High Court Patna High Court

Ram Baban Rai vs Ram Shakhi Devi on 25 February, 2009

Patna High Court
Ram Baban Rai vs Ram Shakhi Devi on 25 February, 2009
Author: S.Nayer Hussain
                          APPEAL FROM APPELLATE DECREE NO.15 OF 1988
                                        ***

Against the judgment and decree dated 07.09.1987 passed by Sri Mohan Krishna
Verma 1st Addl. District Judge, Begusarai in M.T.A.No.44 of 1974/ 14 of 1987
reversing the judgment and decree dated 22.08.1974 passed by Sri Raghuraj
Singh, Munsif 2nd Begusarai in T.S. No. 38 of 1962.

***

1. Rambhaban Rai son of late Singheshwsar Rai

2. Indu Shekhar Rai son of late Singheshwar Rai

3. Daimun Kumari @ Daimani Kumari daughter of late
Singheshwar Rai,
All residents of village Pasopur, P.S. Bachhawara, District- Begusarai.

….. Plaintiffs- Respondents- Appellants 1st Set

4. Ganga Rai

5. Ramphal Rai

6. Chandra Shekhar Rai, all sons of late Jhari Rai,
Nos.4-6 residents of village- Pasopur, P.S. Bachhawara, District-
Begusarai.

…. Defendants-Respondents- Appellants 2nd Set
Versus

1. Ram Sakhi Debi wife of late Siriphal Rai

2. Fauzdar Rai

3. Muna Rai

4. Jhuna Rai

5. Sanjay Kumar Rai

6. Manju Devi

7. Nirmala Devi,
Nos.2-7 sons and daughters of late Siriphal Rai @ Siriphal Lal Rai
Nos.1-7 residents of village-Pasopur,P.S.Bachhwara, District-Begusarai.

…. Defendant 1st party- Appellants-Respondents

For the appellants : M/S Sukumar Sinha, Sr. Advocate and Abinash
Kumar, Advocate.

For the respondents : M/S Devendra Prasad Sharma and Kamta Prasad
Rai, Advocates.

***

PRESENT

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.N. HUSSAIN

S.N. Hussain, J. This second appeal has been filed by the appellants against the

judgment and decree of the learned court of appeal below by which the judgment

and decree of the learned trial court was set aside and the claim/suit of the

plaintiffs was dismissed.

2. The matter arises out of Title Suit No. 38 of 1962 which was

filed by appellants 1 st set for declaration of their title over the suit properties,

detailed in Schedule-A of the plaint, recovery of its possession, permanent

injunction and other ancillary reliefs. The said Schedule-A lands include several
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plots totally measuring 1 bigha, 17 katha and 13 dhurs situated in village Pasopur,

Pargana Nayipur, P.S. Bachhwara, Thana No.27 in the district of Munger (now

Begusarai). The plaintiffs appended following genealogical table at the foot of the

plaint :-

Pahalwan Rai

Durga Rai Genor Rai Khusi Rai

Mirkhu Bhukhan Ram Nath Pradeep Dahu Buchan
X = Murta =Sitalman

X

Jhari Doman Parmeshwar Singheshwar Ram Charan
X (Pl-2) (Pl-1) = Imda

Ganga Rampal Chandra Shekhar
(D-4) (D-5) (D-6)

3. The claim of the plaintiffs was that the suit property originally

belonged to Pahalwan Rai who left behind three sons, Durga, Genor and Khusi,

out of whom Genor’s heirs are plaintiffs and Durga’s heirs are defendants 3 rd

party. It is also claimed that third brother Khusi left behind two sons, Dahu and

Buchan out of whom Dahu was issueless whereas Buchan had a son only named

Ram Charan who was also issueless and all three of them died prior to the

cadestral survey operation leaving behind their respective widows out of whom,

Murta widow of Dahu and Sitalman widow of Buchan, were recorded in the

cadestral survey whereas Imda widow of Ram Charan did not inherit because

Ram Charan died in the life time of his father and uncle.

4. It was also submitted by the plaintiffs that although Imda had

no title over the suit property but she executed two sale deeds dated 06.02.1938

and 06.01.1943 in favour of predecessors in interest of defendant first party,

namely, Shri Siriph Lal Rai, hence Genor filed Title Suit No. 23 of 1944 ( 15/46)

against the said Siriph Lal Rai ( defendant first party) for declaration of title,

setting aside the said sale deeds and other ancillary reliefs. The heirs of Durga
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also appeared in that suit and supported the claim of the plaintiffs and the said suit

was decreed by the trial court vide judgment and decree dated 12.06.1947 ( Ext.

