficient but the Rent Controlling Authority had no jurisdiction to proceed with it as the same was not entertainable and had no option left but to dismiss or reject the same as premature.
8. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent-landlord, however, on the other hand, has urged that the plaintiff in the circumstances of the case could not be deemed to have acquired the interest in the accommodation in dispute by transfer. The contention is that the transfer contemplated under the proviso taking into account the Legislative policy underlying the Act was restricted to a transfer inter-vivos and not any other type of transfer, such as by inheritance or devolution or testamentary succession. It has further been contented that in any view of the matter since a period of one year had already elapsed from the date of acquisition, there was no impediment in proceeding with the application, as by the date of the order disposing of the application, the deficiency in the cause of action, if any, could not be taken to have been continuing and once the deficiency stood removed by lapse of time the Rent Controlling Authority could, in such a situation, pass an order of eviction on the finding that the conditions contemplated under section 23-A(b) read with section 23-J and 23-D(3) of the aforesaid Act stood satisfied by the date of the order, taking notice of the subsequent events, if any, which had taken place during the pendency of the application.
9. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and I have perused the relevant provisions of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961.
10. The proviso to section 23-A of Chapter III-A of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act is to the following effect:-
“Provided that where a person who is a landlord has acquired any accommodation or any interest therein by transfer, no application for eviction of tenant of such accommodation shall be maintainable at the instance of such person unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of such acquisition.”
A provision to the similar effect is contained in section 12(4) of the Act, which reads as under :-
“(4) Where a landlord has acquired any accommodation by transfer, no suit for the eviction of tenant shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) on the ground specified in clause (e) or clause (f) thereof, unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of the acquisition.”
Clauses (e) and (f) referred to hereinabove are to the following effect :-
“(e) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned;”
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“(f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or of any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonable suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned;
11. Section 23-A of Act was brought on the Statute Book vide the M. P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Act, 1983 while section 12(4) was inserted by M. P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Act, 1985.
12. It may be noticed that in determining either of the general object of the legislature or the meaning of its language in any particular passage, it is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reasons, justice and legal principles, should in all cases of doubtful significance be presumed to be true one. The Apex Court in its decision in the case of Administrator, Municipal Corporation v. Dattatraya Dahankar reported in 1991(4) Judgment Today page 500, the mechanical approach to construction is altogether out of step with the modern positive approach. The modern positive approach is to have a purposeful construction i.e. to effectuate the object and the purpose of the Act.
13. In an earlier decision the Apex Court in the case of Manmohan Das reported in 1967(1) SCR 836 had pointed out that the provisions of statute must be construed in accordance with language used therein unless there are compelling reasons where the literal construction would reduce the Act to absurdity or prevent the manifest legislative purpose from being carried out.
14. The Rent Controlling Acts are necessary social measures for protection of tenants but these Acts have tried to balance the equity providing for a just balance being struck between the competing interests of the landlord and tenant.
15. A provision containing a similar stringent restriction, as contemplated under the proviso to section 23-A, was brought into effect in West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act in the year 1969. This provision was to the following effect:-
“13(3A) Where a landlord has acquired his interest in the premises acquired his interest in the premises by transfer, no suit for recovery of possession of the premises on any of the grounds mentioned in Clause (f) or Clause (ff) of sub-section (1) shall be instituted by the landlord before the expiration of a period of three years from the date of his acquisition of such interest;”
Clause (ff) referred to in section 13 (3A) was to the same effect as provided under section 12(1)(e) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act.
16. The Apex Court in its decision in the case of B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan, AIR 1975 SC 1146, had pointed out that the Legislature was faced with a fresh danger in the shape of ingenious transfer of ownership of buildings by indigenous but indigent landlords and the transferees resorting to eviction on a large scale equipped as they were with better financial muscles and motivated as they were by hope of speculative returns from their investments on eviction and by this legislation the new class of transferee landlords was subjected to a stringent trammel viz., that they should not sue for eviction within three years of the date of transfer.
17. Obviously, the underlying policy and object of the amended provision was to give more protection to the tenants against eviction and the classification of landlords into owner-landlord and transferee-landlord was found to be based upon a rational and intelligible differentia. The Apex Court in its aforesaid decision held that the classification of landlords into two classes of owner-landlords and transferee-landlords and the imposition of an embargo on the latter minacious class against bringing eviction suits within three years of purchase passed the dual tests of reasonable classification and the differentia having a rational nexus with the statutory object. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly indicated that the suits instituted within the prohibited period must be straightaway dismissed, their institution being invalid, was not contemplated observing that “We do not think that this consequence is inevitable.”
18. The Apex Court in its aforesaid decision has further observed – “that as far as possible courts must avoid multiplicity of litigation. Any interpretation of a statute which will obviate purposeless proliferation of litigation, without whittling down the effectiveness of the protection for the parties sought to be helped by the legislation, should be preferred to any literal, pedantic, legalistic or technically correct alternative.” The Apex Court clearly indicated by this construction we do no violence to language but, on the other hand, promote public justice and social gain, without in the least imperiling the protection conferred by the amending Act.
