JUDGMENT
Gokhale H.L., J.
1. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
2. Petitioner No. 1 herein is a Co-operative Sugar Society registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (“MCS Act” for short). Respondent Nos. 4 to 7 had applied for becoming members of this Society to the 2nd respondent-Regional Deputy Director (Sugar), Kolhapur in August 1995. On that application having been made, the Regional Deputy Director, by his letter dated 30th September, 1995, wrote to the 1st petitioner-Co-operative Sugar Society forwarding applications of 229 members to be made members as well as their demand drafts towards the membership. Earlier the Sugar Co-operative had returned those applications and the payments to the applicants. The letter dated 30th September, 1995 asked the Sugar Co-operative to explain as to why the persons concerned should not be made members of the 1st petitioner-Co-operative Sugar Society and as to why the necessary directions under Section 79 of the MCS Act should not be issued.
3. This letter dated 30th September, 1995 was replied by the 1st petitioner-Co-operative Sugar Society by its response dated 19th October, 1995. The Society wrote back that as on that date the share capital of the Society had been fully contributed and, therefore, there was no scope to enroll more members as per the bye-laws. It was stated that unless the bye-laws were amended, the share capital could not be increased. It was further stated that the factory had some 12,500 producer/members. That strength was sufficient for the factory. It was submitted that it will not be correct to issue the necessary directions under Section 79 of the MCS Act and, therefore, it was requested that the letter dated 30th September, 1995 be withdrawn.
4. This response of the 1st petitioner was rejected by the Regional Deputy Director and by his letter dated 1st November, 1995 he informed the 1st petitioner that the share capital was permitted to be increased by Rs. Ten Lakhs. He further directed that the increased share capital be used for giving membership to the concerned applicants/farmers only. Thereafter he directed that the concerned bye-laws be taken up for appropriate amendment in the next annual general meeting and the decision be returned for approval of the concerned officer. It is this decision which is challenged by filing the present petition.
5. The petition came up for consideration earlier before a Division Bench way back on 16th January, 1996 when ad interim relief in terms of prayer Clauses (d) and (e) was granted. The petition was also admitted on that date. These prayer Clauses (d) and (e) prevented the operation of the impugned letters/orders passed by the Regional Deputy Director (Sugar), Kolhapur and the petitioners were not compelled to increase the share capital as sought by the applicants/members.
6. Mr. Jahagirdar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, firstly, submitted that it is for the Co-operative Society concerned to decide as to whether it should increase its share capital. It will depend upon the examination of its financial position and that will be for the members of the Co-operative Sugar Society to decide. The Registrar of the Co-operative Societies cannot direct a Society that the share capital be increased. Secondly, he submitted that assuming it is decided to increase the share capital, again it is for the Society to decide after considering the applications of the applicants (who may be numerous) as to whom the shares should be allotted. The Registrar cannot direct that particular persons be made members and the shares be allotted to them.
7. Mr. Patil, learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 4 to 7, on the other hand, submitted that the 1st petitioner- Co-operative Sugar Society is financially quite strong. It is exhausting the sugarcane which is available within its area of operation. Over and above it is required to purchase the sugarcane from other adjoining areas. Its financial results were very good and because of its good performance and crushing of very large quantity of sugarcane, it has set up another Unit at village Vategaon.
8. Mr. Patil submitted that it is totally unreasonable for the Sugar Co-operative to decline membership to the applicants. They were producer/applicants, they were having their agricultural fields in the area of operation of this very Sugar Co-operative and were supplying their sugarcane to the 1st petitioner-Co-operative Sugar Society. This being so, there was no reason as to why they should not have been made members. He further submitted that there was a full justification for the Registrar of Co-operative Societies to issue the kind of directives that he had. We note that Mr. Jahagirdar appearing for the petitioners disputes the assertion of Mr. Patil that respondent Nos. 4 to 7 supplied their sugarcane to the 1st petitioner-Co-operative Sugar Society.
9. We may not go into this factual controversy. What is in issue is the direction by the Regional Deputy Director (Sugar) in the present case directing the petitioners to increase the share capital and to allot it to the particular applicants. As far as this aspect is concerned, Mr. Jahagirdar has relied upon two judgments of the Apex Court. Firstly, there is a judgment of a Constitution Bench in the case of Smt. Damyanti Naranga v. The Union of India and Ors. in the context of Hindi Sahirya Sammelan Act. In paragraph 6 of the judgment, the Constitution Bench has noted that it was argued that the right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) is only to form an Association and that any regulation of its affairs after it is formed will not amount to a breach of that right. The Apex Court thereafter observed that the Act did not merely regulate the administration of the affairs of the Society. What it did was to alter the composition of the Society itself. The result of this change in composition was that the members who voluntarily formed the Association were compelled to act in that Association with other members who had been imposed as members by the Act and in whose admission to membership they had no say. Thereafter what the Court observed is material for our purpose which is as follows:
The right to form an association, in our opinion, necessarily implies that the persons forming the Association have also the right to continue to be associated with only those whom they voluntarily admit in the Association. Any law, by which members are introduced in the Voluntary Association without any option being given to the members to keep them out, or any law which takes away the membership of those who have voluntarily joined it, will be a law violating the right to form an association. If we were to accept the submission that the right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) is confined to the initial stage of forming an Association and does not protect the right to continue the Association with the membership either chosen by the founders or regulated by rules made by the Association itself, the right would be meaningless because, as soon as an Association is formed, a law may be passed interfering with its composition, so that the Association formed may not be able to function at all. The right can be effective only if it is held to include within it the right to continue the Association with its composition as voluntarily agreed upon by the persons forming the Association. This aspect was recognised by this Court, though not in plain words, in the case of G.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph .
10. The second judgment relied upon by Mr. Jahagirdar is a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Karvenagar Sahakari Griha Rachana Sanstha Maryadit, Pune and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. which has been subsequently confirmed by the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Karvenagar Sahakari Griha Rachna Maryadit reported in 2000(9) S.C.C. 295. That was a matter wherein the bye-laws of the Housing Society laid down that a member would be enrolled provided such member desires to construct a house on the allotted plot for his own use. In the instant case, one of the members sought to put a multi-storeyed building and which was not to come up for self occupation. The Society did not permit such construction which led to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies to issue such a direction to the petitioner-Society. In paragraph 5 of the judgment, the Division Bench framed a question as to whether the State Government had the power to issue a fiat to the Registrar to compel the Society to amend the bye-laws and which are detrimental to the interest of the Housing Society. The Division Bench followed the law laid down in Damyanti’s case (supra) and in terms held that such a direction could not be given either by the State Government or by the Registrar. As stated above, the judgment has been confirmed by the Apex Court.
10-A. The third judgment relied upon by Mr. Jahagirdar is in the case of Zoroastrian Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. and Anr. v. District Registrar, Cooperative Societies and Ors. . This was a case of a Housing Society which was formed with the object of providing the housing to the members of the Parsi community. Persons not belonging to the Parsi community were not permitted to become members. The stand taken by the Society was approved by the Apex Court. The Court held that it was permissible for a legislature to introduce in the statute a provision eliminating qualifications for membership based on a religion, persuasion or mode of life etc. However, so long as there was no legislative intervention of such a nature, it was not open to the Court or authorities acting under the statute to direct that a particular approved bye-law of a Society was not desirable. Mr. Jahagirdar, therefore, submits that the law on this aspect is quite clear. The Society has its own bye-laws and it is permitted to function in accordance therewith. In the present case, according to the Society, its financial position did not permit enhancing the share capital. If that was the view of the Society, it was not permissible and not expected of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies to give a direction under Section 79 of the MCS Act to enforce any particular obligation on the Society. He further submitted that assuming that any such direction could be given, surely the Registrar cannot direct that particular persons should not be enrolled as members. That was a prerogative of the Society.
11. On the other hand, Mr. Patil, learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 4 to 7, submitted that as can be seen from the Division Bench judgment of our Court in the case of Karvenagar (supra), if any direction is given detrimental to the interest of the Housing Society that could be frowned upon. He places this interpretation on paragraph 5 of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. In his submission, in the present case, respondent Nos. 4 to 7 fulfilled all the requirements. They were farmers producing sugarcane. They were having the requisite agricultural holdings and they were having their agricultural fields in the area of operation of the 1st petitioner-Co-operative Sugar Society. Besides, the financial position of the factory was very good. That being so, the law laid down by the Apex Court in Damyanti, Karvenagar and Zoroostrian’s cases (all supra) should not be read as obstructing or preventing the direction as given in the present case.
12. We have noted the submissions of both the Counsel. As seen from the impugned directions of the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies in which he is relying upon Section 79 of the MCS Act, it is clear that he has directed the Co-operative Sugar Society to increase its share capital by Rs. Ten Lakhs. Mr. Jahagirdar has submitted that the 1st petitioner-Co-operative Sugar Society is interested in giving better facilities to its existing members and does not wish to expand it any more. It is an aspect where perhaps another view is possible but it is ultimately the members of a particular Society who have to decide as to whether they should enroll more members. Right to form an Association includes a right to make a decision as to who should remain as members of the Association or Society and whether any new members should be added therein. In our view, the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Damyanti (supra) and particularly the observations made by it in paragraph 6 thereof as above will squarely apply to the present case. Therefore, the direction of the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies to the 1st petitioner-Cooperative Sugar Society to increase its members was uncalled for and was in excess of his powers under Section 79 of the MCS Act.
13. Similarly even if the membership is to be increased, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies cannot direct that the particular persons be enrolled as members. It is possible that they are having the necessary qualifications as pointed out by Mr. Patil in the case of respondent Nos. 4 to 7. At the same time, there would be many other persons who will be having the necessary qualifications. The Registrar cannot inform the 1st petitioner-Co-operative Sugar Society that it should make the particular persons as members. In the event the Society decides to increase its share capital, it is for the Society to invite applications and from among the applicants, it is for the Society to decide as to who should be enrolled as members which, of course, will be on the basis of examination of their qualifications.
14. In the circumstances, we allow the petition and set aside the orders/directions contained in the letter dated 1st November 1995 issued by the 2nd respondent-Regional Deputy Director (Sugar), Kolhapur to the 1st petitioner-Co-operative Sugar Society.
15. Rule is made absolute accordingly. No order as to costs.