JUDGMENT
S.K. Dubey, J.
1. This is a revision by the petitioners-defendants being aggrieved of the order passed in C. S. No. 2-B of 1986 on August 8, 1986, by the Eighth Additional Judge to the Court of the District Judge, Indore, whereby the learned trial court rejected the application of the petitioners-defendants for stay of the suit in view of the provisions of Section 6(1)(b) of the Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1983 (Act No. 40 of 1983), for short “the Act”. The plaintiff, Dena Bank, filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 2,19,220.60 against the petitioners and other defendants, including M/s. Sitaram Mills Limited. It is said that M/s. Sitaram Mills Limited was declared as a sick textile unit and the management of the same was taken over by making certain declarations and a custodian was appointed under the provisions of the Act. An application was filed on
September 10, 1982, by counsel for defendant No. 8, i.e., the sick mills, for stay of the suit in view of the provisions of Section 6(1)(b) of the Act. This application was dismissed on August 8, 1986.
2. Thereafter, an application was filed by the petitioners on December 12, 1983, praying for stay under Chapter III, Clause 6, Sub-clause (4), of the said Act. This application was opposed by the plaintiff-bank. Learned trial court dismissed the application holding that as no notification envisaged under Section 6(1)(b) of the Act has been issued, the proceedings cannot be stayed. The trial court relied upon a decision of the apex court in the case of State Bank of India v. Saksaria Sugar Mills Ltd. [1986] 59 Comp Cas 861 ; AIR 1986 SC 868. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioners have come up to this court in revision.
3. Smt. Shubada Waghmare, learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously contended that the case of the apex court in the case of State Bank of India [1986] 59 Comp Cas 861 ; AIR 1986 SC 868, is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case as the case related to a sugar industry and was with respect to the secured liability due to the bank which was excluded by a notification, while suspending all liabilities under contract to which the notified undertaking was a party. As such, the apex court held that the suit would remain unaffected by the notification. Learned counsel, Smt. Waghmare, further contended that as admittedly, in the present case, the management has been taken over and M/s. Sitaram Mills has been declared a sick textile unit, the provisions of Section 6 apply automatically and hence the court committed a grave error in not staying the suit.
4. Shri J. W. Mahajan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-bank, which is the only contesting party before this court, contended that for staying of all contracts and assurances or suits, it is incumbent that the Central Government has to make certain declarations in relation to certain textile undertakings and has to issue a notification suspending the operation of such contracts, assurances of property agreements, etc. According to learned counsel, there is no such notification and if there had been any notification, when the custodian applied to the court for stay, that notification would have been produced. But, as there was no notification, the application was dismissed and against that order, defendant No. 8 did not come in revision. The affected party was only the custodian i.e., M/s. Sitaram Mills, and not the present petitioners who are the borrowers and are the partners of the partnership firm, Radhakishan and Co. Moreover, even if the notification is issued, at the first instance, it remains in force for one year and the duration of such notification may be extended from time to time by a further notification for a further period not exceeding one year at a time provided such notification shall not, in any case, remain in force after the expiry of three years from the commencement of the Act or the Ordinance. The Act came into force in the year 1983 and more than three years have elapsed ; even assuming that there was such a notification, which is not, in that case too, the suit cannot be stayed. Learned counsel placed reliance on Section 6 of the Act and the case of the apex court in State Bank of India v. Saksaria Sugar Mitts Ltd. [1986] 59 Comp Cas 861 ; AIR 1986 SC 868, and also a case decided by this court in C.R. No. 247 of 1986 decided on July 7, 1988 (Bank of Baroda v. Chaddha and Co. [1990] 67 Comp Cas 6).
5. After hearing counsel, I am of opinion that this revision has no force. The suit was filed as long back as on February 17, 1982, before the enforcement of the Ordinance and thereafter the Act. The custodian so appointed for respondent No. 5, i.e., Sitaram Mills, appeared and applied for stay of the suit. But, his application was dismissed, vide order dated August 8, 1986. No revision was preferred and as such the order became final and in fact the aggrieved party was only Sitaram Mills Ltd. and not the petitioners. In fact, the petitioners cannot have any grudge. Moreover, even if the petitioners have any right to apply under the provisions of Section 6 of the Act, the petitioners could not show or place any notification issued under Section 6(1)(b) of the Act. According to the provisions of Section 6 of the Act, it is necessary that a notification must be issued by the appropriate Government under the said provisions for suspension of contracts, etc. As no such notification has been issued or published in the Gazette up to this time, the suit could not have been stayed and so was rightly not stayed by the trial court. Moreover, in Section 6, there is a limitation provided that, after the issue of the notification, the notification shall remain in force, in the first instance for a period of one year, but the duration of such notification can be extended, from time to time, by a further notification by a period not exceeding one year at a time. There is a proviso under Section 6(2) of the Act that no such notification in any case shall remain in force after the expiry of three years from the commencement of the Act. Even this period of three years has expired. Hence, under the garb of Section 6 of the Act, no application can be made for stay of the suit nor can the suit be stayed. That is the view I have taken in the case of Bank of Baroda v. Chaddha and Co. [1990] 67 Comp Cas 6 (MP).
6. The result is that this revision is dismissed with no order as to costs. The record of the trial court be sent back to that court so as to reach it on or before November 30, 1988, which is the date fixed by the trial court.