9) against which defendant first party filed Title Appeal No. 204 of 1946 which

was allowed by the learned lower appellate court vide judgment and decree dated

09.06.1947 ( Ext. 9-A). Against the judgment and decree passed in title appeal the

plaintiffs filed S.A. No. 1837 of 1947 which was allowed by this Court on

02.09.1949 ( Ext. 9-B) declaring the title of the heirs of Genor and Durga as

reversioners but found them to be entitled to possession only after the death of

Imda who was found to be holding the suit property as widow’s estate which was

subject to restrictions on alienation . It was also held that two sale deeds executed

by Imda would not bind the reversioners after death of Imda. The said judgment

and decree of S.A. No. 1837 of 1947 was never challenged by anyone and thus it

attained finality.

5. The plaintiffs also claimed that Imda died issueless on

11.11.1950 (Ext. 10), whereafter the heirs of Genor and Durga ( plaintiffs and

defendants 3rd party) came in possession of the suit land as reversioners but they

were dispossessed from the said land on 05.02.1962 by defendant first party on

the basis of order passed in a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure ( Ext. I), whereafter the plaintiffs filed the instant Title Suit

No. 38 of 1962 on 08.05.1962. The claim of the plaintiffs (appellants 1 st Set), who

are the heirs of Genor, was fully supported by defendant 3 rd party (appellants 2nd

set), who are the heirs of Durga.

6. The suit was contested only by defendant 1 st party, namely,

Siriph Lal Rai (predecessor of respondents), claiming that after the death of Dahu,

Murta, Buchan, Sitalman and Ram Charan only Imda was left among the heirs of

Khusi , hence she inherited the entire property of Khusi as absolute owner and in

that capacity she sold the same to Geeta Rai and Harku Rai by registered deed

dated 06.02.1938 and 06.01.1943 ( Exts. B and B-1) whereafter Geeta Rai

relinquished his claim in favour of Harku Rai, predecessor of defendant 1 st party,

who became absolute owner in possession of the entire 5 bigha, 14 katha, 8 dhur
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of land including the suit land which has been inherited by defendant 1 st party. It

was also claimed by defendant 1st party that Imda died in the year 1949 and not on

11.11.1950 as claimed by the plaintiffs and hence the suit was barred by law of

limitation having been filed after 12 years of the death of Imda.

7. On the basis of the claim of the parties the learned trial court

framed the following issues for deciding the suit :-

                    (i)       Is the suit maintainable, as framed?
                    (ii)      Have the plaintiffs any cause of action or right to
                              sue?
                    (iii)     Is the suit barred by res judicata, estoppel and
                              acquiescence?
                    (iv)      Is the suit barred by limitation?
                    (v)       Had Mostt. Imda Kumari died on 11.11.1950?
                    (vi)      Is the genealogical table appended at the foot of the
                              plaint correct?
                    (vii)     Are the plaintiffs next reversioners of Ramcharan
                              Rai last male holder of the lands in dispute?
                    (viii)    Are the plaintiffs entitled to recover possession of the
                              lands in dispute?
                    (ix)      Are the plaintiffs entitled to the reliefs prayed?


8. On the said issues, evidence were led by the parties and after

considering the pleadings and the evidence adduced on behalf of both the parties,

the learned Munsif-2, Begusarai vide his judgment and decree dated 22.08.1974

decreed the suit on contest with cost after arriving at the following findings :-

(a) Plaintiffs are reversioners- title holders.

(b) Sale deeds Exts. B and B/1 executed by Imda was
valid only till her life time.

(c) Imda died on 11.11.1950 and hence the suit was
filed within 12 years of her death.

(d) Defendant 1st party is in possession on the basis of
the sale deeds Exts. B and B/1 executed by Imda.

(e) Plaintiffs having right and title over the suit
property are entitled to recovery of possession.

9. Against the aforesaid judgment of the learned trial court

defendant 1st party filed Title Appeal No. 44 of 1974 which was dismissed on

contest with cost by the learned Subordinate Judge-III, Begusarai by his judgment

and decree dated 26.08.1978.

10. Against abovementioned judgment and decree of the learned

court of appeal below defendant 1st party filed S.A. No. 702 of 1978 which was

allowed by this court vide judgment dated 21.07.1986 and the matter was
5

remanded back to the learned court of appeal below for fresh disposal on the basis

of materials on record, including the original death register which was called for

by this court and was sent to the learned court of appeal below under the seal and

cover.

