ORDER
T.N. Singh, J.
1. In this Reference, we are required by the learned Single Judge to answer the following two questions framed by him:
“(1) Whether in view of amendment in section 115, Civil Procedure Code, made by M.P. Act No. 29/84 an interim order passed by an appellate or revisional Court not finally disposing of the proceedings is open to revision by High Court?
(2) Whether the law contemplates anything like an ‘original order’ passed by a superior Court in a pending appeal or revision as distinguished from an appellate or revisional order?”
2. Indeed, the learned Judge (R. C. Lahoti, J.) was confronted with the question of maintainability of revision and decisions were cited before him by both sides. He found conflicting views expressed by this Court in the decisions cited and felt compelled to make a Reference. As regards facts, suffice to say this much for the purpose of disposal of this Reference that in the revision, an order passed by learned Additional District Judge under Order 41, Rule 3A, Civil Procedure Code was challenged. By that order, the Court below had allowed the application of the defendant/appellant made under section 5, Limitation Act; and delay in filing the appeal was condoned. Evidently, that appeal is awaiting final decision on merits.
3. Section 115, Civil Procedure Code has been amended locally by M.P. Act No. 29 of 1984. Indeed, the following provision has been substituted in its place:
“115. Revision. The High Court in cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value of twenty thousand rupees and above, and the District Judge in any other case may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court or District Judge, as the case may be, and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears –
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity;
the High Court or the District Judge, as the case may be, make such order in the case as it thinks fit:
Provided that in respect of cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of any valuation, decided by the District Judge, the High Court alone shall be competent- to make an order under this section:
Provided further that the High Court or the District Judge shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order including an order deciding an issue, made in the course of a suit or other proceedings, except where, –
(i) The order, if so varied or reversed, would finally dispose of the suit or other proceedings; or
(ii) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made.
Explanation – In this section, the expression ‘any case which has been decided’ includes any order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceeding.”
Be it mentioned immediately that a similar local amendment of section 115 has been brought about in the neighbouring State of Uttar Pradesh and both provisions are substantially in pari materia. We have noticed that position as Apex Court had two occasions to deal with that provision in Vishesh Kumar’s case, AIR 1980 SC 892 and Sri Vishnu Awatar’s case, AIR 1980 SC 1575.
4. We would also like to observe even at this stage, that in the order of Reference, three reported decisions are mentioned, but there are other decisions also of this Court which have a signal bearing on the controversy. Learned Judge has referred to Govindram’s case, 1988 JLJ 235, Ramesh Chandra Sharma’s case, 1989 MPLJ-746 = 1989 MPJR HC 829 and Manbhawati’s case, 1986 (1) MPWN 219. He has also referred to an unreported decision. Recently, however, at this Bench, in the case of Bhanu Prakash Agrawal’s case, 1990 MPJR 16, in a Letters Patent Appeal, the decision in Govindram was examined. This Court’s Full Bench decision in Ramchandra v. Dattatraya, 1986 MPLJ 406 = 1986 JLJ 344 as also Sri Vishnu Awatar (supra) were examined in the said Letters Patent Appeal. One of us (K. K. Varma, J.) had spoken for the Court in that case and he had an occasion to speak also on the scope of amended section 115, in Jagman Singh’s case, 1985 JLJ 319.
5. Although in Ramesh Chandra (supra) some passages are extracted from Sri Vishnu Awatar (supra), the purport of Apex Court’s view appears to have been misconceived. Before we reproduce the passages extracted and add to that another passage from Sri Vishnu Awatar itself, we may refer to the factual basis of Ramesh Chandra’s case. An interlocutory order passed in revision by learned Additional District Judge was challenged and challenge to maintainability of the revision preferred against that order was negated. The short ground for the view, to quote the language of the learned Judge, was, “the distinction between an order thereunder (section 115, Civil Procedure Code) passed by him (District Judge) in exercise of his revisional or appellate jurisdiction affecting the trial Court’s order and an original order thereunder (Section 115, Civil Procedure Code) passed by him not touching the trial Court’s order on merits”. In support of the view it was also observed, “any contrary construction of the provision would offend against the rule regarding availability of at least one remedy referred to in the extract from paragraph 10 in the S.C. decision” (Sri Vishu Awatar).
