JUDGMENT
P. K. BAHRI, J. :
This is a suit seeking separation of the shares of the plaintiffs after due partition of the joint properties. Plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 are the sons of defendant No. 1 whereas plaintiff No. 4 and defendant No. 2 are the daughters of defendant No. 1 and plaintiff No. 3 is the wife of defendant No. 1. Plaintiffs 1, 2 & 4 were minors at the time of the filing of this suit and the suit was brought through their mother and next friend, plaintiff No. 3. The plaintiffs 1, 2 & 4 had since become major and had elected to continue this suit. Unfortunately Plaintiff No. 2 Maharajkumar Amanjit Singh died on 10th November, 1991. He had died intestate and his estate is inherited by his mother Plaintiff No. 3.
2. The case set up by the plaintiffs in brief is that the plaintiffs and defendants constituted Hindu undivided family (HUF) and all of them have been joint in estate and worship and up to August, 1976, they were also joint in mess. It is averred that defendant No. 1 had deserted the family since August, 1976 and has been separately residing in Gymkhana Club, New Delhi. In para 8 of the plaint, the details of the co-parcenary properties have been given which are (1) double-story residential house bearing municipal No. 90A, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi; (2) Commercial flat No. 101 on the first floor of the building known as Surya Kiran situated at Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi; (3) a residential house known as Villa Bouna vista and Cottage Villa Chalet, servant quarters, garages, etc., located in Village Chuharwal, Distt. Kapurthala; (4) a residential palace in Mussoorie known as Chateau St. Helens, Mussoorie; (5) all movables including furniture, carpets, etc., lying in Villa Kapurthala, Chateau St. Helens, Mussoorie and in property in Greater Kailash; (6) all jewellery and valuables lying in the safes of To khana inside the Villa, Kapurthala and in the safes of Chateau, Mussoorie; (7) jewellery lying in locked brief case kept in locker No. 325, Grindlays Bank, H Block, Connaught Place, New Delhi; (8) jewellery lying in Societies General, Boulevard Hussmann, Paris, France; and (9) shares in joint stock companies, share certificate of which are lying in safe custody with the First National City Bank, Fort, Bombay. It is also pleaded that if there are some other properties which are coparcenary properties, of which the plaintiffs for the present have no knowledge, if are found, they be also partitioned.
It is averred in the plaint that on or about 13th January, 1977, the defendant No. 1 had filed a suit in this Court against plaintiff No. 3, his wife, seeking a declaration that the two properties namely Villa at Kapurthala and the Chateau, Mussoorie with all the movables lying therein are his personal and exclusive properties and the property at Greater Kailash, B 90A is also owned exclusively by him acquired from his personal funds and the jewelries lying in different places in the said properties are also exclusively owned by him.
It is pleaded that defendant No. 1, who is the Karta of the HUF has set up wrongful claims to the coparcenary properties and has thus committed a gross misconduct which thus furnishes the cause of action for the plaintiffs to seek partition of the joint family/coparcenaries properties. It is averred that the grandfather of defendant No. 1 had succeeded to the Gaddi of Kapurthala as a male heir and the same constituted a valuable property right carrying privileges, title and monetary benefits and all the properties of the Gaddi to which the grandfather of the defendant No. 1 with the aid of any impartible estate became ancestral properties and are governed by law of inheritance of ancestral properties applicable to the Mitakshara School. It is further averred that the great grandfather of the plaintiff 1 & 2 had built Chateau St. Helens at Mussoorie with the aid of ancestral funds and the properties acquired with the aid of any impartible estate by the great-grandfather or the grandfather of plaintiffs 1 & 2 became HUF properties. It is contended that defendant No. 1 and his father had not acquired any property with the aid of any privy purse and even if they did so, the same also at any rate became HUF coparcenary properties as any property acquired with the aid of impartible estate would become joint property with all the incidents of coparcenary attached to it. It is pleaded that all the jewellery and pieces of art, etc., are ancestral properties. It was reiterated by the plaintiffs in the plaint that all the properties acquired by great grandfather of defendant No. 1 were acquired with the aid of ancestral funds and all the properties thus including the Gaddi and the income attached thereto became ancestral in the hands of grandfather of the plaintiffs 1 and 2 so also in the hands of defendant No. 1.
It is pleaded that some of the properties have been acquired by defendant No. 1 from the compensation received by defendant No. 1 in respect of the zamindari rights which were ancestral properties and also from the sale proceeds of the Palace at Kapurthala. In para 22 of the Plaint, the plaintiffs have given the details of some of the share scripts held in the name of plaintiff No. 3 and defendant No. 1 which are also claimed to be HUF properties.
3. The defendant No. 1 has contested the suit and has filed a lengthy written statement. He had taken the preliminary objections to the maintainability of the suit on the ground that plaintiff No. 3 had no locus standi to represent plaintiffs 1, 2 & 4 but that objection no longer survives inasmuch as the minors had become major and had elected to pursue the suit and even a statement was made by counsel for defendant No. 1 that defendant No. 1 did not dispute the right of the plaintiff No. 3 to act as next friend of minor plaintiffs in filing the present suit.
4. It is pleaded by defendant No. 1 that no partition could be claimed in respect of impartible estate and that the suit is also not maintainable because the properties in dispute had devolved on defendant No. 1 by virtue of two wills dt. 16th January, 1949 and 10th July, 1975 by his late grandfather and father respectively and defendant No. 1 is absolute and exclusive owner of the said properties which have been assessed for taxation purposes as his individual properties. It was also pleaded by defendant No. 1 that the will of his father and of his grandfather have been duly probated not only in India but also in England and France and those cannot be challenged.
A reference is made by defendant No. 1 to a plea taken by plaintiff No. 3 in the written statement in Suit No. 35/77 filed by defendant No. 1 that the alienation of the Gaddi and the properties comprising the Kapurthala State was also not permissible by the family custom. Then it is also averred by defendant No. 1 that plaintiff No. 3 had in that very written statement admitted that the Gaddi of Kapurthala and all the properties of the Maharaja for the time being used to devolve on his eldest son according to the rule of primogeniture by survivorship.
It is further pleaded that in the State of Punjab there existed no right of partition in respect of joint family estates during the life time of the father. Then pleas were taken that the suit has been brought by plaintiff No. 3 who has been instigated by some other persons namely Shri Anup Singh when in fact plaintiff No. 3 has no right in the properties. Defendant No. 1 claims that he being the only son of Maharaja Paramjit Singh of Kapurthala was recognised by the Government of India as a “Ruler” and he was recipient of a privy purse of Rs. 2,70,000 per annum, till the enactment of the Constitution (Twenty-Sixth) Amendment Act, 1971.
