Allahabad High Court High Court

Pandit Sukhraj Raghunathi … vs The National Council For Teacher … on 3 February, 2010

Allahabad High Court
Pandit Sukhraj Raghunathi … vs The National Council For Teacher … on 3 February, 2010
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Court No. - 11

Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 100 of 2010

Petitioner :- Pandit Sukhraj Raghunathi Institute Of Education Technology
Respondent :- The National Council For Teacher Education Wing-Ii Hans
Petitioner Counsel :- Pt.S.Chandra
Respondent Counsel :- Vinay Bhushan

Hon'ble Anil Kumar,J.

Heard Sri Pt. S. Chandra, learned counsel for the petitioner
and Sri Vinay Bhushan, learned counsel for the respondents.

In brief the facts as stated by learned counsel for the
petitioner are that the Pandit Sukhraj Raghunathi Institute of
Education Technology Ranjeetpur, which is situated at Chilbila
Pratapgarh had applied for B.Ed. Course with the respondents
and the said application of the petitioner was rejected by the
order dated 10.7.2009 passed by Regional Director of National
Council for Teacher Education New Delhi (annexure no.2).

Aggrieved by the order dated 10.7.2009 the petitioner filed
an appeal before the appellate authority. The appellate authority
by means of order dated 11.12.2009 had rejected the
petitioner’s appeal on the ground that the same was filed at a
belated stage i.e. after expiry of period of two months four days,
hence the present writ petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioner Pt. S. Chandra submits
that the order dated 11.12.2009 passed by the respondent no.1
thereby rejecting the petitioner’s appeal on the ground of delay
is totally arbitrary and in-contravention to the principle of natural
justice. He further submits that the delay in filing the appeal
should be condoned and the matter should be decided on merit.

Sri Vinay Bhushan, learned counsel for the respondents
submits that the order dated 10.7.2009 has been passed by the
Regional Direction, National Council for Teacher Education, New
Delhi under Section 14(1) of the N.C.E.T.Act, 1993 taking into
consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, however
he does not disputed that the appeal filed by the petitioner has
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been rejected only on the ground of delay by order dated
11.12.2009.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record.

From perusal of the record, it is clear that the appeal filed
by the petitioner has been rejected only on the ground of delay.

It has been the constant view of Hon’ble Supreme Court
and this Court that the principles of natural justice must be
followed and nobody should be condemned unheard as such the
submission made by the counsel for the petitioner that the
impugned action on the part of respondent no.1 rejecting the
petitioner’s appeal only on the ground of delay is an action
arbitrary in nature has got force.

Further in the matter of condonation of delay, the Apex
Court has consistently held that pragmatic view should be taken.

In the case of Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst.
Kati Ji and others,1987(13) ALR 306 (SC) Hon’ble
Supreme Court held as follows:-

“The legislator has conferred the power to
condone delay by enacting section 5 of the
Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable th Courts
to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of
matter on “merits”. The expression “sufficient
cause” employed by the Legislature is adequately
elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a
meaningful manner which subserves the ends of
justice – that being the life – purpose of the
existence of the institution of Courts. It is
common knowledge that this Court has been
making a justifiably liberal approach in matters
instituted in this Court. But the message does not
appear to have percolated down to all the other
Courts in the hierarchy.

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And such a liberal approach is adopted on
principle as it is realized that:

1. Ordinarily , a litigant does not stand to
benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in
a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very
threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As
against this; when delay is condoned, the highest
that can happen is that a cause would he decided
on merit after hearing the parties.

3. “Every ” day’s delay must be explained”
does not mean that a pedantic approach should
be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every
second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a
rational, common sense and pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other, the
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred, for the other side can not claim to have
vested right in injustice being done because of a
non-deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay is
occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable
negligence, or on accout of mala fides. A litigant
does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In
fact, he runs a serious risk.

6. It must be grapped that the judiciary
is respected not on account of its power to
legalise injustice on technical grounds but
because it is capable of removing injsutice and is
expected to do so.”

In N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy,(1998) 7
SCC 133 the Apex Court explained the scope of limitation and
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condonatin of delay, observing as under :-

” The primary function of a Court is to
adjudicate the dispute between the parties and
to advance substantial justice. The time- limit
fixed for approaching the Court in different
situations is not because on the expiry of such
time a bad cause would transform into a good
cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to
destroy the rights of parties . They are meant to
see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics,
but seek their remedy for the redress of the legal
injury so suffered. The law of limitation is thus
founded on public policy.”

In Smt. Prabha Vs. Ram Praskash Kalra, 1987
(Suppl.) SCC 338 the Supreme Court took the view that the
Court should not adopt an injustice- oriented approach in
rejecting the application for condonation of delay.

In Vedabai alias Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil Vs.
Shantaram Baburao Patil and others, 2001 (44) ALR
577 (SC) the Apex Court made a distinction in delay and
inordinate delay observing as under:-

” In exercising discretion under section 5
of the Limitation Act, the Courts should adopt a
pragmatic approach. A distinction must be
made between a case where the delay is
inordinate and a case where the delay is of a
few days. Whereas in the former case the
consideration of prejudice to the otherwise will
be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more
cautious approach…..”

In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Shanti
Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237 Hon’ble Supreme Court held that
discretion given by section 5 should not be defined or crystallized
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so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law.
The expression” sufficient cause” should receive a liberal
construction.

In Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari, AIR
1969 SC 575 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that unless
want bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive
a party of the protection of section 5 is proved, the application
must not be thrown out of any delay cannot be refused to be
condoned.

In O.P. Kathpalia Vs Lakhmir Singh, AIR 1984 SC
1744 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if the refusal to
condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it
would be a ground to condone the delay.

For the foregoing reasons, writ petition is allowed. The
order dated 11.12.2009 passed by respondent no.1 is set aside
and the matter is remanded back to the respondent no.1 to
decide the same in accordance with law after hearing the parties
concerned expeditiously say within a period of four months from
the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.

Order Date :- 3.2.2010
Pramod