6. We reproduce now two passages extracted from Sri Vishnu Awatar in Ramesh Chandra Sharma’s case:
“10. Schematically, we are satisfied that decisions of District Courts rendered in appeal or revision are beyond revision by the High Court, if the suit is of less than Rs. 20,000. But an exception has been engrafted by the first proviso to section 3 to the effect that where an original decision has been made by a District Court the High Court’s appellate or revisional power will come into play. That is as it should be, for one appeal or revision is almost universal. But otherwise, the District Court’s decision is immune to revisional probe by the High Court.”
“13. The short test to refuse revisory jurisdiction to the High Court is to ascertain whether the decision sought to be challenged is in a case arising out of a suit of the valuation of Rs. 20,000 and more. If the answer is ‘yes’ then the High Court has revisory power, but if the suit from which the case arises and in which the decision is made is one where the valuation is less than Rs. 20,000/- then the litigation cannot travel beyond the District Court except in that class of cases where the decision is taken for the first time by the District Court itself in a case arising out of an original proceeding. …….”
However, another passage also from para 6 of Sri Vishnu Awatar we extract, as that would put in proper perspective the ratio as also the purport of the view expressed by their Lordships in the extracts reproduced above:
“The words “or other proceedings” in the phrase “cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings” refer to proceedings of final nature. These words have been added in order to bring within the purview of the revisional jurisdiction orders passed in proceedings of an original nature, which are not of the nature of suits, like arbitration proceedings. This phrase cannot include decisions of appeals or revisions, because then the legislature will be deemed to have contradicted itself. The words “or other proceedings” have to be read ejusdem generis with the words “original suits”. They will not include appeals or revisions. The phrase “in any other case” used with reference to the District Court will refer to cases arising out of original suits of the value of less than Rs. 20,000 and also cases arising out of other proceedings of an original nature of a valuation below Rs. 20,000.”
The factual controversy in Sri Vishnu Awatar was short one. High Court had dismissed as not maintainable revisions filed against orders rendered in appeals. Those orders were upheld and the view of the High Court was confirmed that the revisions were not maintainable. What is unclear, however, is that the facts stated by their Lordships do not disclose as to whether revisions were held not maintainable against final or interlocutory orders passed in the case. That indeed, is the crux of the controversy to be decided in this Reference and, therefore, our examination of the law has to proceed further.
7. One short answer is projected in the language used by their Lordships in the extract reproduced above from para 13. To use their Lordships’ Language, “The short test” by which the High Court is yielded revisional jurisdiction is “that class of cases where the decision is taken for the first time by the District Court itself in a case arising out of an original proceeding”. This test, unfortunately, has been missed in Ramesh Chandra (supra). Possibly because the context was missed as in the earlier part of the judgment at para 6, their Lordships had expatiated on the reasonings for reaching subsequently the conclusion regarding the “short test”. They had earlier said as to what they meant by the term “original proceeding”, in para 6, of which relevant portion we have extracted. The phrase “case arising out of original suits or other proceedings”, they observed, “cannot include decisions of appeals or revisions, because then the legislature will be deemed to have contradicted itself.” This they reiterated, saying once again, “They will not include appeals or revisions”.
8. Indeed, this holding is also key to the stray remark which their Lordships made in para 10, “one appeal or revision is almost universal”, on which also Ramesh Chandra has leaned heavily. That remark obviously and logically is referable, as has been expressly stated, to “original decision” of the District Judge. Indeed, the remark merely exemplified the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium in that context – It is dificult to justify, therefore, enlargement of scope of that remark to embrace all orders passed by District Judge, against their Lordships’ contrary intention explicitly manifested.