On page 9 of the written statement the defendant No. 1 has given the genealogical table of the family of defendant No. 1 starting from Baba Jassa Singh and defendant No. 1 has pleaded that among the ruling families of Punjab, succession in the Kapurthala family has always been according to the rule of primogeniture and the laws governing impartible estates and the properties of the Ruler of Kapurthala have always devolved in accordance with the rule of primogeniture as an impartible estate and the holder of the same holds such properties absolutely.
It is averred in the written statement that on 5th May, 1948, the rulers of various States including of Kapurthala had entered into a Covenant with the concurrence of the Government of India for the integration of their territories into one union by the name of Patiala and East Punjab States Union which also provided that the ruler of each Covenant state shall be entitled to full ownership, use and enjoyment of all the private properties (as distinct from State properties) belonging to him on the date his making over the administration of that State to the Raj Pramukh. It is pleaded that a declaration was made by the then Maharaja of Kapurthala with regard to his private properties which are shown in the circular dt. 20th April, 1949 and those properties are set out in Annexure 1 to the written statement. It is also pleaded that the said Covenant also provided that the privy purse which was to be given under the said Gaddi became impartible and the law of primogeniture applied to it and it was accepted by the Government of India.
It was also pleaded by defendant No. 1 that Maharaja Jagatjit Singh during his life time had gifted jewellery, valuables and money to defendant No. 1 from time to time and the details of the said gifts are shown in Annexure 2 to the written statement, details of the jewellery and valuables have been given which came to defendant No. 1 vide the wills of his grandfather and the father respectively and defendant No. 1 claims that they are his exclusive properties. The defendant No. 1 has pleaded that in law the property which devolves by principle of primogeniture vests in the holder thereof absolutely and exclusively.
It is pleaded by him that he had joined Indian Army as a Commissioned Officer in 1954 and he had been posted at various places and had been leaving his things to a large extent in the hands of plaintiff No. 3, his wife and, thus, plaintiff No. 3 had access to the safes and repositories located in the Villa, Kapurthala, Chateau, Mussoorie and house in Greater Kailash. Defendant No. 1 also pleaded that in view of his being employed on active duty with the army involving great risk to his life, he had included the name of plaintiff No. 3 his wife, as the mere namelender, while acquiring several movable and immovable properties although entire consideration for the same were paid by defendant No. 1 with his own money and those properties are detailed out in Annexure 4 to the written statement. It is pleaded that he had been also giving money from time to time to the plaintiff No. 3 for maintenance and plaintiff No. 3 had purchased various properties, which are detailed out in Annexure 5, from the said funds and plaintiff No. 3, in fact, has no right or title to the said properties. Defendant No. 1 has alleged that plaintiff No. 3 had removed certain jewellery No. 1 has alleged that plaintiff No. 3 had removed certain jewellery and items belonging to him and, thus, he had to file a Suit No. 35/77 for recovery of those jewellery items and for restraining the plaintiff No. 3 from entering the Villa, Kapurthala, the Chateau, Mussoorie and from removing the valuables lying in property in Greater Kailash.
It is pleaded that plaintiff No. 3 had caused a clout on the title of defendant No. 1 in respect of his exclusive properties. He has mentioned that he retired as Brigadier and he had been getting salary during salary during his employment with the army besides privy purse of Rs. 2,75,000 and he had acquired properties and assets as detailed out in Annexure VI from the said money. It is pleaded that the properties which have been acquired jointly in the name of plaintiff No. 3 exclusively belong to defendant No. 1 as plaintiff No. 3 had no source of her for acquiring belong to defendant No. 1 as plaintiff No. 3 had no source of her for acquiring any properties. Then he has given details of some of the lockers in para 22 which are in the name of plaintiff No. 3. He has mentioned in para 23 of the preliminary objection that the Villa properties stand in the name of plaintiff No. 1 & 2, although the entire consideration of the said property was paid by him and without prejudice to his contentions and for the limited purpose of the present suit, defendant No. 1 has no objection to the Villa property continuing to be in the names of Plaintiffs 1 & 2.
Coming to the pleas taken by the defendant No. 1 in parawise reply on merits, the defendant No. 1 has reiterated that the estate in dispute is an impartible estate and has devolved upon him by virtue of the wills and even otherwise the properties devolved on defendant No. 1 by virtue of the rule of owner of the same and the income derived from the said properties also belongs to him exclusively. He has mentioned that in respect of the impartible estate, a member of the family can only claim the right of survivorship and the impartible estate is not a coparcenary property and, thus, the suit for partition is not at all maintainable.
Defendant No. 1 has disclosed in para 7 of the written statement that out of the compensation received by him in 1975 for the U.P. Zamindari from the Government of U.P., he had made over some specific assets to the family and declared the said assets as joint family assets and effected partial partition in March, 1976 purely with a view to make suitable provision for the members of his family and also for obtaining the tax reliefs. He has mentioned that the said assets voluntarily given by defendant No. 1 to his family members are not subject matter of this suit.
Coming to the details of the properties mentioned in para 8 of the plaint defendant No. 1 has pleaded that the plot of land in respect of House No. B-90A, Greater, Kailash I, New Delhi was purchased and constructed by him from his own personal funds and the same is his self-acquired property and he had voluntarily arranged for the plaintiff No. 3 to have one seventh share in the said house. In respect of the commercial flat No. 101, Surya Kiran, he has mentioned that it was purchased by him from his own funds and the same is his exclusive and absolute property although he had joined the name of plaintiff No. 3, his wife, as co-vendee in the sale deed of the said flat. He has also mentioned that the entire consideration for the purchase of residential house known as Villa Bouna Vista and Cottage, Villa Chalet, came from his own sources and he is exclusive owner of the same. He has further pleaded that the residential property in Mussoorie known as Chateau St. Helens had vested in him exclusively in 1975 upon the demise of his father on the basis of the will mentioned by him earlier and also under the law of primogeniture and the same is an impartible property. He has further mentioned that all the movables lying in the said house absolutely vest in him on the basis of the said will and the jewellery and valuables are part of his impartible estate. He has further pleaded that he is the exclusive owner of the shares although name of plaintiff No. 3 has been included as joint owner of the shares as mere name lender and he had acquired those shares with his own money. He has mentioned that there are certain life insurance policies, details of which are given in Annexure VI and he is the sole beneficiary of those policies.
