JUDGMENT
Arun Mishra, J.
1. This appeal has been preferred under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 aggrieved by the award dated 27.11.2001 passed by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation at Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh in Case No. 54 of 1998 (Fatal).
2. Claimant-respondent No. 1 is mother of deceased Manoj Kumar Jain and respondent No. 2, Rajendra Kumar Jain, who is the owner of truck No. MP 20-G 4416.
3. An application was filed by the respondent No. 1 claiming compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act against Rajendra Kumar Jain and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Truck was owned by Rajendra Kumar Jain and insured with Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.
4. It was alleged in the application that Manoj Kumar Jain was cleaner of the truck and was employed by Rajendra Kumar Jain. Truck had met with an accident on 26.7.1997, when it turned turtle on Temar Bridge. When the truck Turned turtle, deceased Manoj was the cleaner of the truck and was looking after the truck in the course of employment. He was murdered by unknown persons. Report was lodged at Police Station, Ghansor. Post-mortem was performed. Deceased was murdered on 26.7.1997.
5. The claimant examined herself. In support of the case, she submitted registration book of the truck, Exh. PI; fitness certificate, Exh. P2; permit, Exh. P3; insurance policy, Exh. P4; F.I.R., Exh. P5 and driving licence, Exh. P6 of driver Rajendra Kumar Patel. On behalf of insurer no evidence was adduced. Rajendra Kumar Jain had examined himself.
6. The Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation has found that deceased was the cleaner of the truck. He was murdered in the course of employment while guarding the truck. It was loaded at the time of accident. The age of the deceased was 25 years. The age factor of 216.91 has been applied, salary of Rs. 2,000 has been taken for the purpose of computation of compensation. 50 per cent has been found to be loss of dependency. Total compensation arrived at Rs. 2,16,910 (rupees two lakh sixteen thousand nine hundred and ten). In case amount was not deposited within two months, same shall carry the interest at the rate of 8 per cent per annum.
7. Mrs. Amrit Ruprah, learned Counsel appearing for appellant insurer has assailed the order on the ground that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the finding recorded by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation that deceased died in the employment of respondent No. 2, is perverse. She has further submitted that death did not take place during the course of employment, thus the compensation which has been awarded is illegal. Thus, the order passed by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation deserves to be set aside. She has relied upon a decision of High Court of Karnataka in Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Gujjamma 2004 ACJ 1719 (Karnataka), to contend that self-serving statement of the mother of the deceased is not reliable to come to finding that the deceased was cleaner. She has further submitted that the vehicle was not driven when murder took place, thus it cannot be said that murder took place during course of employment.
8. Mr. Narendra Chouhan, the learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 has submitted that no case for interference is made out. There is uncontroverted evidence on record to indicate that deceased was employed as cleaner of truck. No evidence has been adduced by the appellant as such there is no substantial question of law involved in this appeal. No interference is called for.
9. First question for consideration is whether the deceased was employed as a cleaner of the truck No. MP 20-G 4416? Sheela Bai Jain, respondent No. 1, has clearly stated that deceased Manoj Kumar Jain was her son, he was unmarried. He was employed by Rajendra Kumar Jain, another son as a cleaner of truck. On the date when he was murdered, he had gone from Jabalpur to Ghansor, truck met with an accident on Temar Bridge, it turned turtle. As the truck was loaded, deceased Manoj and driver were looking after the truck. Deceased Manoj was murdered by unknown persons while he was performing the duty of looking after the truck. He was in receipt of Rs. 2,500 and his age was 25 years.
10. Rajendra Kumar Jain, respondent No. 2, owner of the truck has also examined himself. He has clearly stated that the deceased Manoj was employed as a cleaner of the truck No. MP 20-G 4416. He has produced various documents, registration book of the truck, Exh. P1 ; fitness certificate, Exh. P2; permit, Exh. P3; insurance policy, Exh. P4; F.I.R., Exh. P5 and driving licence, Exh. P6 of the driver Rajendra Kumar Patel. We find that it is not uncommon to engage a family member as a cleaner. Merely by the fact that deceased was family member, it cannot be inferred that he was not engaged as a cleaner of the truck in question, thus we find that he was engaged as a cleaner and was on duty when truck went from Jabalpur to Ghansor on 26.7.1997.
11. Coming to the question whether deceased Manoj was murdered during the course of employment. In view of the finding that he was cleaner of truck and admittedly the truck turned turtle on Temar Bridge, it was loaded with the goods, it became necessary to stay near the bridge in order to look after the truck to safeguard the goods of the truck. Though the vehicle was not plied at the time when murder took place after the vehicle turned turtle, obviously the deceased was performing the duty of looking after truck in the course of his employment, he could not have left it abandoned, thus submission raised by Mrs. Ruprah that death did not take place in the course of employment, cannot be accepted. Section 3(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 defines accident must arise out of and in the course of employment.
12. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Veena Sethi , it was held that murder arose out of and in the course of employment, murder took place while driver had taken the vehicle for delivering goods and was returning when he was killed by someone, it was held that driver was discharging his duties on behalf of the employer and very nature of his employment made it imperative for him to drive the vehicle and put it at the spot where he was killed. It was held that accident arose out of and in the course of employment. The Supreme Court in Employees’ State Insurance Corporation v. Francis De Costa , has laid down that while interpreting the meaning of the expression ‘arising out of and in course of employment’, there has to be causal connection between the accident and employment. The Apex Court has observed:
(29) …In order to succeed, it has to be proved by the employee that (1) there was an accident, (2) the accident had a causal connection with the employment and (3) the accident must have been suffered in course of employment….
13. The Supreme Court in Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahmmod Issak 1969 ACJ 422 (SC), has held that the words ‘in the course of employment’ mean ‘in the course of the work which the workman is employed to do and which is incidental to it’. The words ‘arising out of employment’ are understood to mean that ‘during the course of the employment’, injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service. The Apex Court held:
(5) To come within the Act the injury by accident must arise both out of and in the course of employment. The words ‘in the course of the employment’ mean ‘in the course of the work which the workman is employed to do and which is incidental to it’. The words ‘arising out of employment’ are understood to mean that ‘during the course of employment, injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service which, unless engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe the workman would not otherwise have suffered’. In other words, there must be causal relationship between the accident and employment. The expression ‘arising out of employment’ is again not confined to the mere nature of employment. The expression applies to employment as such to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of those factors the workman is brought within the zone of special danger, the injury would be one which arises ‘out of employment’. To put it differently, if the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation must succeed, unless of course the workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent act….
14. Thus, we find that deceased was on the spot as the truck met with an accident. He was performing the duty to look after the goods and the truck, thus accidental murder took place in the course of employment. In Rita Devi v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. , the Apex Court has held thus:
(10) The question, therefore, is: Can a murder be an accident in any given case? There is no doubt that ‘murder’, as it is understood, in the common parlance is a felonious act where death is caused with intent and the perpetrators of that act normally have a motive against the victim for such killing. But, there are also instances where murder can be by accident on a given set of facts. The difference between a ‘murder’ which is not an accident, and a ‘murder’ which is an accident depends on the proximity of the cause of such murder. In our opinion, if the dominant intention of the act of felony is to kill any particular person then such killing is not an accidental murder but is a murder simpliciter, while if the cause of murder or the act of murder was originally not intended and the same was caused in furtherance of any other felonious act then such murder is an accidental murder.
(15) Learned Counsel for respondents contended before us that since the Motor Vehicles Act has not defined the word ‘death’ and the legal interpretations as relied upon by us are with reference to definition of the word ‘death’ in Workmen ‘s Compensation Act, the same will not be applicable while interpreting the word ‘death’ in the Motor Vehicles Act because according to her, the objects of the two Acts are entirely different. She also contends that on the facts of this case no proximity could be presumed between the murder of the driver and the stealing of the autorickshaw. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the respondents. We do not see how the objects of the two Acts, namely, the Motor Vehicles Act and the Workmen’s Compensation Act are in any way different. In our opinion, the relevant object of both the Acts is to provide compensation to the victims of accidents. The only difference between the two enactments is that so far as the Workmen’s Compensation Act is concerned, it is confined to workmen as defined under that Act while the relief provided under Chapters X to XII of the Motor Vehicles Act is available to all the victims of accidents involving a motor vehicle. In this conclusion of ours, we are supported by Section 167 of Motor Vehicles Act as per which provision it is open to the claimants either to proceed to claim compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or under the Motor Vehicles Act. A perusal of the objects of the two enactments clearly establishes that both the enactments are beneficial enactments operating in the same field, hence the judicially accepted interpretation of the word ‘death’ in the Workmen’s Compensation Act is, in our opinion, applicable to the interpretation of the word ‘death’ in Motor Vehicles Act also.
In view of the aforesaid decision, we find that deceased was performing duty. There was close nexus of murder and performance of his duty in course of employment. He died in the course of employment. Thus, we find that order passed by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation awarding compensation is proper.
15. The decision in Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Gujjamma 2004 ACJ 1719 (Karnataka), of Karnataka High Court is based on the statement of witnesses examined in the said case, which was found to be unreliable, has no applicability to the instant case. Appeal lies only on the substantial question of law. We find that no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal, thus no interference is called for.
16. Resultantly, appeal being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed. No costs.