11. Thereafter the aforesaid Title Appeal No. 44 of 1974 (14 of

1987) was restarted and the learned court below after considering the claims of

the respective parties formulated the following points for deciding the title appeal

afresh:-

                      (i)     Whether most. Imda Kumari died on 11.11.1950 as
                              alleged by the plaintiffs or in the year 1949 as
                              alleged by the defendant?

                      (ii)    Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of

title and recovery of possession or the defendant has
acquired title by adverse possession.

12. After considering the pleadings and evidence of the parties on

the aforesaid points the learned 1 st Additional District Judge, Begusarai allowed

the title appeal on contest with cost by judgment and decree dated 07.09.1987

after arriving at the following findings :-

(a) Imda died in 1949 and more than 12 years thereafter
suit was filed in the year 1962 .

                        (b)    The suit is barred by law of limitation.
                        (c)    Plaintiffs were definitely held by the Hon'ble High
                                Court as reversioners of Imda Kumari.
                        (d)    Since the plaintiffs did not file the suit within the

period of limitation they are not entitled to recovery
of possession over the suit land and have no cause
of action.

(e) The suit is not maintainable and the plaintiffs are
not entitled to the reliefs as prayed for.

(f) The judgment and decree of the learned trial court is
set aside and the suit is dismissed.

13. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree of the learned

lower appellate court the plaintiffs and defendant 3 rd party jointly filed the instant

second appeal on 12.01.1988, which was admitted by this Court on 22.01.1989

stating that “the points for consideration involved in this appeal are enumerated in

paragraphs 1 and 6 of the substantial questions of law contained in the memo of
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appeal itself”. Following are paragraphs 1 and 6 of the memorandum of second

appeal :

(i) Whether the lower appellate court was right in law
in not holding that Imda Kumari died on
11.11.1950, when the defendant did not prove any
death register nor actual date of death in support of
their claim?

(ii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the exclusion of
the period in which property remained attached
under section 146 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure in counting the period of limitation?

14. The instant second appeal was finally heard in 2001 and was

allowed by a Bench of this Court by judgment dated 18.10.2001, setting aside the

judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and affirming the judgment and

decree of the trial court.

15. The said judgment of this Court was challenged by the

respondents before the Hon’ble Apex Court in S.L.P.(C) No. 5990 of 2002 (Civil

Appeal No. 5044 of 2005) on the ground that the law is well settled that the High

Court can exercise its jurisdiction under section 100 of the Code of Civil

Procedure in second appeal only on the basis of substantial questions of law

framed at the time of admitting the appeal but in the instant case neither any

substantial question of law was framed by the High Court nor the second appeal

was finally decided on the basis of such duly framed substantial question of law.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court by its judgment dated 12.08.2005 allowed the civil

appeal, set aside the aforementioned judgment of this Court dated 18.10.2001 and

remitted back the matter to this Court with the following directions:

“Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the
impugned judgment and remit the matter back to the
High Court. The High Court shall first frame the
substantial question(s) of law, if any, in exercise of its
jurisdiction under clause (4) of Section 100 of the Code
of Civil Procedure and then decide the same in
accordance with law. In case no substantial question(s)
of law arises then the court shall proceed with the matter
in accordance with law.”

16. Thereafter the said second appeal was mentioned by the

parties on 02.09.2008 for being heard at an early date and hence in view of the

order of the Hon’ble Apex Court and as prayed by learned counsel for the parties,
7

the instant second appeal was immediately directed to be listed under the heading

“for hearing” on 15th of September, 2008 as the first case, subject to part heard

cases. On the basis of the initial arguments on behalf of the parties the following

points were formulated as substantial questions of law for deciding the second

appeal :-

(i) Whether the plaintiffs having proved the death of Imda
on 11.11.1950 by both oral and documentary evidence
and the trial court relying upon the said evidence
having decreed the suit, the learned court of appeal
below was justified in reversing the judgment and
decree of the trial court, failing to appreciate that the
defendants could not bring on record any death
register or any other document to show the actual date
of death of Imda in 1949 in support of their claim?

(ii) Whether the period during which the suit property
remained attached under section 146 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, is legally to be excluded while
counting the period of limitation for filing the suit?

17. On the said questions both parties were heard at length and

their arguments continued for several weeks and only after completion of their

arguments the judgment was reserved in the instant case.