The defendant No. 1 has reiterated, in para 15 of the written statement, that all the properties of late Maharaja of Kapurthala including the Gaddi have always devolved on the eldest son under the rule of primogeniture as an impartible estate and thus, they are not liable to be partitioned and moreover, he had acquired those properties under the wills and thus, is absolute owner of the said properties and as he acquired those properties in 1955 on the death of his father, i.e., prior to the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, so he continues to be the owner of the said property exclusively and those properties have never become joint Hindu family properties or coparcenary properties. He has pleaded that the said properties are part of his impartible estate and thus no partition in respect of the same can be claimed. He has also controverter the plea that the properties acquired from the income of the impartible estate have become coparcenary or joint Hindu family properties. He has also filed a counter claim for getting declaration that he is the exclusive owner of the properties mentioned in Annexure I to VI.
In replication, the plaintiffs controverter the pleas of the defendant No. 1 on all respect and reiterated that the properties in question are coparcenary properties and plaintiffs have every right to claim partition of the same.
5. Initially, issues were framed on 7th March, 1980 but certain issues were modified and modified issues were framed on 11th March, 1980, which are as follows :
1. Whether the properties in suit are coparcenary properties ? O.P.P.
2. If issue No. 1 is proved, whether the properties are not liable to be partitioned ? O.P.D.
3. Is the present suit not in the interest of plaintiffs 1 & 2 ? O.P.D.
4. What are the rights of plaintiff No. 3 & 4 and defendant No. 2 in the property in dispute in case they are found to be coparcenary properties and partible ? O.P.D.
5. Did Maharaja Jagatjit Singh make a declaration dt. 11th August, 1948 declaring Mussoorie Chateau and other associated properties to be his self-acquired properties ? If so, to what effect ? O.P.P.
6. Did Maharaja Jagatjit Singh execute a will dt. 16th January, 1949 ? If so, to what effect ? O.P.D.
7. If issue No. 1 is proved in favor of the plaintiff, whether Maharaja Jagatjit Singh could bequeath the property by will dt. 16th January, 1949 ? O.P.D.
8. Did Maharaja Paramjit Singh execute a will dt. 10th July, 1955. If so, to what effect ?
9. If issue No. 1 is proved in favor of the plaintiff, whether Maharaja Paramjit Singh could bequeath property by means of a will dt. 10th July, 1955 ? O.P.D.
10. What is the nature of the property held be defendant No. 1 ? O.P.D.
11. Relief.
Before I deal with the various issues arising in this suit I may mention that on 9th September, 1981, a joint statement was made by counsel for the plaintiffs and counsel for defendant No. 1 which is to the following effect :
“We agree that the properties B-90A, Greater Kailash, Flat No. 101, Surya Kiran, New Delhi, and the shares of Continental Devices India Ltd., standing in the joint names of plaintiff No. 3 and defendant No. 1, were acquired from the sale proceeds of the Jagatjit Palace and Elyse Palace, Kapurthala. It is also agreed that Rs. 1,20,000 in respect of the Villa at Kapurthala was paid to the heirs of Maharani Brinda Devi out of the sale proceeds of the Jagatjit Palace and Elyse Palace. This joint statement is given by the counsel for the parties without prejudice to their contentions as to the character of the Jagatjit Palace and Elyse Palace in the hands of Defendant No. 1. There were four life Insurance Policies mentioned in cl. 4(a) of Memorandum dt. 11th March, 1975. Two of these policies were to mature in the year 1979, and the other two were encashed (premature) in the year 1980, and the money was placed into the HUF bank account with the Punjab & Sind Bank, Janpath, New Delhi by Defendant No. 1.
Parties are agreed that the above matter can be decided on the question of principles as to the character of the property in the hands of Defendant No. 1, and the custom prohibiting a son from claiming partition in the life time of the father. However, defendant No. 1 does not press the plea that the present suit is not for the benefit of the minors. Other pleas remain.”
In view of the aforesaid statement issue No. 3 is decided in favor of the plaintiffs.
6. Issue No. 1, 2 and 10 being inter-connected are being decided together.
The case set up by the plaintiffs, in brief, is that this particular family of the plaintiffs and the defendants from the very beginning has been a Joint Hindu Family governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law and the properties in question having come into the hands of defendant No. 1 from his grandfather being ancestral properties had become coparcenary properties as soon as plaintiff No. 1 was born in the family and with the birth of plaintiff No. 2, plaintiffs 1 & 2 and defendant No. 1 became coparceners in the aforesaid coparcenary properties and they have a right to seek partition of the properties.
It has been pleaded by the plaintiffs that there was never any family custom by virtue of which any rule of primogeniture was applicable and the properties could be inherited only by the eldest male son and the said property could be deemed to be any impartible estate. The case of the impartible estate governing the inheritance, the same stood abrogated with the coming into force of Hindu Succession Act and the properties in the hands of defendant No. 1 are to be deemed to be coparcenary properties of the Joint Hindu Family.
It is also the case of the plaintiffs that in the written statement of defendant No. 1 no proper plea has been taken with regard to the applicability of any custom in respect of rule of primogeniture and the plea taken by defendant No. 1 in the written statement that among the ruling families of Punjab succession in the Kapurthala Family has always been according to the rule of primogeniture and the laws governing impartible estate, in fact, cannot be given any importance as no particulars of the alleged custom governing the said family have been pleaded.
On the other hand, defendant No. 1 has pleaded that, in fact, rule of primogeniture and the laws governing impartible estate have been in vogue in the family and the properties of the rulers of Kapurthala have always devolved in accordance with the aforesaid rule and the holder of the said properties is absolute owner of the same. It is pleaded that the Mitakshara Law applicable to Hindu with regards to existence of Joint Hindu Family and coparcenary properties was not applicable to the ruler who was holding the properties in his absolute capacity.
7. In order to appreciate the contentions being raised before me and before I deal with the evidence led by the parties in support of their respective pleas, I may mention that both the parties have referred to the Book Ex. PW1/51 The Rajas of the Punjab by Sir Lepel Henry Griffin to show as to how Kapurthala State came into existence and came to be ruled by the ancestors of the parties. At page 495 of the Book, it has been indicated that as to whatever the real origin of the Kapurthala Family, it appears first in the history as of that Jat Kalal or Distiller caste to which Sadao Singh belonged, the founder of the villages of Ahlu (from which the Kapurthala Family takes its name of Ahluwalia), Ahlu Sadho, turn and Chak, in the neighborhood of Lahore. So, it is evident that Sadao Singh was not Raja or the Ruler or Emperor. He appears to have founded only some of the villages and the genealogy of the family starting from Sadao Singh is delineated at page 497 of the Book.
