JUDGMENT
B.L. Hansaria, C.J.
1. An application was filed on 10.9.1986 by respondent No. 1 under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short, ‘the Act’) before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Cuttack praying for awarding a sum of Rs. 35,000/- as compensation for the damage caused to her tractor due to the negligent driving of truck No. OSC 8798 belonging to respondent No. 2 which was insured with the appellant. The application has come to be allowed by awarding compensation as prayed for along with interest and costs as indicated in the award. The legality of the same has been assailed in this appeal.
2. The ground of challenge is that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition. This submission has been advanced because of the following provision in Section 110(1) of the Act as it had stood after amendment brought about by Act 56 of 1969 which became effective from 2.3.1970:
110. Claims Tribunals.-(1) A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereinafter referred to as ‘Claims Tribunals’) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both:
Provided that where such claim includes a claim for compensation in respect of damage to property exceeding rupees two thousand, the claimant may, at his option, refer the claim to a civil court for adjudication and where a reference is so made, the Claims Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to such claim.
Explanation.-
XXX XXX XXX
3. The submission of Mr. Roy is that as the damage claimed exceeded Rs. 2,000/-, the proper forum to claim compensation was the civil court and not the Claims Tribunal. Mr. Mohanty appearing for respondent No. 1 does not accept this position and contends that the aforesaid proviso has no application to the facts of the present case and even if it were to apply, the same has given an option to the claimant to choose his forum; and as in the present case, respondent No. 1 opted to get her claim adjudicated by the Tribunal, it cannot be said that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the same.
4. The language of the proviso being what it is, the submission of Mr. Mohanty has to be accepted. It has been held by a number of High Courts of the country including this Court that the proviso has given an option to the claimant to choose the forum-either the civil court or the Claims Tribunal-where he/she would like his/her case to be adjudicated; and so, if the claimant does not opt to get his/her case referred to the civil court, the Claims Tribunal would be competent and be within its jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. Indeed, if the claimant does not exercise option, the Tribunal shall have to adjudicate the dispute.
5. The aforesaid was the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Central Road Transport Corporation v. Orissa State Commercial Transport Corporation AIR 1985 Orissa 256 and by a learned single Judge in G. Krishna Rao v. Chalasani Pooran Chandra Rao 1988 ACJ 194 (Orissa). This was also the view taken by a learned single Judge of the Gauhati High Court in State of Assam v. Sunil Kumar Dey 1991 ACJ 382 (Gauhati) and in Assam State Transport Corporation v. Kamurun Nessa Mazumdar 1991 ACJ 464 (Gauhati), so also by a learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in C.H. Jagdeshwar v. S. Rajaiah 1986 ACJ 740 (AP) and Kishori v. Chairman, Tribal Service Co-operative Society Ltd. 1988 ACJ 636 (MP), respectively. A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Rajkumar v. Mahendra Singh 1985 ACJ 103 (MP), has taken the same view. May we state that in all these cases, the sum awarded by the Tribunal towards damage to property was more than Rs. 2,000/-.
6. As against the unified view taken by different High Courts of the country that the aforesaid proviso does not oust the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal even if the damage to the property be more than Rs. 2,000/- unless an option in this regard is exercised by the claimant. Mr. Roy has not been able to lay his hand on any decision taken by any High Court of the country taking a contrary view. All that the learned Counsel contends is that if a person is allowed to get his claim for compensation for damage to property, even in those cases where it exceeds Rs. 2,000/-, adjudicated by the Claims Tribunal, the proviso would be rendered nugatory, which must have been inserted with some purpose. As to this, the submission of Mr. Mohantgy is that after Section 110-A was amended by Act 47 of 1978 by inserting Clause (aa) in Sub-section (1) by allowing ‘the owner of the property’ to apply to the Claims Tribunal for compensation arising out of a motor accident, the proviso must be deemed to have become redundant.
7. Let us examine the soundness of the aforesaid contentions. As to the submission of Mr. Roy, we would first state that, according to us, the aforesaid proviso has really no application to a case of the present nature. We have said so, because the proviso applies where the claim ‘includes’ a claim for compensation for damage to property. This shows that a part of the claim as made includes claim for compensation for damage to property. If the words ‘such claim’ finding place in the proviso are read along with the substantive part of Sub-section (1), as it has to be because of the adjective ‘such’, it would become apparent that the claim, about which the proviso speaks, is a claim relating primarily to compensation in respect of death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. It may be stated at this stage that before Sub-section (1) had been amended in 1969, the claim for damage to any property of a third party arising out of a motor accident could not have been made before the Tribunal. It was by Act 56 of 1969 that this came to be permitted. By that amendment Act, Section 95 of the Act had also been amended by adding Sub-clause (d) in Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) by requiring a policy of insurance to cover damage to the property of a third party also, but limiting it to Rs. 2,000/-. This has been done, as would appear from the ‘notes on clauses’ appended to the relevant bill to avoid “inconvenience, delay or harassment to people of small means”. It is because of this thinking on the part of the legislature that the aforesaid proviso was inserted along with the aforesaid amendment in Section 95 to state that if the claim for compensation in respect of damage to property be more than Rs. 2,000/-, which would be a case not involving ‘people of small means’, an option was given to them to get it adjudicated by the civil court where the proceeding is time-consuming and costlier.