18. From the arguments of the parties, it transpires that now

there is no dispute with regard to the above mentioned genealogy. Although

earlier the defendants claimed that the entire suit property of the branch of Kushi

devolved upon Imda wife of Late Ram Charan Rai as the sole heir and absolute

owner which was rejected by both the learned courts below on the basis of the

judgment dated 02.09.1949 (Ext.9/B) passed by this court in S.A. No. 1837 of

1947 declaring that the said property did not devolve upon Imda as an heir, rather

she held it as a widow estate for lifetime maintenance subject to restrictions on

alienation and the real inheritors were the heirs of Durga and Genor who would be

entitled to possession only after the death of Imda and that the two sale deeds

executed by Imda in favour of defendants-respondents would not bind the

reversioners after the death of Imda. This finding of the lower courts has not been

challenged by the respondents and hence like the aforesaid judgment in S.A. No.

1837 of 1947 the judgments of the learned courts below in the instant matter also

have attained finality. However, the learned court of appeal below vide its
8

impugned judgment and decree although held that the plaintiffs were reversioners

and title holders but at the same time held that since defendant 1 st party remained

in possession of the suit premises on the basis of sale deeds executed by Imda

who died in the year 1949, hence the title suit which was filed in the year 1962

was beyond twelve years of the death of Imda and as such was barred by law of

limitation and the plaintiffs were not entitled to recovery of possession. In the said

circumstances, the above mentioned two questions were raised by the plaintiffs in

the instant second appeal.

19. So far the first question is concerned, it is an admitted fact

that Title Suit No. 38 of 1962 was filed by the plaintiffs (appellants in this court)

on 08.05.1962 and the question in dispute is with respect to the date of death of

Imda who according to the plaintiffs had died on 11.11.1950 but according to the

contesting defendant 1st party she died in the month of Kartik 1357 Fasali which

is equal to November, 1949.

20. In support of their claim the plaintiffs produced a certified

copy of death register Ext.10 showing that Indira Kumari widow of Ram Charan

Rai died on 11.11.1950 in village Malipur and the informant was Gulzar Mian,

whereas the contesting defendants brought on record another certified copy of

death register Ext.9 showing that Indira Kumari widow of Ram Chandra Rai died

on 11.11.1950 at village Malipur and the informant was Gaffur Mian. Although

the date of death and the name of village as well as the date of registration

(16.01.1951) in both the certified copies of death register of Malipur were the

same but the name of the husbands and the informants were different in both the

exhibits. Although the admitted case of the parties was that the name of the

deceased was Imda but in both the certificates her name was shown as Indira

Kumari and hence in the earlier S.A. No.702 of 1978 this court called for the

original death register from the authorities concerned and after examining the

same it was found that entry no.27 was registered on 16.01.1951 at the instance of

the informant Gulzar Mian showing 11.11.1950 as date of death of Indira Kumari

widow of Ram Chandra Rai of village Malipur. This entry in the original death
9

register has been reproduced in the judgment of this court dated 21.07.1986

passed in S.A. No. 702 of 1978.

21. In the said circumstances the original death register

clearly proved that both the certified copies of death register namely Ext.10 and

Ext.J filed by the plaintiffs and defendant 1st party contained mistakes as in Ext.10

produced by the plaintiffs the name of the husband was not correct, whereas in

Ext.J produced by defendant 1st party the name of the informant was wrong.

However, the original death register clearly proved that one Gulzar Mian

informed on 16.01.1951 about the death of the lady on 11.11.1950 at village

Malipur. Now the question was who was that lady and what was the name of her

husband? On the said issue the plaintiffs adduced PW.8 and PW.15 (plaintiff

himself) in the trial court who stated that Imda Kumari died on 11.11.1950 and

the death register (Ext.10) filed by them was with respect to the said Imda.

Furthermore, after remand of the case from this court the plaintiffs adduced

several witnesses before the learned court of appeal below including PWs.17, 18

and 19 clearly stating that Imda/Indira Kumari was the same person who died at

village Malipur on 11.11.1950.