Badar Singh, great grandson of Sadao Singh, became disciple of Guru Gobind Singh and as he was not having any son, he sought blessings of the Guru and in 1718 Jassa Singh was born. After death of Badar Singh, his widow, brought her son Jassa Singh to Delhi where Mai Sandri, widow of Guru Gobind Singh, was living and till the age 12 years Jassa Singh and his mother lived in Delhi and thereafter Bagh Singh, uncle of Jassa Singh, brought him back to Punjab and he helped to conduct business of his uncle Bagh Singh. Bagh Singh is stated to have been killed four years later in a skirmish with the imperial troops at Harian.
Jassa Singh is stated to have become a Sirdar and he soon acquired a great reputation. It is Jassa Singh who fought various battles, consolidated his position by conquering different territories and the narration of his history in this Book is replete with his valour in the battles he fought. He had seized many territories. It appears that during the said period the Mughal Empire was floundering and various confederations under different Sirdars came into existence in the area of Punjab and Ahmad Shah from Kabul had been making raids in that area and had been establishing his authority and then used to retreat to his native place leaving the filed open again for different Sirdars to take away these territories conquered by Ahmad Shah. Jassa Singh came to be known amongst his followers as Sultan-e-Kapurthala and it is mentioned that this title was not acknowledged by Sikhs generally. It is not necessary to refer to various exploits of Jassa Singh. Suffice it to mention that he was controlling various territories which he had acquired by dint of his valour by sword. He had also reconstructed Darbar Sahib which had been earlier devastated by Ahmad Shah on his different raids. Jassa Singh had no issue. On his death, his second cousin Bagh Singh succeeded to the estate. After death Bagh Singh, his only son Fatheh Singh became the Chief and he succeeded to the estate. It appears that he and Maharaja Ranjit Singh had joined hands and had taken some solemn oath to treat each other as real brothers and they had joint exploits in acquiring different territories and ultimately a treaty was signed with Lord Lake who represented the East India Company. This Treaty was negotiated by Fatheh Singh for himself governing his territories and also on behalf of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. During his time it appears that the British protection was being sought by him vis-a-vis Maharaja Ranjit Singh.
Certain territories which were taken over by Maharaja Ranjit Singh were restored to Fatheh Singh on British Government persuading Maharaja Ranjit Singh to restore those territories to Fatheh Singh. Fatheh Singh died on 13th October, 1837 and he had left behind Nihal Singh and Amar Singh, two sons. The British Government acknowledged Nihal Singh as the chief but Maharaja of Lahore and his minister Raja Dhyan Singh had no intention of recognising Nihal Singh without gaining something out of it. Amar Singh, younger brother of Nihal Singh was encouraged by them to grab the power from his brother Nihal Singh. It appears that Amar Singh had conspired to get killed his brother Nihal Singh and Maharaja of Lahore had tried to bring about some settlement between the two brothers and required Nihal Singh to allow Amar Singh a separate Maintenance of Rs. 30,000 a year instead of Rs. 1,00,000 as demanded by Amar Singh. Amar Singh, however, prematurely died in an accident. In the first Sikh war, it appears that Nihal Singh had sided against the British and after the defeat of Sikhs certain territories of Nihal Singh were confiscated and in the second Sikh war, he supported British Government Whole-heartedly. He had died on 13th September, 1852. Nihal Singh had left behind three sons, namely, Randhir Singh, Kharrak Singh and Harnam Singh. By virtue of his will dt. 11th July, 1852, which is reproduced on page 553 of the Book, he had proceeded to divide his estate.
It may be also mentioned here that for the services rendered by S. Nihal Singh in the Second Anglo-Sikh War of 1849-50, the Governor General of the East India company conferred the title of Raja on him.
As far as the will of Raja Nihal Singh is concerned, by which he wanted that after his death the estate be divided into three parts amongst his three sons, the same was not given effect to as both the younger brothers had given their consent for the estate to remain united but later on Bikrama Singh and Suchet Singh, younger brother, raised disputes and wanted the estate to be divided. Suchet Singh was given some territory as his share but ultimately, in view of the services rendered by Raja Randhir Singh to the British Government during the disturbances of the year 1857, the British Government annulled the will of Raja Nihal Singh and recognised Raja Randhir Singh as the successor of the estate being the eldest son.
Raja Randhir Singh expired in the year 1870 and he had been, during his life time, granted large Taluqdari in Oudh by the British. He had left behind two sons namely, Kharrak Singh and Harnam Singh. The entire estate was inherited by his elder son, Raja Kharrak Singh whereas his younger brother, Harnam Singh got only maintenance allowance. Harnam Singh had embraced Christianity when he married a Christian lady in the year 1876. Raja Kharrak Singh died in the year 1877 leaving behind only one son, namely, Maharaja Jagatjit Singh. All the immovable properties and the estate were inherited by Maharaja Jagatjit Singh. During his life time, Maharaja Jagatjit Singh had built various properties and had also given gifts to his sons and State officials. He was of illustrious character and had represented India at the League of Nations at Geneva.
It is to be remembered here that the paramount power was the British and it was the British Government which was recognising the successors to the Raj of Kapurthala from time to time since the demise of Raja Nihal Singh. In view of the various treaties entered into between the ruler of Kapurthala State and the British Government, the ruler was left with only managing the affairs of the territory under his control internally and was to pay some tributes to the paramount power. Maharaja Jagatjit Singh is alleged to have executed a will in favor of his eldest son, Tikka Paramjit Singh, in which he also recited that the estate was to be inherited by Tikka Paramjit Singh on the basis of the rule of primogeniture. He had left behind two more sons namely, Karamjit Singh and Ajit Singh. They were granted only maintenance allowances. The British paramountcy lapsed on 14th August, 1947 and Maharaja Jagatjit Singh entered into a merger agreement on 20th August, 1948 by virtue of which separate State of Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU) came into existence. Before this merger agreement was executed, a declaration was made by Maharaja Jagatjit Singh with regard to his private properties in which he mentioned that they are his exclusive properties. From the period 14th August, 1947 to 20th August, 1948, Maharaja Jagatjit Singh was sovereign absolute ruler of Kapurthala State. Maharaja Jagatjit Singh died in the year 1949. Maharaja Paramjit Singh, his eldest son, succeeded to the properties left behind by his father to the exclusion of his other brothers and the also is alleged to have executed a will dt. 10th July, 1955 bequeathing his properties in favor of his only son, defendant No. 1 by recognising the rule of primogeniture Maharaja Paramjit Singh died in the year 1955.