8. We may also state here that the proviso might have been inserted keeping in view the fact that where damage to property is involved and that too involving a large amount, complicated questions of fact may arise, which may require leading of various types of evidence to support the claim, which may delay the disposal of the case, in which a claim for compensation for death or bodily injury is also made, granting of which should not be delayed.
9. The object of Sections 110 to 110-F of the Act, which were introduced by Act 100 of 1956, is to supply a cheap and expeditious mode of enforcing the liability arising out of claims for compensation in respect of motor accidents, as stated in para 11 of Swarnalata v. National Transport India Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1974 Gau 31, to which our attention has been invited by Mr. Roy. In this connection, reference may also be made to what was stated by this Court in Central Road Transport Corporation’s case AIR 1985 Orissa 256, about the aforesaid proviso in para 8. The same was that this provision being a beneficial provision has been designedly made so that a claimant in respect of damage to property exceeding Rs. 2,000/- can get the claim adjudicated by the civil court on payment of much less court-fee than which is payable before the Tribunal. If these be the aims and objects of the legislature, a liberal approach in the matter is called for. If the remedy before the Tribunal be cheap and quick, a person should not be denied the same unless the language of the provision was unambiguous and mandatory in this regard. From what has been stated above, it would, however, appear that even where the proviso is attracted, which is not in the present case for the reason that the present claim was not a part of the composite claim including compensation for death or bodily injury but was a claim simpliciter for damage to property, it is left to the option of the claimant to choose his/her forum; it is only when the claimant opts for the civil court that that court would get the jurisdiction; otherwise it would be the Claims Tribunal which has to adjudicate the dispute.
10. While on this point, we may, however, state that the submission of Mr. Mohanty, that the aforesaid amendment to Section 110-A by Act 47 of 1978 inserting Sub-clause (aa) in that section as noted above has made the proviso redundant, has not appealed to us. It is because of the reason that that sub-clause was inserted as per the relevant ‘notes on clauses’ to indicate the category of persons who can prefer a claim for damages to property in an accident involving a motor vehicle and this was done by providing that an application for claiming such compensation can be filed by the owner of the property. This addition cannot be regarded as having made the proviso redundant.
11. Before closing this part of the discussion, it would be apposite to say a few words about the role of a proviso in a statute. The purposes of a proviso were stated as below in para 42 of S. Sundaram v. V.R. Pattabhiraman AIR 1985 SC 582:
(1) qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment;
(2) it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment in insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable;
(3) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the enactment and thus acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself; and
(4) it may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the enactment with the sole object of explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision.
Thus, whatever purpose a proviso may be called upon to serve in a statute, it is apparent that the same has to be read along with the main provision. The language of the proviso in the present case leads us to think that it is the first of the aforesaid four purposes which the present proviso was required to serve by way of qualifying certain provisions in the main enactment. We have taken this view because the words ‘such claim’ occur in the proviso which undoubtedly connect it with the main enactment and thereafter qualify or restrict the operation of the main provision to the extent mentioned in the proviso. It is, therefore, not a case where the proviso has entirely changed the very concept of the intendment of the enactment, as seems to be the submission of Mr. Roy.
12. This leaves for consideration a small submission advanced by Mr. Roy. The same is that as at the relevant time the statutory limit of the insurance company in respect of damage to property was Rs. 6,000/-, the appellant could not have been called upon to pay the entire sum of Rs. 35,000/- along with interest and costs. This submission may not detain us, for it is an admitted position in law that the insurance company can take upon itself by the contract of insurance a liability to indemnify the insured more than what is required by the statute, which liability cannot be cut down by any insurer. Mr. Roy fairly does not dispute this legal position. In the present case, the insurance policy on record would show that the insurer had limited its liability in respect of one claim arising out of one event to a sum of Rs. 50,000/- in case of damage to property caused by the use of motor vehicle. This appears clear from a combined reading of the provision in the policy relating to ‘Limits of liability’ and section II-1(ii), which deals with ‘Damage to property caused by the use of the motor vehicle’, limit of which has been specified as Rs. 50,000/- in the policy.
13. In view of all the above, the appeal has no merit and the same is, therefore, dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 2,000/-.
K.C. Jagadeb Roy, J.-
I agree.