22. However, defendant 1st party did not produce any witness

after the remand but in the trial court before the remand they had produced

DWs.12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 20 on the said point, out of whom DW.20 was

defendant no.1 himself. DW.12 admitted that Imda, who was the vendor of the

defendant had her Naihar at village Malipur and that there was a criminal case

against him in which original plaintiff no.1 used to do Pairvi as Moharir. DW.14

was of village Malipur and while deposing in the year 1974 he stated that the lady

whom he did not know personally had died twenty four years back. His name was

Gaffur and he claimed that he was the informer of the death of the lady but his

said statement contradicted the entries of Ext.J itself. DW.15 failed to give the

date and month of the death of the lady and only said that it was 1357 Fasali. He

also knew no one of the family. So far DW.16 was concerned, his statement was

in utter confusion regarding the name of the lady who had died as to whether she
10

was actually called Imda, Inda, Indra or Indira and as to whether her

husbands’name was actually Ram Chandra Rai or Ram Charan Rai. DWs.17 and

18 were the witnesses and identifier of the sale deed executed by Imda Kumari in

favour of defendant 1st party and they admitted that Pradeep Rai, father of original

plaintiff nos.1 and 2 had filed criminal cases against them. However, DW.18

stated that wife of Ram Charan Rai was Indira Kumari and not Imda Kumari, who

died at Malipur.

23. In these circumstances the contradictory and confusing

evidence of the defendants could not validly disprove the claim of the plaintiffs

which was proved by clear depositions of their witnesses. Now the question arises

as to whether Indira Kumari was the same lady shown as Imda Kumari, the

vendor of defendant 1st party and that Ram Chandra Rai as shown in the original

death register was the same as Ram Charan Rai son of Buchan Rai. The said

confusion has arisen merely on the account of the fact that in the plaint drafted in

English the plaintiffs described the lady as Imda Kumari and at some places Inda

Kumari and her husband’s name was described as Ram Charan Rai. The

defendants also in their written statement drafted in Hindi referred to this lady

inconsistently sometimes as Imda Kumari, sometimes as Inda Kumari and

sometimes as Indira Kumari. The claim of the plaintiffs fully supported by their

witness was that on the death of her husband Imda Kumari had shifted at her

Naihar at Malipur and she died there on 11.11.1950. This fact could not be validly

controverted by the defendants’ evidence and hence there was every chance that

Imda, the vendor of defendant 1st party had died in village Malipur. The judgment

dated 02.09.1949 passed by this court in S.A. No.1837 of 1947 clearly showed

that the vendor of defendant 1st party was alive till then and the defendants

completely failed to prove by their evidence either oral or documentary that their

vendor died thereafter in the year 1949 itself as no date or month of death of their

vendor was either mentioned in their pleadings nor stated in their evidence.

24. So far the confusion with regard to the name of the lady

being Imda, Inda, Indra or Indira as well as the name of her husband Ram Charan
11

Rai or Ram Chandra Rai is concerned, from the entire oral evidence on record as

stated above it transpires that the name of the lady who was the vendor of the suit

property was spelt in Hindi and in English by both the parties differently at

various stages clearly because there was not much difference in the said names

and it depended on how the village people, who were rustic and illiterate and were

prone to commit such mistakes regarding a particular name, pronounced their

names variously on account of their rusticity and illiteracy due to which Indra

had been wrongly called Imda, Inda or Indira and Ram Chandra had been wrongly

called Ram Charan Rai. Furthermore, due to long lapse of time after the death of

the lady and her husband it transpires that their names were pronounced and spelt

differently by various people at various times and various stages, but one thing

has been clearly proved that the vendor of contesting defendant 1 st party had her

Naihar at village Malipur where she lived after the death of her husband and the

defendants had miserably failed to show that the said lady who died in village

Malipur was different from the lady who was the vendor of the said defendants.

Furthermore, the defendants had tried to build up a case that their vendor died in

village Pasopur but they could not bring on record any death register or certificate

of any authority of Pasopur to prove their case and hence they miserably failed to

prove their claim.

25. In view of contradicting oral evidence led by the parties

as discussed above, the entries in the original death register of Malipur had to be

given due significance as the defendants had failed to produce any death register

of Pasopur where according to them their vendor had died and specially in view

of the above mentioned consideration and findings with regard to the confusion

between the names of Imda Kumari and Indra Kumari as well as Ram Charan Rai

and Ram Chandra Rai by various people at various time and various stages of the

litigation also, hence it is quite apparent that the lady who is recorded to have died

on 11.11.1950 is none else than the lady who had executed the deeds of transfer in

favour of defendant 1st party.

