JUDGMENT
Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.
Rule D.B.
With the consent of the parties this Writ Petition is being finally disposed of.
1. This is a writ petition filed by an advocate of this Court, inter alia, praying for calling of the records of the Respondent (Central Bureau of Investigation) relating to RC No. DAI/2002/A/0062 dated 7.11.2002 and for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction to quash/set aside the RC No. DAI/2002/A/0062 dated 7.11.2002 (hereinafter referred to as the `said FIR’) copy whereof has been annexed as “Annexure P-5” to the Petition.
2. The petitioner was enrolled as an advocate with the Bar Council of Delhi on 27.1.1989 and was appointed as Government advocate by the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi in the year 1995 and conducted cases of this Government till 1999. Around 1997 the petitioner was also appointed as Government advocate by the Land and Building Department dealing with acquisition matters and which he has been doing till date.
3. Before adverting to the said FIR it would be pertinent to notice certain facts:
3.1. On or about 14.05.2001, the petitioner received advance copy of four writ petitions which were subsequently numbered as CW No. 3236/2001, 3237/2001, 3238/2001 and 3239/2001. The first, second and fourth petitions were filed under the name of Runwell India Private Limited and the third i.e. CW 3238/2001 was filed by Shri Kishori Lal.
3.2. These petitions were filed in connection with a Notification dated 25.11.1980 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in respect of 13 South Delhi Villages. By an order dated 18.11.1988 in respect of the same notification and in particular with regard to the hearing of objections under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 this Court in the case of Balak Ram Gupta Vs U O I, , quashed the entire acquisition proceedings.
3.3. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in the case of Abhay Ram Vs. UOI held that the judgment delivered in Balak Ram Gupta’s case (supra) by a Division Bench of this Court was confined to those persons who had filed objections under Section 5A to the said notification dated 25.11.1980 and that the benefit of the judgment could not be taken by any person who had not filed objections under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Thereafter, the Supreme Court by another judgment in the case of Delhi Administration vs. Gurdip Singh Uban further clarified that the decision in Balak Ram Gupta’s case (supra) was not a judgment in rem but in personam.
3.4. In a succeeding round of the said Gurdip Singh Uban’s case the Supreme Court by a judgment and order dated 14.8.2000 further clarified many aspects and held that the benefit of the judgment passed in Balak Ram’s case (supra) could be availed by the writ petitioners. In another writ petition bearing CW 155/2000 filed before the Supreme Court which was heard together with the decision the Supreme Court while dismissing the same granted liberty to the petitioners to approach this Court.
3.5. Thereafter, several writ petitions were filed in this Court and are pending disposal. The aforesaid four writ petitions bearing Nos. CW 3236/2001, 3237/2001, 3238/2001 and 3239/2001 belong to this genre of cases. In these four writ petitions, the writ petitioners have specifically stated that Section 5A objections were filed by them and that accordingly they were entitled to claim the benefit of the judgment in Balak Ram Gupta’s case (supra). Copies of the respective Section 5A objections were placed on record in these four writ petitions.
4. The allegation against the petitioner is that he was part of a conspiracy which fabricated and forged the said Section 5A objections which formed part of the said four writ petitions and that because of this the Petitioners therein were able to obtain a stay order against the notification for acquisition of land owned by Runwell India Private Limited in village Chhatarpur, Satbari and Sayurpur.
5. As stated above on or about 14.5.2001 the petitioner being the Government advocate on behalf of the land and building department, dealing with the acquisition matters, received advance copy of the said four writ petitions which came up for hearing on 21.5.2001 for admission. It is the present petitioner’s case that it was brought to the notice of this Court by the writ petitioners in the said four cases that similar petitions raising the same issues were listed on 8.8.2001 and interim orders had been passed therein. This Court passed the following order:-
“Notice to respondents to show cause as to why rule nisi be not issued.
Mr. Sanjay Poddar accepts notice on behalf of respondent No. 2.
Ms. Anusuya Salwan accepts notice on behalf of respondent No. 3. Let counter affidavit be filed within three weeks. Rejoinder, if any, before the next date of hearing.
It is contended by counsel for the petitioner that connected matters are coming up for hearing on 8.8.2001.
Respondents are directed not to dispossess the petitioner, if not already dispossessed.
Petitioner further undertakes that he will not construct or change the nature of the property in question.”
