ORDER
S.C. Pandey, J.
1. This revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the Order dated 16-11-95 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Bhopal (henceforth the Tribunal) in Claim case No. 51/95. The Tribunal by the impugned order has declined to hold that the application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (henceforth the Act) was barred by time and consequently it has held that there was no question of condoning the delay in filing the application.
2. The facts of this case giving rise to this revision petition may be stated in short. The non-applicant No. 1 filed the application for compensation against the Non-applicant No. 3, the owner, the Non-applicant No. 2, the driver and the application claiming compensation for the death of Smt. Tulsibai on 20-9-91 under Section 166 of the Act. The application was filed on 8-3-1995, after a period of 3 years, 5 months and 16 days. At the time of filing of the application, Section 166(3) of the Act stood deleted by Motor Vehicles Amending Act, 1994 (the Act No. 54 of 1994) with effect from 14-11-1994. The Section 166(3) of the Act provided that the claim application before ‘the Tribunal’ should be filed within 6 months from the date of accident failing which a further period of 6 months was provided for filing the application in case the applicant was able to show ‘sufficient cause’ for filing an application beyond the period of six months. Thus the outer limit for filing the application under Section 166 of the Act would be 1 year at the most prior to the deletion of Section 166(3) of the Act which provided for the period of limitation. The application filed by non-applicant No. 1 was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay.
3. The non-applicant No. 2, the non-applicant No. 3 and the applicants argued that the accident occurred on 20-9-91. Therefore, as per Section 166(3) of the Act, limitation would expire after one year. The ’cause of action’ against them stood extinguished, after one year and consequently the question of condonation of delay did not arise. It appears to have been argued before ‘the Tribunal’ that the deletion of Section 166(3) would have no effect to those cases wherein the time for filing the application under Section 166 of the Act had already expired on the dale of presentation of the application as per Section 166(3) of the Act. The non-applicant No. 1 on the other hand argued that after deletion of Section 166(3) of ‘the Act’ there was no limitation provided by ‘the Act’. The intention of the legislature was to do away with the period of limitation in all cases of Motor accidents. The non-applicant No. 1 could take advantage of the deletion of Section 166(3) by the amending Act No. 54 of 1994 which came into force from 16-11-1994. It could not be argued by the applicant and non-applicant Nos. 2 and 3 that Section 166(3) of the Act was still on the statute book as it was deleted on 16-11-94. On the date of presentation of the application, no period was prescribed by ‘the Act’ because Section 166(3) of the Act was not on the statute book. The sub-section simply vanished from the statute-book and therefore, it could not be looked into for any purpose.
4. It appears the Tribunal upheld the contention of the non-applicant No. 1 and held that he was entitled to file the claim application, as if, there was no period of limitation prescribed. In other words, the Tribunal held that the non-applicant No. 1 could take advantage of deletion of Section 166(3) of the Act.
5. The learned counsel for the applicant Shri N.S. Ruprah, assails the conclusion of the Tribunal and argues that deletion of Section 166(3) of the Act would not clothe the applicant with the right to file the application under Section 166(1) of the Act beyond one year from the date of accident with an application for condonation of delay as the accident took place on 20-9-91. By the time the amendment came into force the application under Section 166(1) stood barred by time and the rights of non-applicant No. 1 stood extinguished by the application of unamended Section 166(3) of ‘the Act’. They could not be revived by the simple deletion of Section 166(3) with effect from 16-12-94 by the amending Act No. 54 of 1994. In other words, the simple deletion of Section 166(3), would not breathe life in to dead and moribund cause of action of the non-applicant No. 1. The other part of the argument of the learned counsel for the applicant was that the effect of deletion of Section 166(3) of ‘the Act’ would not be that there was no limitation for filing an application under Section 166(1) of ‘the Act’. The learned counsel contended in the alternative that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be attracted. The non-applicant No. 1 had filed the application beyond 3 years and therefore unless the Tribunal condoned the delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 it could not proceed to decide the case on merits.