8. The learned counsel for defendant No. 1 has contended that the rulers of Kapurthala State were sovereign rulers and being absolute monarchs, were not subject to any law as they were themselves the fountain head of law and succession to such rulers had been always by rule of primogeniture by virtue of which the eldest male lineal descendant succeeded to the Raj and the property left by the Ruler which assumed the nature of impartible estate in respect of which no partition could be claimed. He has contended that the properties of such ruler could never be termed as coparcenary properties or Joint Hindu Family properties. In support of his contention that the rule of primogeniture was the general custom applicable to Hindu Rulers, he has made reference to certain passages appearing in various books. He has argued that in view of the consistent custom being followed, rule of primogeniture in respect of the Hindu Rulers of India in the ancient and medieval history, the British Government, after becoming a paramount power, continued to recognise the said custom by recognising the eldest son as the Raja for a particular State. He has also pointed out that even after integration of the States after independence, the Govt. of India had been also giving effect to the same rule of primogeniture for recognising the successors to the rulers of the various States which had been merged with the territories of India. He has referred to certain administrative reports wherein also the eldest son of the Ruler has been described as heir apparent in respect of almost all princely States. He has pointed out that the term “heir apparent” used in respect of the eldest son also gives recognition to the rule of primogeniture. He has pointed out that the words Maharaja or Raja commonly are used for the ruler whereas the younger brothers of the ruler are called Kunwars and the eldest son of the Ruler is called Tikka or Yuvraj and the younger sons are usually referred to as Maharaj Kumars or Raj Kumars or Kanwars. He has pointed out that only allowance have been given to the younger brothers of the Ruler. He also referred to an enactment of the Raja of Faridkots Estate Act 5 of 1948 which again recognised the rule of succession on the basis of rule of primogeniture. He has made reference to certain judgments dealing with the princes of different states wherein the rule of primogeniture had been recognised.
The counsel for defendant also referred to admission of the plaintiff No. 3 made in written statement filed in Suit No. 35 of 1977, certified copy of which is Ex. D-49, wherein she had admitted that properties in the family had devolved upon the father of the plaintiff as well as on the plaintiff through survivorship by virtue of the rule of primogeniture. It appears that the plaintiff No. 3 in that suit had got amended the written statement to withdraw the said admission does not vanish and still can be taken note of as proof of the existence of the rule of primogeniture in the ruling family of Kapurthala State. The learned counsel for defendant No. 1 has pointed out that in her testimony in this Court also, she had not made a statement that the rule of primogeniture was not being followed in the Kapurthala family. He has also drawn my attention to the statement of Dewan Piare Lal, Advocate, DW-2 who was the counsel in the succession case with regard to the will of Maharaja Jagatjit Singh and who also knew the ruling family of Kapurthala personally and also to the statement of Desraj Kapur, DW-3 and the Statement of defendant No. 1 who have all deposed that the rule of primogeniture was being followed by the rulers of Kapurthala State. He has also referred to statement of Major Kirpal Singh made in succession proceedings in Kapurthala Court while proving the will of Maharaja Paramjit Singh, copy of same being D-17, wherein also he deposed that the rule of primogeniture applied to the ruling family of Kapurthala and he reiterated the statement in Court proceedings with regard to supplementary succession certificate with regard to the estate of Maharaja Jagatjit Singh, copies of same being D13 and D15. Major Kirpal Singh is since dead. He had been in service of the Kapurthala family from the early 1930s.
As far as the documents being relied upon by counsel for defendant No. 1 are concerned the same comprise of apart from the wills of Maharaja Jagatjit Singh and Paramjit Singh, execution and validity of which are in challenge and will be decided by me under the relevant issues, the reference is made to reports of administration of the Punjab and its dependencies market X-22 to X-27 of the period 1867 to 1918. The factum of grant of maintenance to junior members is evident from the plaintiffs own evidence, contents of letter dt. 19th September, 1837, Ex. D-63 by which Maharaja Ranjit Singh required S. Nihal Singh to grant maintenance of Rs. 30,000 to his brother, Kanwar Amar Singh, D-64, letter dt. 24th March, 1940 by Maharaja Sher Singh of Lahore to S. Nihal Singh for grant of maintenance Jagir to Kanwar Amar Singh, D-61, an agreement arrived at between Amar Singh and Raja Nihal Singh dt. 4th July, 1837 by which he expressed gratitude for getting maintenance Jagir of Rs. 27,000 per annum, D-62 another translation of the will executed by Kanwar Amar Singh accepting the said maintenance and also to certain portions of the book, Talukhdari Law of Oudh 1910 by Shail Behari Lal, pages 288, 289 and 541 showing application of law of rule of primogeniture in respect of Oudh property granted to the ruler of Kapurthala governed by Oudh Estate Act, 1869. The use of the title Heir Administration Reports of 1910-11 (X-26), 1917-18 (X-27) and Ex. D-59, copy of gift deed of Maharaja Jagatjit Singh dt. 7th September, 1925 gifting some property in Oudh to his younger sons leaving out the Heir apparent, who is referred to as the Walia had who was to succeed to his entire estate and properties and D-37, a certificate issued by the Govt. of India dt. 8th July, 1949 recognising Maharaja Paramjit Singh as a heir to his late father.
So, it is argued by learned counsel for defendant No. 1 that keeping in view the history of Kapurthala family and the facts evident from the documents as well as from the oral evidence do go to show unmistakably that the rule of primogeniture was being followed by the Kapurthala ruling family since the time of Raja Bidar Singh.
The learned counsel for defendant No. 1 also printed out that the rulers of Kapurthala family, being sovereign rulers, were absolute owners not only of the Raj property but also of the other properties and there was no distinction being maintained by the absolute ruler in respect of those properties. He has referred to statement of plaintiff No. 3 wherein she had admitted that Maharaja Jagatjit Singh was the sovereign ruler and the zamindari in Oudh was his private property and as a ruler of sovereign state, the entire estate belonged to Maharaja to Maharaja Jagatjit Singh and every thing belonged to him and he was a ruler for about six decades.
He has argued that a sovereign ruler possibly cannot be termed as a Karta of a joint Hindu family and such a sovereign ruler is a supreme legislature, the supreme judiciary and the supreme head of the executive and there could be no limitations on his authority and apparently so because even if he acted against any alleged rule of law, there was no Court to enforce compliance by the sovereign ruler of any particular provisions of personal law.
He has then referred to Indian history as recorded in the White Paper of Indian States (1950 edition) which also records that the rulers in India made no distinction between private and State property and could freely use for personal purpose any property owned by their respective States. He has also pointed out to the statement of plaintiff No. 3 wherein she admitted that as a ruler of the sovereign state, entire estate belonged to Maharaja Jagatjit Singh meaning thereby that there was no distinction between State property and the private property contemplated. She has also admitted that in the year 1945, it was not necessary for any ruler to make a distinction between what belonged to him in his private capacity and what belonged to the State.