6. Thereafter, by a letter dated 30.5.2001 the petitioner informed the department of the proceedings and the order passed by this Court on 21.5.2001. Subsequently, counter affidavits were also filed in all the said four cases on 4.9.2001 and the case has thereafter been pending disposal in this Court.
7. While the matter rested here, on 8th November, 2002 the petitioner has alleged that when he was getting ready for the Court and his wife and two children were also getting ready for going to school a team constituted by the respondent having a Search Warrant and showing a copy of the said FIR searched the residence of the petitioner and that he was even deprived from contacting his colleagues. The said team thoroughly searched the premises opened all almirahs, belongings, cup-boards, drawers, files, books and did not even spare the belongings of his wife and children and that at the same time on the same day when the clerk of the petitioner opened the petitioner’s office in the morning a team was awaiting there and also searched all the files lying in his office whether connected with the case or not. Confidential records of his private clients and other departments were seen and files were even down-loaded from the computers lying in his office.
8. The said FIR has been registered under Section 120B read with Section 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the petitioner and six others. As we are considering the question of quashing of this F.I.R., it would be pertinent to set out the information as contained in the said FIR in its entirety:-
“A reliable information has been received that M/s. Runwell India Pvt. Ltd., 5, Doctor Lane, Bengali Market, Delhi and its Director viz., Sh. Kishori Lal, Ashish Kishore and O.P. Sachdeva entered into a criminal conspiracy with officials of Land & Building Department, Govt. of NCT, Delhi viz. Sh. U.P. Singh, OSD Litigation and V.B. Pandey, Legal Advisor together with Sh. Sanjay Poddar, Standing Counsel for Land & Building Department and were able to obtain a stay order against the notification for acquisition of land owned by M/s. Runwell India Pvt. Ltd., in village Chattarpur, Satbari & Sayoorpur.
The Govt., of NCT, Delhi had issued a notification u/s 4(1) of Land Acquisition Act on 25.11.1980 for acquisition of land in the villages of Chattarpur, Satbari & Sayoorpur for the public purpose. All the affected parties were required to file objections, if any, U/s. 5-A of Land Acquisition Act within 30 days of the notification before the Competent Authorities. In pursuance to above criminal conspiracy, M/s. Renwell India Pvt. Ltd., and its Directors moved the Delhi High Court through 4 Civil Writ petitions Nos. 3236/2001, 3237/2001, 3238/2001 & 3239/2001 in May, 2001 i.e. almost after 20 ye4ars since the notification and were able to obtain a stay order on the basis of copies of forged/false objections u/s 5-A of Land Acquisition Act purported to have been filed in the L&B Deptt.
For preparing the forged documents, copy of objections filed by some other parties were supplied to M/s. Runwell India Pvt. Ltd., by the officials of Land & Building Department. The Directors of M/s. Renwell India Pvt. Ltd. Prepared the forged documents using the photocopy technique and correcting fluid. Standing Counsel of Land & Building Department Sh. Sanjay Poddar received the copies of Civil Writ Petition filed by M/s. Renwell India Pvt. Ltd. In May, 2001 itself, acted in connivance with the Directors of M/s. Renwell India Pvt. Ltd. And did not inform the Department in time regarding four Civil Writ petitions nor did he obtain comments from the Department and appeared in the concerned Court on behalf of the Department on 21.5.01 without the knowledge of the Department and facilitated M/s Renwell India Pvt. Ltd. In obtaining the Stay Order from the High Court. The Copies of Civil Writ petitions were sent to the Department much after the stay order was obtained. Sh. UP Singh OSD & VB Pandey, Legal Advisor did not seek any clarifications from Sh. Sanjay Poddar about the delay nor made any attempts to get the stay order vacated even after receiving the copy of the Civil Writ Petitions.
Thus, all above accused acting in a criminal conspiracy helped preparation of forged documents and facilitated M/s Runwell India Pvt. Ltd. to obtain Stay Order against the acquisition order. The aforesaid facts disclose the commission of offence punishable u/s 120B 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC against M/s Runwell India Pvt. Ltd., Sh. Kishori Lal, Sh. Ashish Kishore, O P Sachdeva, Sh. V B Pandey and Sh. U P Singh. Sh. V B Pandey and Sh. U P Singh have further committed offence punishable u/s 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of PC Act, 1988.”