12

26. The law is well settled in this regard that where it cannot

be disputed that the plaintiffs became entitled to the suit property on the death of

Imda Devi, it was for the defendants to prove that they had perfected their title

being in adverse possession for over 12 years from the date of death of Imda Devi

and that the plaintiffs lost their right to sue by efflux of time. Reference in this

regard may be made to a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Saroop

Singh vs. Banto and others, reported in AIR 2005 SC 4407. It is also well settled

that a person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour and since

he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and

establish all facts, including animus possidendi, necessary for proving adverse

possession. Reference in this regard may be made to a decision of the Hon’ble

Apex Court in case of Karnataka Board of Wakf vs. Government of India and

others, reported in (2004) 10 SCC 779. But in the instant case the defendants

could not legally prove their adverse possession over the suit land continuously

for 12 years after the death of Imda Devi nor could legally discharge their onus.

27. So far the second question is concerned, it has been

specifically claimed that the suit property remained attached under the provision

of section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a substantial period which

has to be excluded while counting the period of limitation for filing the suit. It had

been specifically claimed and proved on behalf of the plaintiffs that from

08.10.1958 to 05.02.1962 the suit property remained attached under section 146

of the Code of Criminal Procedure and this fact has not been denied by the

contesting defendants. It was also claimed that earlier the proceeding under

section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was initiated whereafter Case No.

255M/1958 started under the provision of section 145 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure which was disposed of on 05.02.1962 and only thereafter the suit

property became free from attachment which is proved by Ext.I. The learned court

of appeal below while reversing the judgment and decree of the trial court has

dealt with this question very cursorily and rejected the plaintiffs’ claim merely on

the assumption that attachment by Magistrate under section 146 of the Code of
13

Criminal Procedure did not amount to dispossession of the true owner from the

property attached nor does it amount to a discontinuance of possession by an

owner. It was also assumed that section 31 of the new Limitation Act, 1963

provided that in a suit pending on the commencement of the Act will be governed

by the old Limitation Act and hence the instant suit will not be governed by the

said new Limitation Act which came into force on 29.10.1963 and furthermore

twelve years after the death of Imda had also passed before coming into force of

the said Act.

28. The aforesaid provision of Section 31 of the Limitation

Act 1963 that nothing in the said Act of 1963 would affect the claim expired after

the commencement of the Act or the cases instituted before and pending at, such

commencement, will not raise any legal bar of limitation in the instant case,

which apart from Articles 65 and 108 of the Limitation Act 1963, is well within

the period prescribed under Articles 125 and 141 of the Indian Limitation Act

1908, which is specifically provided for the nearest reversioners, before coming

into force of the Limitation Act 1963.

29. Furthermore, the law is well settled that an attachment by

a Magistrate under section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not

amount to dispossession of the true owner from the property attached, hence

during the period of attachment it shall be presumed that the true owner has been

continuing in possession. The property was attached on 08.10.1958 and it had

already been decided by this court vide judgment dated 02.09.1949 passed in S.A.

No. 1837 of 1947 that the true owner having title over the suit property were the

plaintiffs. Thus the view of the learned court of appeal below that during the

period of attachment from 08.10.1958 to 05.02.1962 also defendant 1 st party

would be assumed to be in possession is absolutely illegal and against the specific

provision of law as admittedly in the year 1958 the defendants had not acquired

any title as per the aforesaid decision of this court. Hence when the property was

released from attachment on 05.02.1962 the plaintiffs rightly claimed that they

were dispossessed by defendant 1st party who came in possession thereof. In the
14

said circumstances no provision of the Limitation Act would act as a bar to the

claim of the plaintiffs as the said period of attachment when the property was

custodia legis would enure to the benefit of the plaintiffs who have already been

decided to be true owners and title holders of the suit properties and accordingly

the said period has to be deducted from the time taken in filing the suit for

calculating limitation.

30. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is quite

apparent that in any view of the matter with respect to the two questions raised

and decided above the suit was not barred by limitation and hence the learned

court of appeal below committed serious errors of law as well as of records while

reversing the judgment and decree of the learned trial court, which was not only

based on the correct appraisal of the pleadings and evidence of the parties but was

also based on the correct propositions of law. Accordingly, both the aforesaid

substantial questions of law are decided in favour of the appellants and

accordingly the judgment and decree of the learned court of appeal below are

hereby set aside and the judgment and decree of the learned trial court are

affirmed.

31. As a result, this second appeal is allowed but in the

facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to cost.

    Patna High Court,                                   (S.N.Hussain, J.)
    Dated, the 25th February, 2009
    N.A.F.R./harish