9. In Govindram (supra), their Lordships’ decision in Sri Vishnu Awatar was, unfortunately, not noted. That may be the reason for the view expressed therein that the words “other proceedings” in the phrases “cases arising out of original suits……” were supposed to mean “every proceeding which is not the original suit”. This view runs directly counter to the supreme dicta we have just noted above. The words, according to Apex Court, are to be read in ejusdem generis sense with the word “suit”. On this short ground, it is not possible to support the view taken in Govindram. True, as in Apex Court, this Court in Govindram had also finally disposed of. the appeal allowing withdrawal of the appeal exercising power under Order 23, Rule 1(3), Civil Procedure Code. In that regard, the factual bases of Govindram and Ramesh Chandra Sharma were different. But, neither view appears to us to be tenable in law in the context of diverse holdings in Sri Vishnu Awatar.
10. Full Bench decision in Ramchandra v. Dattatraya (supra) was distinguished on facts in Govindram and main support for the view taken appears to be found in Satyanarayan Chhotelal, 1948 NLJ 325 = AIR 1949 Nag. 10 as also Abdul Gafoor, AIR 1951 All. 845 and Phulchand. AIR 1962 Patna 63. What was, however, missed was that those decisions were rendered on unamended section 115, Civil Procedure Code. This position was noticed by the Letters Patent Bench in Bhanu Prakash Agrawal (supra). That Bench referred commendably and relied most appropriately on Ratanlais case, 1948 NLI 406 = AIR 1949 Nag. 188 and we have to refer to both decisions in regard to the basic concepts to which courts had addressed themselves in those cases.
11. In Bhanu Prakash Agrawal (supra), the question was of maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal which was negatived mainly on the ground that the appeal was barred by the new section 110A, Civil Procedure Code. The relevance of Bhanu Prakash Agrawal to the instant controversy lies in the fact that learned Single Judge’s order challenged therein was passed on an application made under section 151, Civil Procedure Code, after the Second Appeal was disposed of. It was held that by disposing of that application, the learned Single Judge had exercised Second Appellate jurisdiction and the appeal was, therefore, barred. In Ralanlal too, the plea of non-maintainability was accepted, though on a different ground. The Letters Patent appeal was preferred without obtaining “leave” of the learned Single Judge. In that regard, it was held that the prohibition applied “to ail orders passed in exercise of second appellate jurisdiction”. The Division Bench found that the learned Single Judge had “obtained, seisin of the case as a second appellate court”. For entertaining that view reference was made to section 107, Civil Procedure Code, to explain that appellate Court’s power contemplated thereunder was relatable to exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
12. The Full Bench, in Ramchandra’s case (supra), repelled the challenge to the view expressed in Pir Bux case, 1986 MPLJ 720 = 1986 CCLJ MP 36. Indeed, the Division Bench in Pir Bux as also the Full Bench in Ramchandra rested their decisions mainly on the view expressed by the Apex Court in Sri Vishnu Awatar’s case and in doing so, this Court accepted the position that Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh amendments of section 115, Civil Procedure Code, were in pan materia and Apex Court’s view was the leading light for both. In Pir Bux, reference was made to Apex Court’s decision in Vishesh Kumar as also this Court’s decision in Jagman Singh (supra). Due importance was attached in Jagman Singh to the real purport of the holding in Sri Vishnu Awatar in respect of the phrase “other proceedings” and in that view the revisions filed were held not maintainable. The orders impugned in revisions were passed in appeal, but the suits out of which the appeals arose were of valuation of less than Rs. 20,(X)0/-
13. It may be profitable to refer in this connection to the scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure and to the types of “jurisdiction” of Courts envisaged thereunder. Part I deals with “Suits” (in general); Part VII with “Appeals” and Part VIII with “Reference, Review and Revisions”. There are certain “Preliminary” provisions n.d of those section 6 speaks of “pecuniar limits” and of “ordinary jurisdiction” of civil Courts. As respects “place of suing” jurisdiction of Courts is dealt with variously in sections 15-20. That is fixed also with reference to the place where cause of action arises, as per section 20(c). It is in section 21 that an express mention is made of jurisdiction of “any appellate or evisional Court” and of objection to jurisdiction of such courts that can be taken in respect either of place of suing or of pecuniary limits. Section 96 et. sec. of part VII deals with appeals; and “powers of appellate Court” are enumerated generally in section 107. Section 113 and 114 provide respectively for “Reference” to High Court and “Review” by any court of its judgment, order or decree. High Court has been exclusively contemplated under section 115 as the forum for questioning jurisdictional errors of subordinate courts in any “case” decided by it. Local amendment of that provision, as noticed, has been made in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. In Vishesh Kumar (supra), the object of the amendment was stated as reducing the number of revision petitions filed in the High Court by vesting concurrent jurisdiction in District Court to the extent contemplated. For that, the classification made in terms of two exclusive categories depending on value of suits was recognised.
