ORDER
K.K. Lahoti, J.
1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court by which the suit of plaintiff/respondent under Section 12(1)(a) and Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred as ‘the Act’) has been decreed. The Trial Court dismissed the suit but on filing appeal by the respondent it has been decreed.
2. Before considering the case of appellant it will be appropriate to state one material fact that during the pendency of this appeal, plaintiff/respondent Bhagwandas has died on 18-1-2006. The appellant filed an application for substitution of legal heirs which has been allowed and wife of late Bhagwandas has been substituted in this appeal. The appellant has also filed another application under Order 6 Rule 17, CPC seeking amendment that during the pendency of the second appeal, sole plaintiff has died on 18-1-2006. The need as set upto by the plaintiff and pleaded in the plaint has come to an end and appellant cannot be evicted from the suit shop under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As this appeal has not been admitted yet, the aforesaid application cannot be considered at pre-admission stage. However, this fact may be taken into consideration at the time of admission of the appeal and accordingly it is taken into consideration.
3. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the Appellate Court erred in decreeing the suit of plaintiff/respondent under Section 12(1)(a) and Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. Though the suit was filed on the ground of arrears of rent but there was dispute in respect of amount of rent and a dispute under Section 13(2) of the Act was raised by the appellant. The Trial Court vide order dated 6-1-1998 allowed one month’s time to the appellant to deposit the rent and thereafter on 19-3-1998 again allowed a week’s time to deposit the rent to the appellant. The appellant deposited the entire rent on 20-3-1998 and there was in fact no default on the part of the appellant, and on compliance of Section 13(1) of the Act the decree under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act could not have been passed against the appellant. So far as the decree under Section 12(1)(f) is concerned the plaintiff failed to establish his need. He was having a shop adjoining to the disputed shop which was vacant for the alleged need of plaintiff. The said house was sold by the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit so the need was not bonafide and the Appellate Court erred in decreeing the suit of the respondent. For starting the business of selling whole sale fruits, the need has come to an end after the death of the plaintiff/respondent. It is submitted that this appeal be admitted/allowed and the plaintiff suit may be dismissed.
4. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the Appellate Court has rightly decreed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent under Section 12(1)(a) and Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. There were arrears of rent since 1-10-1992. The tenant failed to deposit the rent in spite of service of summon as required under Section 13(1) of the Act so plaintiff filed an application under Section 13(6) of the Act. The tenant also filed an application under Section 13(2) of the Act. Both the applications were considered by the Trial Court vide order dated 6-1-1998. Though the Trial Court dismissed both the applications but allowed a month’s time to the tenant to deposit the entire arrears of rent before the Trial Court. The appellant failed to deposit the rent as directed by the Trial Court on 6-1-1998 so the plaintiff was entitled for a decree under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. Thereafter the landlord filed an application under Section 13(6) of the Act to strike out the defence of the appellant on the ground that the rent as directed by the Trial Court on 6-1-1998 was not deposited. This application was decided by the Trial Court on 19-3-1998 in which the Trial Court directed the tenant to file receipts within a period of one week and to furnish the statement of the rent deposited by him, in default of which the Trial Court directed to strike out the defence, but no further opportunity to the tenant was allowed by the Trial Court to deposit the rent within a period of one week. In these circumstances Appellate Court has rightly held that though the rent was deposited after the order dated 19-3-1998 but no prayer was made by the tenant for condonation of delay in deposit and the landlord was entitled for the decree under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. So far as the decree under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act is concerned, merely because of the death of the landlord after passing of the decree the ground of eviction shall not vanish. In this regard he has placed reliance to the Apex Court judgment in Shakuntala Bai and Ors. v. Narayan Das and Ors. and submitted that in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court that in a suit filed by the landlord on the ground of his personal need for non-residential accommodation and after the decree is passed by the Court and during the pendency of the appeal by the tenant, because of the death of landlord, bonafide need does not come to an end and the legal heirs of the landlord are entitled for a decree. The bonafide need of the landlord has to be examined on the date of institution of the suit, subsequent event of death of landlord is not relevant.
Relying on the aforesaid, it is submitted that even during the pendency of this appeal, the death of landlord, will not affect the decree. It is submitted that no substantial question of law arises in this appeal an the appeal may be dismissed at the admission stage.
