JUDGMENT
S.L. Jain, J.
1. Being aggrieved by the order dated February 21, 2002, passed by the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 448/2001, followed by dismissal of MCC No. 1295/2002 on January 24, 2003, filed for review of the order dated January 21, 2002, the appellant has filed this Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent.
2. The case of the appellant, in brief, is that he was working in Ramnagar Colliery with effect from July 31, 1977. He was charge sheeted on May 24, 1987. Thereafter, he was dismissed summarily from the service vide order dated May 24, 1987 passed by respondent No. 3. Aggrieved by the dismissal order, the appellant sent a representation to the Government. The Government of India referred the dispute for adjudication to Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur (hereinafter referred to as the “Tribunal”). The Tribunal, fixed the case for recording evidence and after recording evidence decided the reference against the appellant holding that misconduct of the workman has been fully established and the punishment of his dismissal from service is neither disproportionate nor harsh. The petitioner challenged the order of the Tribunal by filing Writ Petition No. 448/2001. In the writ petition it was put forth by the appellant that he was also prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 294/506B and 341, Indian Penal Code. He faced the trial before the JMFC, Kotma, District Shahdol, in Criminal Case No. 61/1987 and vide judgment dated September 16, 1991 he was acquitted by the Court. The appellant also put forth that once he was acquitted by the competent Court, he could not have been punished in the departmental enquiry on the same allegations. In the writ petition, the appellant averred that the Tribunal should not have allowed management to lead evidence. He also submitted that the punishment of dismissal is very harsh in nature. His services ought not to have been dismissed after 13 years on the ground of an imaginary incident. It was prayed by the appellant that he be reinstated in service with full back wages and consequential benefits.
3. The learned single Judge did not find any infirmity or perversity in the order passed by the Tribunal and dismissed the petition at the admission stage. The petitioner, thereafter, submitted an application (MCC No. 1298/2002) before the learned single Judge for review of the order dated January 21, 2002, passed in the writ petition. The learned single Judge dismissed the review petition also observing that no case is made out for review of the order. It is against this order that the appellant has come up in this appeal.
4. We have heard Shri S.K. Pathak, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and perused the record.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that in rule nisi, the Tribunal held that the dismissal of the appellant was illegal and bad in law. After passing such an order the case should have been proceeded only on the basis of the available material and no opportunity for leading fresh evidence should have been given.
6. Simply because an interim order was passed in favour of the appellant, it is not open for him to say that a final order could not have been passed contrary to the interim order. Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act makes the provision for additional evidence, therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction for taking fresh evidence.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant next submitted that when both, a criminal prosecution and departmental enquiry on similar grounds of misconduct started against the appellant and he was acquitted on the criminal charge, the departmental enquiry against him could not have proceeded on the self same charges. This contention also cannot be accepted. Law is now well settled by series of decisions that on the self same allegations both departmental enquiry and criminal case against a delinquent can be continued and if during the pendency of the departmental proceedings, the criminal case against the delinquent employee is concluded in his acquittal or discharge, then that cannot be a ground for departmental enquiry to be struck off. Nor can a delinquent employee be excluded only because he is acquitted by the Criminal Court on the self same charges. In Corporation of City of Nagpur v. Ramchandra G. Modak and Ors., AIR 1984 SC 626 : 1981 (2) SCC 714 : 1981-II-LLJ-6, the Apex Court has made this position quite clear by stating as follows at p. 6 of LLJ (head note):
” ….. merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental enquiry is not taken away nor is its discretion in any way fettered.”
“If, however, the authority feels that there is sufficient evidence and good grounds to proceed with the enquiry, it can certainly do so.”
Thus, the acquittal in criminal case does not abate the disciplinary enquiry pending against a delinquent employee because the nature and scope of the criminal case is very different from the departmental enquiry or disciplinary proceedings. The enquiry or trial by a criminal Court and disciplinary proceedings cannot be equated and the fact that a particular act alleged against the employee amounts to an offence under Indian Penal Code or any other special criminal statute, does not necessarily impose a duty on the disciplinary authority to take recourse to criminal prosecution only and not to initiate the departmental enquiry. In such a case, it is discretionary for the employer to start a disciplinary proceedings against the employee after or before conclusion of the trial or to initiate the departmental enquiry without starting the criminal case.
8. The processes of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are different and distinct. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty which the offender owes to society. Crime is an act of commission in violation of law or omission to public duties. Departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of the public service. Therefore, the learned single Judge has rightly held that the order of acquittal passed in a criminal Court does not debar the disciplinary authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant on the self same charges.
9. The Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that Article 20(3) of the Constitution is attracted in this case. Once the appellant was acquitted in a criminal proceeding, the continuance of departmental enquiry on the same facts amounts to double jeopardy and hence violates Article 20(3) of the Constitution. This contention also is bereft of any substance. Article 20(3) of the Constitution is not attracted when criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings on the same subject are started.
10. The Learned counsel for the appellant lastly contended that punishment of dismissal of the appellant from service is harsh. When the appellant, employee of coal mine made a target to put up attack on a senior officer of the organisation and his conduct was quite detrimental to the proper functioning of the organisation or its internal discipline, the punishment cannot be said to be harsh. The ‘misconduct’ is a generic term and means a conduct amiss to mismanagement, wrong or improper conduct or behaviour. Insubordination, is a serious matter. When competent authority passes an order of dismissal validly and legally, the order of dismissal cannot be faulted. It is fully established that on May 20, 1987 the appellant had behaved in a riotous manner with Shri S.K. Mitra, who was then working as Dy. CME, such conduct of an employee can hardly be protected. Keeping in view that the appellant spurned the discipline and misbehaved with the superior officer, the disciplinary authority had no option but to impose punishment of dismissal. The punishment of the appellant, under the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be said to be harsh.
11. No other point was raised before us.
12. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.