14. Having regard to the holdings in Vishesh Kumar and Sri Vishnu Awatar of the highest Court of the land, there is little scope for doubting the object of the local amendment that vesting of concurrent jurisdiction was meant to decentralise exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Whether it has really served the purpose of providing easy access to litigants, as observed in Sri Vishnu Awatar. or of load-shedding of work in High Courts, as observed in Vishesh Kumar, is another matter. What is not doubtful is that while vesting concurrent jurisdictions, it was not meant to leave scope for any conflict of jurisdiction at two levels and protraction in final disposal of a litigation was never contemplated. That object has to be kept in view to accord due primacy to norms of purposive interpretation. There can be hardly any warrant, therefore, for making a distinction between an “Original Order” and “Final Order” to produce an absurd or prohibited result. In those cases in which against District Judge’s final order High Court’s jurisdiction to entertain revision is barred, creating conflict by providing revision against his interlocutory order should be a hazardous exercise as that would defeat legislative intent.
15. The word “jurisdiction” implies a court or tribunal with judicial power to hear and determine a cause and that power is conferred by law. (See – Corpus Juris Secundum – Vol. 50 p. 1089). In Butterworths Words and Phrases Legally Defined, Vol. 3, at p. 113, it is stated, “By jurisdiction is meant the authority which a Court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision”. It is also stated that limitations may be imposed on exercise of authority and that may be either as to the kind and nature of the action and matters of which the particular Court has cognizance, or as to the area over which the jurisdiction extends. The Apex Court, in Kiran Singh, AIR 1954 SC 340, enumerated the defects of “jurisdiction” stating that the same may be either pecuniary or territorial and it may also be in respect of subject-matter of the action. Civil Procedure Code has evidently created different types of “actions” such as suits, appeals, revisions, reviews, references etc. to which we have already referred. In regard to each matter, therefore, there is a clear-cut allotment of jurisdiction.
16. Section 2(14), Civil Procedure Code defines the term “Order” to mean “the formal expression of any decision of a civil Court which is not a decree”. If the jurisdiction of a court is fixed with reference to the “action” or the cause litigated before it, it is difficult to conceive of a case in which the same Court will be passing “orders” exercising separate jurisdictions at different stages of progress of the same “action”. Any order passed by that Court, whether it is a trial Court, appellate Court or a revisional Court, will partake the character or status of its author. Merely because an appellate Court or a revisional Court has to deal with and dispose of an interlocutory application and render a decision thereon, it cannot be said that the decision should be treated as a decision rendered not by an appellate Court or revisional Court, but by a trial Court. It would indeed create an anomolaus position if that view is not taken. Because, it would then be possible for revision to be preferred against an interim order passed by any appellate Court or revisional Court in a case in which the final order cannot be revised by High Court on the ground of lesser valuation of the suit. Legislative intent is supposed to eshew obfuscation and indeed, there is nothing in the context to warrant the view that a contradictory result was deliberately intended.
17. Viewed from another angle, in the perspective of the language of the controlling clause, with reference in particular to the expression “case decided”, the same conclusion is reached. Evidently, jurisdiction under section 115 is exercised in respect of a “case decided” and meaning of that expression has crystallised judicially at the summit indelibly. Long back in S.S. Khanna, AIR 1964 SC 497, it was held that part of a “case” was included in the expression. In Baldevdas, AIR 1970 SC 406. it was observed that the word “case” is of comprehensive import and encompasses the entire proceeding in the Court. It follows, therefore, that, generally, all orders passed in appeal or revision are to be regarded as a “case decided” by the appellate or revisional Court exercising respective jurisdiction. It may also be noted that section 107(2), Civil Procedure Code referentially incorporates “same powers” and “same duties” but refers also, at the same time, to “original jurisdiction” in regard to “suits”. An appellate Court, evidently, is not supposed to exercise in “appeal”, in any manner, “original jurisdiction”. For the purpose of determining amenability of any order passed in appeal or revision to High Court’s revisional jurisdiction under amended section 115, there is no scope for distinction between an interim or interlocutory and final order. This view has been rightly taken in Manbhawati (supra).
