JUDGMENT
S.S. Nijjar, J.
1. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners at length.
2. it has been vehemently argued by Mr. Goyal, learned senior counsel that the Financial Commissioner was not competent to invoke suo moto powers under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling of Land Holdings Act, 1972, after a period of 18 years. It has been further argued by the learned counsel that the Financial Commissioner has erred in holding that the petitioners has committed a fraud on the government while intimating number and ages of his children. In any event, the learned counsel submitted that there is no evidence on the record to show that the petitioners has committed any fraud. The earlier orders do not suffer from any illegality and had been acted upon for the last 18 years. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Loku Ram v. State of Haryana and Ors., (1999-3)123 P.L.R. 590 (S.C.).
3. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel. A perusal of the order passed by the learned Financial Commissioner shows that the ground of delay and laches was argued by the learned counsel before the Financial Commissioner. It was stated that the case had been brought after an in ordinate delay of 18 years and should be dismissed on that basis. It was further stated that Smt. Krishni, widow of Bhartu, Ram Singh Lambardar and Ram Chand, Sarpanch are illiterate and must have put their thumb marks without reading what was written in their statements. It was further stated that it was possible for the landlord to have four children between 1966 and 1969 since these four years contained 48 months and illiterate villagers did not practice family planning. Counsel has argued that every child had two names, one real name and another nickname and this had led to the confusion about the number and ages of the children.
4. After noticing the aforesaid submissions, the learned Financial Commissioner has given findings of fact. She has considered the evidence placed on record. Even verbal as well as written arguments but forward by both the sides have been taken into consideration. The matter had been remanded back to the Prescribed Authority by this Court in C.W.P. NO. 4675 of 1981 with a direction that the case may be decided afresh after giving the landowner adequate opportunity to establish number and ages of his children.
5. In compliance with the aforesaid order, the Prescribed Authority had passed order dated March 23, 1982. He accepted the fact that the landlord had six minor children on the appointed day. After allowing one primary unit and three additional units, the Prescribed Authority concluded that there was no surplus land.
6. The Financial Commissioner adverted to the contrary statements made by the claimants about the youngest child. It is further held that the Prescribed Authority has il-logically held that the youngest child would have been two years old on January 24, 1971 and, therefore, the number of minor children would be six on January 24, 1971. It is held that the aforesaid finding of the Prescribed Authority is based on no evidence. It has been further held that the statements made by the land owner in the declaration form about the number and ages of his children and the statements made by Smt. Krishni on March 16, 1982 regarding this subject and by Ram Singh Lambardar on March 16, 1982 on the same subject, all paint a different picture which puts a question mark on the veracity of these contradictory statements. The Financial Commissioner has also held that these contradictions also prove that efforts have been made to hide the truth. After examining all the aforesaid evidence, the Financial Commissioner had given a finding that the landlord had committed a fraud on the government while indicating the number and ages of his children. Thereafter, again, the Financial Commissioner points out that there are three certificates of the Additional District Registrar of Births and Deaths, Kurukshetra, in which it had been indicated that Bhartu had a daughter on August 16, 1952, another daughter on October 24, 1955 and a daughter on August 08, 1967. The name in respect of second and third daughter is the same. There is a School Leaving Certificate in respect of Ram Niwas son of Bhartu, whose date of birth has been shown as July 06, 1962. It is, thereafter, held that the daughter who was born on August 16, 1952 could not have been minor on January 24, 1971. The Financial Commissioner, thereafter, observed that the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the landowner had all the six children between 1966 and 1969 is not only prima facie improbable but is against the documentary evidence i.e. birth certificates of the daughters and the school leaving certificate of the son. We are of the considered opinion that the aforesaid facts have clearly proved that the petitioner had committed a fraud on the Court. These facts were sufficient to enable the Financial Commissioner to condone the delay in entertaining the revision petition under Section 18 (6) of the Act. The judgment relied upon by Mr. Goyal, learned senior counsel in the case of Loku Ram (Supra), is distinguishable. In that case, the Supreme Court has observed that it would be unreasonable to hold that the Financial Commissioner had unlimited powers to entertain the revision after a lapse of several years. In coming to the aforesaid conclusion, the Supreme Court had relied upon an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of Gujarat v. P. Raghvi A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1297, in which it was held as under:-
“The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made under Section 65 at any time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in a reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised”.
7. These observations of the Supreme Court make it incumbent on the Financial Commissioner to examine the facts and circumstances of each case, with reference to the nature of order being revised. This is precisely what the learned Financial Commissioner has done. A specific plea with regard to delay and laches has been taken before the Financial Commissioner, who has meticulously dealt with all the points raised. After examining the entire evidence, the Financial Commissioner has come to the conclusion that the petitioner has committed fraud on the Court. Therefore, in order to do justice, the Financial Commissioner has rightly condoned the delay in entertaining the revision petition. It is settled principle of law that any order obtained by a party by fraud can be avoided at any time and even in collateral proceedings. Once, it was brought to the notice of the Financial Commissioner that the order dated March 18, 1987 had been obtained by fraud, she was duty bound to set it aside. We are unable to accept the proposition that mere length of time for which a fraudulent order remained operative would transform it into a legal or unassailable order. This view of ours finds support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and Ors., (1995-1)109 P.L.R. 293 (SC), wherein it has been observed as follows:-
“Kuldip Singh, J,
“Fraud-avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal” observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or a decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non-est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree by the first court or by the highest court-has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings”.
The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case. Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that “there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence”, the principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property grabbers, tax evaders, bank loan dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court process a convenient lever to retrain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on a falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can summarily be thrown out at any stage of the litigation”.
8. We are of the considered opinion that the order of the Financial Commissioner does not suffer from an error of jurisdiction.
9. Before parting with this order, we may notice that by the impugned order dated April 03, 2002, the Financial Commissioner has merely remanded the case to the Prescribed Authority to redetermine the permissible area after reappreciating the evidence led by the parties. There would have been no need to consider the matter in detail, but for the elaborate arguments addressed by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner.
In view of the above, we find no merit in the writ petition. Dismissed.
Sd/- Hemant Gupta, J.