5. In this case suit was filed by the plaintiff against the appellant on the ground that the suit shop is required bonafide to the plaintiff for the purposes of starting of his own business of fruit-whole sale. At the time of filing of the suit plaintiff was doing the business on the street in a handcart as he was having no alternative suitable place for starting his own business. It is alleged in Para 3 of the plaint that the defendant has not paid arrears of rent in spite of notice of demand dated 11-1-1996. In Para 6 the arrears of rent has been claimed by landlord from 1-10-1992. The suit was filed on 23-3-1996. The Trial Court after framing of the issues and recording evidence arrived on following findings:
(i) That the plaintiff is the landlord of the suit accommodation.
(ii) That the defendant is tenant at the of Rs. 300/- per month of the suit accommodation.
(iii) That the defendant has not paid rent since 1-10-1992 in spite of notice dated 11-14996.
(iv) The Trial Court found that the tenant has deposited the rent as per the order dated 6-1-1998 and 19-3-1998 so the plaintiff is not entitled for a decree under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. So far as Section 12(1)(f) of the Act is concerned, it is found that the plaintiff was having alternative accommodation at the time of filing of the suit and on this ground also the plaintiff was not found entitled for decree of eviction. The Trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent.
6. Against the judgment and decree of the Trial Court an appeal was preferred. The Appellate Court found that though on 6-1-1998, the Trial Court directed the defendant to deposit the entire arrears of rent within a period of 30 days but the rent was not deposited within the time period. There is no extension of time by the Trial Court on 19-3-1998 and the appellant has not deposited the rent as required under Section 13(1) of the Act. As there is no order of condonation of delay in depositing the rent by the appellant, the Appellate Court found that the landlord is entitled for a decree under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. So far as the ground under Section 12(1)(f) is concerned, the Appellate Court found that the alleged alternative accommodation was in the lane, while the suit accommodate is in the main street. The aforesaid alleged alternative accommodation is not suitable for the business of plaintiff and granted decree under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act also.
7. Now to appreciate the contention of the parties, firstly the ground under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act may be seen. In this case it is not in dispute that on 6-1-1998, the Trial Court while considering both the applications directed tenant to deposit entire arrears of rent within a period of 30 days from the date of order. It is not in dispute that the tenant had not deposited the entire arrears of rent within the aforesaid period. The contention of the appellant is that on 19-3-1998, the Trial Court extended a period of one week to deposit the rent and the tenant deposited the entire arrears of rent on 20-3-1998, on succeeding day. While the contention of the respondent is that no such time was extended by the Trial Court and in the absence of extension of time or condonation of delay in depositing the rent, the tenant was not entitled for benefit under Section 12(3) of the Act and the Appellate Court has rightly granted decree under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act.
8. To consider the rival contention of the parties, the order dated 19-3-1998 passed by the Trial Court may be seen. This order was passed by the Trial Court on an application filed by the landlord under Section 13(6) of the Act in which it is alleged that the tenant has not deposited the entire rent nor has furnished the receipts of deposit of the rent. On the aforesaid application, the Trial Court very specifically passed the order that one week time is allowed to the tenant to furnish the deposit receipts in compliance of the order dated 6-1-1998 and shall also furnish the particulars of deposit of the rent to the Court, otherwise the defence of the tenant shall be struck out. From the perusal of the entire order, nowhere the Trial Court had extended the time to deposit the amount to the tenant in continuation to order dated 6-1-1998. When time period was not extended by the Trial Court, the tenant on deposit of the rent on 20-34998 was under an obligation to file an application for seeking condonation of delay or extension of time for depositing the rent. In the absence of which, it can very well be presumed that the tenant has failed to comply with the provisions of Section 13(1) of the Act or order dated 6-1-1998 by the Trial Court and the landlord was entitled for decree under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. The benefit of Section 12(3) of the Act is available only when the provisions of Section 13(1) of the Act are complied with. In the absence of which the tenant could not invoke benefit under Section 12(3) or 13(5) of the Act and the landlord was entitled for a decree under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. The Appellate Court considering the aforesaid aspect has granted decree under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act in which there is no infirmity nor any substantial question of law arises in this appeal.