The learned counsel for defendant No. 1 also pointed out that at no point of time any equal share of the properties of the ruler has been given to other junior sons of the ruler and that is also indicative of the practice of the rule of primogeniture in the said family. He has then referred to the evidence to the plaintiffs and pointed out that the plaintiffs have failed to explain how the State ruled by a sovereign ruler could be a coparcenery property and they have not pointed out any single case of partition and had not pointed out that in case any coparcenery existed in the initial stages, how that coparcenery continued when a particular member of the coparcenery withdrew from the coparcenery and have not explained how all the time the eldest son succeeded to the Raj and the properties and why only maintenance allowance was given to the junior members of the family and why the elder son was referred as Heir Apparent or the Tikka Raja in the various documents.
So, it is urged by learned counsel for defendant No. 1 that the properties in question were inherited by eldest son of the ruler from time to time and, there were, at no time, coparcenery properties and defendant No. 1, who is presently holding the properties on the basis of the rule of primogeniture is absolute owner of the said properties and, thus, no partition could be claimed in respect of these properties during the life time of defendant No. 1. Learned counsel for defendant No. 1 has also advanced arguments with regard to the present position of the said properties after the coming into force of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. I will deal with the said contentions after deciding the question whether defendant No. 1 has acquired the properties or not by virtue of any rule of primogeniture.
9. Counsel for the plaintiffs has, however, contended that at the time the ancestors of the parties were not the rulers by any stretch of meaning, they constituted a Sikh family and were governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law and thus there existed a joint Hindu family and, thus, the said family is governed by all the incidences of joint Hindu family as contemplated by Mitakshara Hindu Law and as defendant No. 1 has inherited the properties from a common ancestor, i.e., from his father and grandfather, they are ancestral properties and as soon as defendant No. 1 had married plaintiff No. 3 there came about joint Hindu family and the properties held by defendant No. 1 became joint Hindu family properties and as soon as first son was born, the joint Hindu family properties became coparcenary properties and, thus, the sons of defendant No. 1 have a right to claim partition of the properties in question which are coparcenary properties.
He has also contended that keeping in view the pleas taken in the written statement it is obvious that defendant No. 1 had not set up any custom by virtue of which he could that the said properties were inheritable by any rule of primogeniture. He has argued that only custom pleaded by defendant No. 1 is that according to the custom prevalent in Punjab there existed on right of partition in respect of the joint family estates in the son during the life of his father. He has contended that although a clear plea has been taken regarding prevalence of custom in this respect but defendant No. 1 has not set up any clear plea regarding any custom applicable to the family by virtue of which rule of primogeniture is applicable to the family. He has argued that although defendant No. 1 has set up rule of primogeniture governing the family but he has not pleaded as to on what basis the said rule is applicable. He has argued that defendant No. 1 has also not pleaded whether the rule of primogeniture was applicable to the State properties and also to the private properties. He has pointed out that a custom must possess certain legal attributes, namely, conscious and voluntary acceptance of the custom/regularity, antiquity, certainly including uniformity and notoriety, reasonableness and in consonance with public policy and morality. He has urged that keeping in view the evidence brought on the record, none of these ingredients for establishing a custom stands proved. He has argued that in absence of any custom having been proved the personal Hindu Law is applicable to the family and, thus, the properties in question should be held to be coparcenary properties.
It is further pointed out that mere fact that paramount British power had imposed the rule primogeniture on the family would not lead to any inference that any custom has come into existence governing the said family by virtue of which rule of primogeniture was applicable. It is contended that as soon as the British paramountcy lapsed, the rule of primogeniture forced on the family by the paramount power also stood extinguished.
He has referred to the history of the family and pointed out that at no point of time any such custom had developed in governing the family by which rule of primogeniture was being followed. He has even pointed out that with the coming into force of the Indian independence Act, 1947, and the State of Kapurthala having merged, the sovereign power of Maharaja Jagatjit Singh coming to an end and the incidence of Mitakshara Hindu Law, which may be considered remaining dormant as long as Maharaja Jagatjit Singh was sovereign ruler, revived as soon as he became an ordinary person and, thus, at least from that day onward the properties in question would be deemed to be coparcenary properties. He has pointed out that the act of the president of India in recognising Maharaja, Paramjit Singh as ruler for the purposes of conferring personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles and for payment of privy purses in terms of the convenants entered into between Maharaja Jagatjit Singh and the Government of India could not have changed the nature of the properties from coparcenary properties to self-acquired properties in the hands of Maharaja Paramjit Singh and later on in the hands of defendant No. 1.
He has further argued that with the enactment of the Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1971, which came into force on 28th December, 1971, and the enactment of the Rulers Abolition of Privileges Act, 1972, which came into force on 9th September, 1972, the said personal privileges and the privy purses also came to an end and defendant No. 1 became an ordinary citizen and the properties being held by him have to be treated as coparcenary properties.
He has argued that whatever may be the position applicable to the State properties vis-a-vis the custom of succession in accordance with the rule of primogeniture and impartible estate yet no such rule would have been applicable to the private properties being held by Maharaja Jagatjit Singh and thereafter by his son Maharaja Paramjit Singh and now by defendant No. 1. He has pointed out that the political power of the British and subsequently the terms of any instrument of merger and thereafter the covenants entered into with the Government of India only referred to the succession to the estate or Gaddi and the alleged rule of primogeniture would have governed succession to the estate or Gaddi and not to the private properties being held by the Rulers of Kapurthala. He has argued that in the written statement defendant No. 1 has not pleaded any specific and distinct custom pertaining to succession in accordance with the rule of primogeniture and impartible estate in the ruling Kapurthala family in respect of the private properties.
The learned counsel for the plaintiffs has also contended at the time of arguments that defendant No. 1 has no right to rely on the custom of primogeniture applicable to other royal families of India as no such plea has been taken in the written statement that such custom was prevalent in other royal families of other States in India. He has also drawn my attention to the proceedings recorded on 9th March, 1981 by Charanjit Talwar, J. (as His Lordship then was) wherein a finding was given that from the averments made in the written statement it cannot be said that defendant No. 1 has alleged any custom of succession in any other States and the evidence was not allowed to be led on any such point which was not pleaded in the written statement.