18. Revisionists’ counsel Shri B. S. Agrawal placed reliance on the Bench decision in Gunnaui, AIR 1990 Delhi 13, but that must be regarded as misconceived. Facts were entirely different in that case. The question was, whether learned Single Judge’s order passed under Order 1, Rule 10, in a suit tried by him in original jurisdiction, was “judgment” against which Letters Patent Appeal would lie. That question has no relevance at all to the controversy confronting us. Counsel has also pleaded that there would arise cases in which a litigant may be rendered remediless if the view taken in Govindram and Ramesh Chandra Sharma, on which he relied, are overrruled. We do not think, it would so happen. We may refer in that connection to this Court’s decision in Balkishan, AIR 1987 MP 120, approved by a Division Bench in Ajit Singh, 1989 MPLJ 6 – AIR 1989 MP 302. The appellate Court had dismissed in that case the appeal by rejecting application for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal, and that was done in exercise of powers under Order 41 Rule 3A, Civil Procedure Code. The Second Appeal, this Court held, was not maintainable, but in appropriate cases, jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution could still be exercised.
19. We sum up now and answer the questions as follows:
(1) No distinction can be made between an “interim” and a “final” order passed by an appellate or revisional Court and all orders passed by those Courts must satisfy the same statutory requirement for a revision against any order passed by those Courts to be maintainable in the High Court.
(2) All orders passed by a Court, in any appeal or revision filed by any party, are orders passed either in appellate or revisional jurisdiction. Law does not contemplate any kind of ‘original order’ being passed in a pending matter in appellate or revisional jurisdiction which can be distinguished in regard to its character from the ‘final order’ passed therein. Law laid down to the contrary in that regard in Govindram, 1988 JLJ 235 and Ramesh Chandra Sharma, 1989 MPU 746 = 1989 MPJR HC 829, is not good law. Law has been correctly stated in Manbhawati, 1986 (I) MPWN 219.
20. We reiterate to clarify the position that as opposed to a single test, under unamended law, of non-appealability of the order, an additional test of valuation has been contemplated under amended law for maintainability of a revision in High Court due to restricted concurrent jurisdiction on the basis of valuation being vested in the District Judge. High Court’s revisional jurisdiction is now invokable against all orders of subordinate courts in those cases only in which the valuation of the suit is above Rs. 20,000/- except against such orders with respect to which it can hear appeals. As a corollary, appellate or revisional orders of a District Judge arising out of a suit of valuation of less than Rs. 20,000 are impervious to High Court’s revisional jurisdiction. However, all orders passed by him in “original suits” or other similar original “proceedings” (not being orders passed in the exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction), irrespective of valuation, are also revisable by the High Court.
21. Before parting with the records, we allow ourselves a bit of loud thinking and plain speaking. While it is not our task to question legislature’s wisdom to change the law to provide concurrent jurisdiction, the working of the provision has not been a happy experience with us. We doubt if there has been any appreciable offtake in regard to load-sharing in so far as High Court is concerned. After revisional power is exercised at the level of the District Judge, petitions are still filed under Article 227 of the Constitution and there is hardly any decline in their number. Work, has, thus, increased at both levels. Courts of District Judges have always remained over-burdened and the new jurisdiction has added to their miseries and to miseries also of the litigants. Protraction in litigation has proliferated and it has become expensive as well, for misadventures are undertaken from time to time at two levels. We would like a copy of this Order to be transmitted to the Secretary to Government, Madhya Pradesh, Law Department, so that State Government can devise means and measures to rationalise the situation, whether by amending the law or otherwise.
Let the records be now placed before the Referring Judge for final disposal of the matter.