9. Now another question arises that on the basis of subsequent event because of the death of landlord, decree under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act may be set aside by this Court or the wife who is the sole legal heir of the respondent may continue with the aforesaid need of business. In this case the bonafide need of the landlord is based on the ground that he was earning his livelihood by selling fruits on hand cart and his need was to start wholesale fruit business in the suit accommodation. The aforesaid business may be continued by the wife, even after the death of her husband, the landlord. The business to sell wholesale fruits may be carried out by the widow. Apex Court in the similar circumstances in Shakuntala Bai (supra) held thus:
14. Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act says “no suit shall be filed in Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction….” The language employed does not say “no decree shall be passed….” So the bar created is against filing of the suit except on one of the grounds enumerated in Clauses (a) to (p) of the Sub-section. Therefore what is to be seen is whether the suit was validly filed, i.e., whether on the date of filing of the suit one of the grounds was made out. A suit validly filed cannot be scuttle or held no longer maintainable in absence of any specific provision to that effect. Therefore, the principle that “the need of the landlord must exist till the decree for eviction is passed by the last Court and attains finality” can even otherwise have no application here in view of the express language used in the section.
15. As the preamble shows the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 has been enacted for expeditious trial of eviction cases on the ground of bonafide requirement of landlords and generally to regulate and control eviction of tenants. If the subsequent event like the death of the landlord is to be taken note of at every stage till the decree attains finality, there will be no end to litigation. By the time a second appeal gets decided by the High Court, generally a long period elapses and on such a principle if during this period the landlord who instituted the proceedings dies, the suit will have to be dismissed without going into merits. The same thing may happen in a fresh suit filed by the heirs and it may become an unending process. Taking into consideration the subsequent events may, at times, lead to rendering the whole proceedings taken infructuous and colossal waste of public time. There is no warrant for interpreting a Rent Control legislation in such a manner the basic object of which is to save harassment of tenants from unscrupulous landlords. The object is not to deprive the owners of their properties for all times to come.
10. In view of the settled law by the Apex Court even after the death of landlord a decree in second appeal cannot be set aside, merely because of the death of landlord. The law permits the eviction of tenant for the requirement of landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting a business for his own or that of his major sons or unmarried daughters. The landlord who intended to start his business in the suit accommodation and could not get the accommodation during his life time, the aforesaid business may be continued by the wife. The decree which was passed in favour of the landlord does not cease to be ineffective because of the death of plaintiff/landlord. After the death of landlord a senior member of his family takes his place and is entitled to the suit accommodation for the business which was intended by the landlord who in spite of two decrees of the Courts below in his favour could not get the accommodation during his life time. The family members of the landlord cannot be deprived with the decree in favour of the deceased landlord. Apex Court in Shakuntala Bai (supra) has considered the law at length and the controversy has been set at rest.
11. The position may have changed if the landlord dies during the course of trial of the suit, but the position will be different when a decree in favour of the landlord is passed and is affirmed by the Appellate Court. Under such circumstances, decree may be treated in favour of benefit of his legal heirs. The rights of landlord are heritable and devolved after his death in his legal heirs. If a suit is filed on a ground which may be available to the legal heirs after the death of original landlord a legal representatives will be entitled to continue with the need and the decree cannot be set aside merely on the ground of death of landlord.
12. So far as the finding recorded by the Appellate Court is concerned, the appellate found that alternative shop alleged by the tenant was in the lane but the suit accommodation is in main street which is suitable for the business of the landlord. It can very well be presumed that in a lane business of fruit cannot be run and the most suitable shop will be the shop in the main street. The Appellate Court after considering the entire facts has recorded the aforesaid findings in which no infirmity is found. In view of the aforesaid, in respect of ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act also no substantial question of law arises in this appeal.
13. At this stage, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant is carrying on his oil business in the suit accommodation, and he may be allowed some reasonable period to vacate the accommodation as he may face some difficulty in getting alternative accommodation. The sole source of livelihood of tenant is business of oil which he is carrying on in the suit accommodation. Though the prayer is opposed by the learned Counsel for the respondent but in the interest of justice, appellant is allowed a period of one year to vacate the shop but on the following terms:
(1) That the appellant shall file an undertaking within 60 days before the Trial Court that the appellant shall vacate the suit accommodation on or before 31-3-2007, peacefully without creating any hindrance or third party interest in the accommodation.
(2) The appellant shall deposit entire arrears of rent (if any) and the cost incurred in the Court below within a period of 60 days from today and thereafter shall continue to deposit the rent till he vacates the shop as directed by this Court.
(3) On furnishing the aforesaid undertaking and depositing the rent as directed by this Court in condition Nos. 1 and 2, the Executing Court shall permit the appellant to occupy the shop upto 31st March, 2007, in default of which, the respondent shall be entitled to execute the decree forthwith.
14. With the aforesaid directions this appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.