The learned counsel for the plaintiffs has further submitted that even assuming for the sake of arguments as urged by counsel for defendant No. 1 that during the period 15th August, 1947 to 20th August, 1948, i.e., after the British power has come to an end and before the Kapurthala State was merged with the other territories of India, Maharaja Jagatjit Singh was a sovereign ruler and was supreme legislature, supreme judiciary and a supreme head of the executive being absolute monarch and there was no law applicable to him, he being the fountain-head of law and his will and volition were the laws and he was not governed by any custom or any other restriction of Mitakshara Hindu Law, then obviously he could not be deemed to be governed by any rule of primogeniture and impartible estate and, if that is so, as soon as he ceased to be the sovereign ruler and became an ordinary citizen, he came to be governed by the law of Mitakshara Hindu Law and the properties in his hands became joint Hindu family properties and subsequently when properties were inherited by his son and thereafter by defendant No. 1, the properties continued to be coparcenary properties. So he has urged that there is an inherent inconsistency in the contentions being raised on behalf of defendant No. 1. On the one hand, the plea is taken that the rule of primogeniture and impartible estate was applicable to the ruling family of Kapurthala yet on the other hand the contention is being raised that Maharaja Jagatjit Singh was the monarch and absolute ruler not governed by any laws and such pleas are not reconcilable. He has also pointed out that on 11th August, 1948, when Maharaja Jagatjit Singh was an absolute monarch and absolute ruler, he had made a declaration (Ex. D1) dealing out the properties as his private and personal properties having full power of disposition over them. If that is so, it is argued that there could be no question of application of any rule of primogeniture and impartible estate to the said properties to be inherited by his heirs. So, he has argued that by virtue of the said declaration, he absolutely abolished any customary rule of primogeniture and impartible estate being applicable to such properties.
He has further argued that although the execution and validity of the will of Maharaja Jagatjit Singh set up by defendant No. 1 are controverter by the plaintiffs yet assuming for the sake of arguments that he had executed such a will dt. 16th January, 1949, even then by virtue of that will he had only made it clear that his eldest son Paramjit Singh would inherit those properties and he had bequeathed those properties to his son, he being his sole legal heir. So, it is urged that the properties were inherited by Maharaja Paramjit Singh being the heir and not on the basis of any rule of primogeniture although in the will reference to such a rule has been made but the bequest is made in favor of the legal heir and, thus, the nature of the properties in the hands of Maharaja Paramjit Singh continued to be coparcenary properties as in that very will it is mentioned that after demise of Maharaja Paramjit Singh the properties are to be inherited by his only legal heir, namely, defendant No. 1. So, it is argued that in the hands of defendant No. 1 the properties were definitely coparcenaries/ancestral in nature.
Similar inference is sought to be drawn from the alleged will of Maharaja Paramjit Singh dt. 10th July, 1955. It has been also urged by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that with the coming into force of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the alleged custom of primogeniture and impartible estate came to be abolished and, thus, the properties in question now in the hands of defendant No. 1 assumed the character of coparcenary properties.
10. We have to determine in this case as to whether the properties in question are coparcenary properties or not on the date the suit was filed. It is undisputed that parties on the date of filing of the suit are governed by Mitakshara Hindu Law and under the Mitakshara Hindu Law a joint Hindu family comes into existence as a creature of law and the coparcenary comes into existence again as creature of law amongst the male members of the joint family who fall within four degrees from a common male ancestor at any given time. Joint Hindu family property comes about if the property is ancestral or the property has been acquired with the used of joint Hindu family funds or from the nucleus of the joint Hindu family property or a member of the family voluntarily putting his self-acquired property into the hotch-potch. But when there are coparceners present in the joint Hindu family the said joint Hindu family properties become the coparcenary properties. The ancestral property under the Mitakshara Hindu Law comes into existence if the property is acquired from the ancestor in any unbroken line of male descent within four degrees.
An impartible estate is an estate partition of which is prohibited by a custom and an estate which is inherited by rule of primogeniture also has a characteristic of impartible estate attached to it. One of the basic facts to be kept in view in the present case is that the ancestors of the parties were undeniably sovereign rulers of erstwhile Kapurthala State. I have already detailed out the family history how the ancestors of the parties became rulers of the erstwhile State of Kapurthala and it may be emphasized that as high power contracting parties the erstwhile rulers of Kapurthala State entered into various treaties and covenants at first with the British Government and after independence with the Govt. of India. In between 15th August, 1947 and 20th August, 1948, when the Kapurthala State was merged in the PEPSU by virtue of a covenant signed by the rulers of different States in that respect, Maharaja Jagjit Singh was definitely a sovereign ruler as he owned no allegiance to anyone else during that particular period. Earlier he was a ruler as far as internal administration of the State of Kapurthala was concerned and he was recognised as such by the treaties entered into with the British Government.
The question which needs consideration is as what was the nature of the properties held by Maharaja Jagjit Singh during his life time. Maharaja Jagjit Singh admittedly died on 19th June, 1949. At the moment, I am not considering the question as to whether there was any customary law applicable to the ruling family of the erstwhile Kapurthala State by virtue of which the succession was governed by rule of primogeniture. What could be the nature of properties in the hands of a sovereign ruler like Maharaja Jagjit Singh stands now determined by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 534 of 1983, Revathimal Balgopal Varma vs. His Highness Sri Padmanabhadasa Varma (since deceased) & Ors. and Civil Appeal No. 535 of 1983, Indira Bayi & Ors. vs. His Highness Sri Padmanabhadasa Varma (since deceased), decided on 28th November, 1991. It is laid down by the Supreme Court that once incidence of the property held by a sovereign was that there was really no distinction between the public or State properties on the one hand private properties of the sovereign on the other, and the other incidence was that no one could be a co-owner with the sovereign in the properties held by him. The Supreme Court also emphasized that when they are speaking of the property of an absolute sovereign there is no pretence of drawing a distinction, the whole of it belongs to him as sovereign and he may dispose of it for public or private purpose in whatever manner he may think. The Supreme Court quoted with approval a judgment of the Gujarat High Court in D. S. Meramwala Bhavala vs. Ba Shri Armba Jethsurbhai (1968) 9 Guj LR 609. It is useful to quote some relevant portion of the said judgment which have ample bearing on the point arising in this case :
“There is, therefore, no doubt that the Khari-Bagasara Estate was a sovereign Estate and the Chief of the Khari-Bagasara Estate for the time being was a sovereign ruler within his own territories subject to the paramountcy of the British Crown prior to 15th August, 1947 and completely independent after that date.