19. The implications arising under the ratio of the decision in the case of B. Banerjee (supra) and the observations made therein, were considered by this Court in the case of Munshi Khan v. Maya Devi reported in 1993 MPLJ 933 = 1993 JLJ 136, emphasising that the imperative underlying section 12(4) is only that on the date of making the “order” of eviction, Court must be satisfied that a transferee-landlord has completed one year’s waiting period contemplated under the aforesaid provision. The learned Single Judge of this Court in his aforesaid decision drew support from the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of B. Banerjee (supra) and held that the provision was meant to “disenchant speculative purchases and provide occupants time to seek alternative housing” and further “institution of a fresh suit was ruled out to pre-empt “litigative waste” and no statutory sanction was also found for such a course. Support was also drawn from the observations made by the Apex Court’s decision in P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders reported in AIR 1975 SC 1409, wherein it was indicated that where cause of action is deficient, but later events have made up the deficiency, the Court may, in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation, permit the amendment and continue the proceeding provided no prejudice is caused to the other side.”
20. It may further be noticed that this Court in its decision in the case of Nisar Ahmed Qureshi v. Smt. Hazra Begam reported in 1997 (2) MPLJ 17, had clarified that a narrow view is preferable noticing that in case the provision contained in section 12(4) of the Act is given a wide interpretation in that event death of a landlord during the pendency of a trial would result in abatement of the suit and the legal representatives would only be entitled to sue after a year. Similarly, it was observed that a widow could not get the property for a year after the death of her husband under section 23-A(a) or 23-A(b) of the Act, which will nullify the object of section 23-A of the Act to give back the property to most needy persons within a maximum period of six months. It was further noticed that a newly widowed woman shall have to wait for one and half years, making the statute beneficial to the tenant even though the section 23-A of the Act was created for the benefit of the landlord. Learned Single Judge in the aforesaid case followed the decision of another Single Bench in the case of Indusingh v. Smt. Leelawati, 1988 MPLJ 682 wherein it was held that the passing of property on account of death of a person could not be a ‘transfer’ as contemplated under the proviso.
21. It seems to me that the expression, “acquired any accommodation or any interest therein by transfer” as used in the proviso in question, contemplates to be within its ambit only those transfers which are inter-vivos that is between living persons and not of any other category. The benefit secured under the proviso can, therefore, extend only in favour of those tenants where their landlord has acquired an interest in the accommodation under their tenancy by purchase etc., the transfer being a transfer inter-vivos. An acquisition of an interest on account of inheritance, devolution or testamentary succession is not contemplated under the proviso and falls outside its ambit. Considering the object sought to be served and the legislative intent underlying the amended provisions the expression ‘transfer’ referred to hereinabove, has to be given a narrow interpretation taking into consideration the observations of the Apex Court in its decision, referred to hereinabove. If the matter is viewed from this angle, that being the only view, I find absolutely no difficulty, whatsoever, in upholding the impugned order. It must be emphasised, as even noticed in its decision of the Apex Court in the case of A Banerjee (supra) that we cannot be ritualistic in insisting that a return of the plaint and a representation thereof is the sacred requirement of the law.
22. Learned counsel for the defendant-applicant has strenuously urged that a learned Single Judge of this Court in his decision in the case of Pushkar Sharma v. Smt. Sudha Mishra, reported in 1996 JLJ 524, has held that the acquisition of right, title and interest contemplated under section 12(4) of the Act, in any case, is an acquisition and “it cannot be gainsaid that the acquisition can be by two modes i.e. by way of transfer under Transfer of Property Act and by way of succession under Indian Succession Act. In either of the case, it was held, that the title passes to the transferee and, therefore, even such a transfer effected by a will was a transfer for the purpose of section 12(4) of the Act, clarifying that even if the plaintiff acquired through succession then too the bar of section 12(4) was applicable and the decree passed on the ground of bona fide requirement has to be set aside.
23. On the strength of the aforesaid observations of the learned Single Judge, it is urged that in the present case where acquisition of interest is claimed on the basis of succession, the same result must follow, and consequently the impugned order deserves to be set aside.
24. The aforesaid submission in essence is to the effect that the previous decision in the case of Pushkar Sharma (supra) had the effect of creating an unsurpassable hurdle as the ratio of that decision stood attracted in the present case also and there could be no escape from that previous decision without violence to the very valuable doctrine of stare decisis and further the aforesaid decision has to be followed till upset.
25. What, however, I find is that in the circumstances which have been referred to hereinabove, the doctrine at per incuriam applies as in the case of Pushkar Sharma (supra) the Court has reached a decision in the absence of knowledge of a decision binding on it and had the Court had this material, it must have reached a contrary decision. This is per incuriam. This doctrine does not extend to a case where if a different argument had been placed before a Court or a different material had been placed before it, it might have reached a different conclusion. In the decision in the case of Pushkar Sharma (supra) the binding effect of the decisions of the Apex Court as well as the observations made therein and the earlier decisions of this Court have not been taken into notice at all. This decision, is, therefore, clearly per incuriam and the defendant tenant cannot derive any advantage out of the same.
26. In view of my conclusions indicated hereinabove no justifiable ground has been made out for any interference by this Court in the impugned order while exercising the jurisdiction envisaged under section 23-E of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act.
27. This revision is clearly devoid of merits and deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.
28. There shall be, however, no order as to costs.