6. Shri R.P. Jain who appeared as amicus curiae argued that none of the points raised by the learned counsel for applicant should be accepted by this Court. It was pointed out that ‘the Act’ was a special law framed with a view to carve out a new jurisdiction which was conferred upon the tribunal by the virtue of ‘the Act’. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court was curtailed in favour of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted by virtue of the provisions of ‘the Act’. The procedure prescribed by ‘the Act’ and the rules framed thereunder are not as elaborate as in the case of ordinary Civil Courts. The legislature had permitted the constitution of The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals with view to expedite the payment of compensation and conferred upon them special jurisdiction as distinguished from that of ordinary Civil Courts. It was submitted that ‘the Act’ was a complete Code in itself and therefore, initially the period of limitation for filing an application under Section 166(1) of the Act was provided by Section 166(3) thereof. The legislature in its wisdom thought that this provision was not conducive to justice. It withdrew consequently, it providing no limitation for filing an application for compensation. The benefit of this deletion should be given to the non-applicant No. 1 as the ban on filing an application beyond 12 months was lifted leaving the field open. It was specifically pointed out that prescription of period of limitation simply bars the remedy and does not extinguish the right. The right of the non-applicant No. 1 would have been extinguished only when his rights were irretrievably defeated by the Order of the Final Court leaving him with no remedy. The learned counsel drew the attention of this Court to the decision of The Supreme Court in the case of Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayvargiya and Ors., reported in AIR 1996 SC 2155. It was further argued that there was no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that Article 137 of the Limitation Act would govern the proceedings before claims tribunal. The Article would not apply to the proceedings before the tribunal and therefore, there was no merit in the contention that an application under Section 166(1) of the Act was barred.
7. The point involved in this revision bears examination on principles as well as precedents and therefore, this Court shall pass an order based on principles supported by the precedents. The first question that to be answered is : What is the effect of omission of Section 166(3) of the Act ?
8. The Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, is being reproduced here for the facility of its construction :
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act :
6. Effect of repeal– Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, ‘unless a different intention appears’, the repeal shall not–
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, or continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.
9. It is clear from the above reproduction of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, that on the repeal of a Central Act or a regulation, it automatically attracted, unless a different intention appears. Now a different intention may be expressed by the repealing statute in express words by saying that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would not apply or by stating that the amending Act would be operative retrospectively from the date the repealed Act came into force. It could be expressed by implication too. For example by providing a saving clause in repealing Act itself which would be so different in its intent and content, that it would be impossible to apply Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 wholly or partially. It would then be a matter of construction to find out the real intention of legislature regarding the extent and the applicability. There might be another category wherein the legislature simply repealed an enactment without saying anything further. The amending Act of No. 54/94 did not repeal the Act but omitted Section 166(3) of ‘the Act’. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would still be applicable even through the amending Act No. 54 of 1994 did not repeal the whole Act or the Section 166 (ibid). Even in the case of omission, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act of 1897 enjoins a duty upon the Court to find out from the text and object of the Motor Vehicles Amendment Act, 1994 (Act No. 54 of 1994) if there was an intention not to apply the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 by necessary implication. The Mischief Rule in Heydon’s case decided in the year 1989 has now acquired the status of a classic rule and is applied very widely in the countries wherein the British Common Law has taken its roots. It says that the Courts are required to consider in absence of clear words the following four things :–
(i) What was the law before making the Act,
(ii) What was the mischief or defect which the law did not provide,
(iii) What is the remedy the Act has provided,
(iiv) The reason for the remedy.
10. It would therefore be necessary to find out what mischief existed before passing of the Act No. 54 of 1994 and then, if more than one construction is possible, favour that which will eliminate the mischief so identified. It is sometime said that this mischief is confined to the cases wherein there is difficulty about the words that are being used as they are capable of being used in more than one senses. In the opinion of the Court that Rule cannot be cribbed, cabined and confined to above circumstances. The real reason of the Mischief Rule is, “ambiguity”. It does not matter how the ambiguity results. The observation of N.H. Bhagwati J., in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax M.P. and Bhopal v. Smt. Sodra Devi, reported in AIR 1957 SC 832 at page 835 cannot be stretched far beyond the facts of that case. Gajendragadkar J., pointed out in the case of Kanailal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan reported in AIR 1957 SC 907 at pages 910 & 911 that the words of a statute are to read in its context. The context or the backdrop of a statute also covers the previous law. If the words in its context are plain the very need to apply the Mischief Rule vanishes. The Mischief Rules looses its usefulness in the face of clear and unambiguous words. However need to resort to it is necessary when the words in the context are found to be capable of being construed in more than one sense. In that case, it has to be judged, what was the appropriate sense, which would clearly denote the intention of the legislature. This Court had the privilege of reading the opinion of Lord Simon in the case of Manusell v. Olins, reported in (1975) 1 All E.R. 16 at page 29. The learned law Lord was at pains to explain that the Heydon Rule is applicable at two stages. Firstly it is applied for finding out the plain and primary meaning of statute. Secondly, it has to be applied in order to resolve the ambiguity if the words are not plain. However, omission of Section 166(3) of the Act leaves a gap in over understanding. Here the problem is not that there are words. The problem is that certain words are omitted. The Court must, therefore, try to answer the question why this gap was created by totally repealing Section 166(3) of the Act with effect from 14-11-1994. If we look into the statement of object and reasons for bring in the Act No. 54 of 1994, it would be apparent that the Government wanted to have a watch over the operation of the Act which came into force from 1st July, 1989. The Review Committee received representations from date of its inception regarding its operation from 1990. Thereafter, on the suggestions of the Review Committee, and those of Transport Council object of deletion of Section 166(3) of the Act by the Act No. 54 of 1994 was given as follows :–
xxx xxx xxx xxx
(i) “Removal of time limit for filing of application by road accidents victims for compensation.”