If the Khari-Bagasara Estate was a sovereign Estate it is difficult to see how the ordinary incidents of ancestral coparcenary property could be applied to that Estate. The characteristic feature of the ancestral coparcenary property is that members of the family acquire an interest in the property by birth or adoption and by virtue of such interest they can claim four rights : (1) the right of partition; (2) the right to restrain alienations by the head of the family except for necessity; (3) the right of maintenance; and (4) the right of survivorship. It is obvious from the nature of a sovereign Estate that there can be no interest by birth or adoption in such Estate and these rights which are the necessary consequence of community of interest cannot exist. The Chief of a sovereign Estate would hold the Estate by virtue of his sovereign power and not by virtue of municipal law. He would not be subject to municipal law; he would in fact be the fountain head of municipal law. The municipal law cannot determine or control the scope and extent of his interest in the estate or impose any limitations on his powers in relation to Estate. As a sovereign ruler he would be the full and complete owner of the Estate entitled to do what he likes with the Estate. During his lifetime no on else can claim an interest in the Estate. Such an interest would be inconsistent with his sovereignty. To grant that the sons acquire an interest by birth or adoption in the Estate which is a consequence arising under the municipal law would be to make the Chief who is the sovereign Ruler of the Estate subject to the municipal law. Besides, if the sons acquire an interest in the Estate by birth or adoption, they would be entitled to claim the rights enumerated above but these rights cannot exist in a sovereign Estate. None of these rights can be enforced against the Chief by a remedy in the municipal Courts. The Chief being the sovereign Ruler, there can be no legal sanction for enforcement of these rights. The remedy or enforcement of these rights would not be a remedy not be a remedy at law but resort would have to be taken to force for the Chief as the sovereign Ruler would not be subject to municipal law and his actions would not be controlled by the municipal Courts. Now it is impossible to conceive of a legal right which has no legal right and, therefore, by the very nature of a sovereign Estate, the sons cannot have these rights and if these rights cannot exist in the sons, it must follow as a necessary corollary that the sons do not acquire an interest in the Estate by birth or adoption ………..
……….. Now it was not disputed on behalf of Meramvala that if prior to merger the Estate did not partake the character of ancestral coparcenary property, the properties left with Bhayawala under merger agreement would not be ancestral coparcenary properties : if Meramvala did not have any interest in the Estate prior to merger, he would have no interest in the properties which remained with Bhayavala under the merger agreement. It was not the case of Meramvala and – it could not be the case since the merger agreement would be an act of State – that as a result of the merger agreement any interest was acquired by him in the properties held by Bhayavala. Bhayavala was, therefore, the full owner of the properties held by him and was competent to dispose of the same by will … … … …
The argument of Mr. I. M. Nanavati, however, was that the effect of applicability of the rule of primogeniture by the paramount power was that the rights of coparceners under the ordinary Hindu Law were eclipsed : these rights were not destroyed but they eclipse being removed, the rights sprang into full force and effect. This argument is wholly unsustainable on principle … …”
From this judgment it is clear that the characteristics of ancestral coparcenary property : (1) the right of partition; (2) the right to restrain alienations by the head of the family except for necessity; (3) the right of maintenance; and (4) the right of survivorship, are not applicable to the properties owned by the sovereign ruler and that the son does not acquire any interest ruler has merged with India the character of his properties does not change. In the case of Revathimal Balgopal Varma (supra), the Supreme Court referred to all the previous judgments which have been cited before me also and has concluded that there is no distinction between the private and public properties owned by the sovereign ruler and the incidents of ancestral or coparcenary properties are not at all applicable to such properties held by the sovereign ruler. It is also laid down in this judgment that the mode of succession also does not make any difference. As soon as one sovereign ruler succeeds another, all the incidents of sovereignty are then possessed by the successor sovereign ruler. In the said case also, the sovereign before surrendering his sovereignty entered into a convenant with the Govt. of India and the terms of the convenant gave an option to the sovereign ruler of furnish a list of such properties which he wanted to retain as personal properties and he having furnished such a list the Supreme Court held that on such list being approved by the Govt. of India the properties would be deemed to be held by the said sovereign ruler as personal properties in the capacity of being their absolute owner.
A contention was raised before the Supreme Court that if the joint Hindu family properties were by custom or otherwise impartible, the incidence of partible joint Hindu family property will get revived on the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System Abolition Act, 1975. The Supreme Court held that in view of the finding that the properties in the hand of the sovereign ruler were not joint family properties at any time, the question of reviving the nature of the property from impartible joint Hindu Family property to partible joint Hindu family property did not arise.
After Maharaja Jagatjit Singh ceased to be the ruler and he entered into a covenant with the Govt. of India which protected certain privileges of the ruler and awarded some privy purse to the ruler, he became an ordinary citizen of this country and became subject to all the laws of this country. I may refer to certain judgments which make this position very clear. In Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuran vs. State of Kerala & Ors. , just two days before the merger of the princely State of Cochin, Maharaja of Cochin in exercise of his law making power issued a proclamation declaring the entire royal estate and palace funds as impartible. In 1961 the legislature passed an Act pertaining to the Valiamma Thampuram Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund and in 1968 another legislation was enacted pertaining to the said matter by the Kerala Legislature. The dispute arose as to the effect of the said legislation on the declaration given by the Ex Maharaja. The Supreme Court held while referring to 26th Constitution Amendment Act of December 1971, that with the denudation of his royal privileges the Maharaja stepped down to the level of the Karta of a joint Hindu family and the said properties and the funds became subject to the enactments made by the Legislature of Kerala.
In the well-known case of H. H. Maharajadhiraja Mahav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur & Ors. Etc. vs. Union of India , it was held the Supreme Court that the Ex-Rulers are citizens of India like other citizens albeit with some privileges and privy purses which other citizens do not get. It was further held that a proclamation and the execution of merger agreements resulted in complete extinction of States and Unions of States as separate units and the prices ceased to retain any vestige of sovereign rights or authority qua their former States and they acquired the status of citizens of India. In this connection, the law laid down by the Supreme Court may be seen in Kunwar Shri Vir Rajendra Singh vs. The Union of India & Ors. and H. H. the Maharana Sahib Shri Bhagwat Singh Bahadur of Udaipur vs. the State of Rajasthan & Ors . In the case of CIT vs. H. E. H. Mir Osman Ali Bahadur , it was held that Nizam of Hyderabad became subject to payment of income-tax after he ceased to be the ruler even in respect of income which had accrued to him during the period when he was ruler because at the time of assessment he had become an ordinary citizen and amenable to ordinary laws of the land.
I may also refer to Ahmadunnisa Begum vs. Union of India , in which the position of Nizam vis-a-vis private properties and the rights of succession came up for consideration before a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court. In this case the Court held that recognition of the successor by the Govt. of India is an act of the State and a political decision depending much upon the paramount power in the past and now by the President under the Constitution and his recognition as a ruler under Art. 366 of the Constitution has not altered his status but as a citizen he is undoubtedly assured a privileged position. So, as a citizen his succession has to be determined by the law of the country applicable to him.
Lastly, I may refer to CIT vs. H. H. Raja of Bhor . In this case the Raja of Bhor held certain Government securities. He died in 1954 and was survived survived