xxx xxx xxx xxx
It appears that the operation of the Act showed that provision of limitation under Section 166(3) of the Act worked harshly on the victims or the claimants. Therefore, it was renounced. The question that this omission would benefit the claimants, who founded their claims on the basis of cause of action on 14-11-1994 or thereafter or to those persons who filed their claims after 14-11-1994 without regard to the cause of action was left open. The gap in the understanding of the intention of the legislature caused by repeal of Section 166(3) of ‘the Act’ is clarified by object and reason for omitting Section 166(3) of ‘the Act’. It is found that the legislature wanted to do away with the limitation clause altogether, as its working was found to be defective. Thus object and reasons indicate that the defect was to be cured by repealing Section 166(3) of the Act. The Court is entitled to give full effect to the principle of ‘Purposive Construction’ to the repeal of Section 166(3) of the Act while applying the ‘Mischief Rule’. We have the opinion of Lord Roskill who pointed out in the case of Anderton v. Ryan, (1985) (2) All E.R. 355 (HL) at page 359 :–
“Statutes should be given what is known as a ‘purposive construction’ that is to say that Court should identify the Mischief, which existed before the passing of the statute and then if more than one construction is possible eliminate the mischief so identified.”
11. Thus the intention of legislature was not to apply Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Therefore, the intention was not to save the operation Section 166(3) of the Act to pending cases or to cases where the ’cause of action’ has already accrued. The intention of Parliament can be given full effect to by holding that it wiped out the disability imposed by Section 166(3) of the Act with retrospective effect as if that sub-section stood repealed from date of the enforcement of ‘the Act’. A two Judge Bench of Supreme Court has taken this view in the case of Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayvargiya, reported in 1996 SC 2155.
12. Faced with the circumstance the learned counsel for the applicant invoked the application of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 on the foundation of the Ruling reported in the case of The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T.P. Kunhatiumma, reported in AIR 1977 SC 282 (three Judge Bench), (2) in the case of 5. Rajan v. State of Kerala and another, reported in 1992 (3) SCC 608, (3) in the case of Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. Thakoredas Major and Ors., reported in 1997 (11) SCC 412.
The first case is the leading case and the other two simply follow it. Therefore, it would suffice to discuss the first case and find out its amplitude. In that Section 16(3) of the Telegraph Act provided that an application for enhancement of compensation lay before the District Judge. The Supreme Court referred to Section 16(4) of the Telegraph Act which showed that the term District Judge was used as an alternative to District Court. Thereafter, considering the overall picture and the context it was held that reference to District Judge was that of a principal Civil Court of Original Civil Jurisdiction. The words ‘District Judge’ were held exchangeable with District Courts which was a Civil Court. It was further held that since the application as defined under Section 2(a) included petitions Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 was applicable. It was pointed out that Article 137 in its setting as well as by the implication of its language showed that it was not confined to Courts constituted under the Code of Civil Procedure, Article 137 would apply to any application filed in a Court. The decision rested on foundation that the District Judge Acts as a Civil Court. However, since other cases were referred to the Court made an obiter observation that Article 137 of the Act would be applicable to all Courts without examining any other provision of ‘the Limitation Act’.
13. In the opinion of this Court the answer the question raised by the counsel for the appellant can be answered by looking to the legislative history rather than trying to find out the logical result posited by him. The learned Counsel who wants this Court to readily infer that repeal of 166 (3) meant that there would be deemed application of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Hereinafter this Court assumes that Motor Vehicles Accidents Claims, Tribunal is a Court in view of the two decisions of this Court reported in the Division Bench case in the case of Krishan Gopal Devi Prasad and Ors. v. Dattatraya Madho Lad, and Full Bench case in the case of Mangilal Ganpat v. The Union of India, reported in AIR 1972 MP 125 and AIR 1974 MP 159 respectively but not accepted wholly by another Full Bench in the case of Yashwant Rao v. Sampat, reported in AIR 1979 MP 21. The doubts expressed therein appear to be justified more so after amendment of 1994. However, the earlier decisions have not been overruled, and therefore, it would be proper to proceed on this hypothesis that the claims tribunal is a Court. It cannot be doubted that Section 166(3) of ‘the Act’ as it stood before the amendment would attract Section 3 of Limitation Act, 1963 by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Thus Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable only to extent it was not excluded by wordings of Section 166(3) of ‘the Act’. Other provisions like Sections 3 and 4 and also Sections 6 to 24 (inclusive) would apply. Thus these Sections would apply because the Act is a ‘Special law’ within the meaning of Section 29(2) of ‘the Act’. It is not necessary to seek the aid of Section 29 of the Limitation Act when the District Judge is required to perform the functions mentioned in Section 16(3) of the Telegraph Act. The words ‘District Judge’ used in Section 16(3) of that Act were equated with District Court which is Court established by the powers conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure. Limitation Act of 1963 would be pari-materia with the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus the Limitation Act of 1963 would be directly applicable without more. This appears to be the ratio of AIR 1977 SC 282 in the case of The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T.P. Kunhaliumma. As already stated, ‘the Act’ would be a special law within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and would not cease to be the special law by omission of Section 166(3) of ‘the Act’. It would still retain the character of special law. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal would not become a Court constituted under the Code of Civil Procedure by deletion of Section 166(3) of the Act. It was the special law that constituted the Motor Vehicles Accidents Claims Tribunal as an alternative to the civil Court. It has already been seen that Parliament wanted no limitation clause after it omitted Section 166(3) of the Act on 14-11-1994. This Court cannot smuggle in by back door Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. If the intention was to extend the limitation by three years, Parliament would have prescribed that limitation in Section 166(3) of the Act rather than omitting it altogether. This action would have been more in consonance with the history of Section 166(3) ibid.
14. Moreover, there is another consideration which militates against the construction suggested by the counsel for the applicant. It appears that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal can itself take cognizance of an accident. Under Section 158(6) of amendment Act there is duty on the officer incharge of the Police to give information received at the police station or to submit completed report of investigation within 30 days to the owner, insurer and the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal of competent jurisdiction. It is further provided that owner shall also send a copy of completed report to the insurers and the claims tribunal of competent jurisdiction. The amended Sub-section (4) of Section 166 of the Act requires the claims tribunal to treat the report under Section 158(6) thereof as an application. It means a claim case can be started without filing of an application on the under Section 166(1) of the Act. If that be so, an application under Section 166(1) of the Act is not compulsory. The question of limitation looses its importance. Last but not least this Court is bound by the following observations of Supreme Court in AIR 1996 SC 2155 in the case of Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayvargiya and Ors. (supra), at page 2157 para 6.
“The effect of the amending Act is that w.e.f. 14-11-1994, there is no limitation for filing claims before the Tribunal in respect of any accident. It can be said that Parliament realised the grave injustice and injury which was being caused to the heirs and legal representatives of the victims who died in accidents by rejecting their claim petitions only on ground of limitation. It is a matter of common knowledge that majority of the claimants for such compensation are ignorant about the period during which such claims should be preferred. After the death due to the accident, of the bread earner of the family, in many cases such claimants are virtually on the streets. Even in cases where the victims escapes death some of such victims are hospitalised for months if not for years”.
Paragraph 7 :–
“When Sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been omitted, then the Tribunal has to entertain a claim petition without taking note of the date on which such accident had taken place. The claim petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim petitions were barred by time when Sub-section (3) of Section 166 was in force.”
Thus the matter appears to be concluded.
15. Before parting this Court, I must thank Shri R.P. Jain, Advocate (Amicus Curiae) who wholeheartedly assisted the Court in arriving at the conclusion by his lucid arguments.
16. The revision has no force. It fails and is dismissed. No costs.