9. Being aggrieved by the registration of the said case as indicated in the said FIR the petitioner has filed the present writ petition for quashing of the same insofar as he is concerned.
10. By an order dated 7.1.2003 this Court had directed the respondent to keep the investigation file ready on the next date and by an order dated 20.1.2003 this Court further directed that the files of CW Nos. 3236/2001, 3237/2001, 3238/201, 3239/2001, 1639/2001 and 1635/2001 be also sent on the date fixed for hearing. As the petitioner had alleged in his rejoinder affidavit that copy of the objections u/s 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 filed by the writ petitioners in the said four writ petitions were already part of the judicial record in CW No. 2645/1987, that file was also sent for and perused by us.
11. On going through the contents of the said F.I.R., it is apparent that the allegations against the petitioner are three-fold:-
(i) That the petitioner entered into a criminal conspiracy with the Director of M/s. Runwell India Private Limited and officials of the Land and Building Department, Government of NCT, Delhi and the Legal Adviser and as a result Runwell India Pvt. Ltd. was able to obtain a stay order against the notification for acquisition of land owned by Runwell India Private Limited in village Chhatarpur, Satbari and Sayurpur;
(ii) That the said purported stay order was obtained on the basis of forged/false objection under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 purported to have been filed in the Land and Building Department;
(iii) That the petitioner being the Standing Counsel of the Land and Building Department received copies of the writ petitions filed by Runwell India Private Limited in May 2001 acted in connivance with Directors of Runwell India Private Limited and did not inform the Department in time regarding four civil writ petitions nor did he obtain comments from the department and appeared in the concerned Court on behalf of the department on 21.5.2001 without the knowledge of the department and facilitated Runwell India Private Limited in obtaining the purported stay order from this Court. However, the foundation or substratum of the allegation in the FIR is that all the accused including the petitioner acted in a criminal conspiracy and helped in the preparation of forged documents, i.e., the objections under section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 purported to have been filed in the land and building department and facilitated Runwell India Pvt Ltd to obtain a stay order against the notice of acquisition.
12. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner Mr Dinesh Mathur contended that, first of all, the order dated 21.5.2001 is not even a “stay order against the notification for acquisition of land” as has been made out to be in the F.I.R.. Secondly, he contended that the question of forging and/or fabricating the objections in 2001 when the said four petitions were filed cannot even arise inasmuch as the purported objections under section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were already in existence in 1985 and in 1987.
13. The learned senior counsel pointed out that the order dated 21.5.2001 could by no stretch of imagination be styled as a “stay order against the notification for acquisition of land owned by M/s Runwell India Pvt. Ltd.” as has been alleged in the said F.I.R. He submitted that the order dated 21.05.2001 was not even in favor of the petitioners in the said four writ petitions. On the contrary, he submitted that the court recorded the undertaking of the petitioner therein that they would not construct or change the nature of the property in question. Apart from this the court merely directed the respondent not to dispossess the petitioner if not already dispossessed. This, he submitted, was merely an order to maintain status quo during the pendency of the writ petitions. As such, there was no question of any advantage much less a pecuniary advantage being drawn by the petitioners in the said four writ petitions. Furthermore, he submits that upon a reading of the order dated 21.5.2001 it is clear that the only role that was played by Mr Sanjay Podar, the petitioner herein, was that he accepted notice on behalf of the respondent No 2. The petitioner had no other role to play on that date of the hearing. In view of this, he submits, there is no question of any offence being made out even if the allegations in the F.I.R. were taken to be true.
14. His main submission, however, was that the whole basis or foundation of the F.I.R. was that the petitioner was a part of a conspiracy with certain other accused persons to forge and fabricate section 5A objections on behalf of the said Runwell India Pvt Ltd and to place the same before the court in the said four writ petitions. This, he submits, is ex facie untenable. He drew our attention to the court record in civil writ petition No 1639 of 1985 in the case of Balak Ram Gupta vs union of India and others. Annexure P-19 thereto is the Lieutenant Governor’s note dated 5.6.1985 wherein it is stated that he had carefully gone through the report of the Land Acquisition Collector under section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in respect of village Chattarpur. It is further stated that he had also considered the objections received against the proposed acquisition and that he did not find substance in any of the objections and accordingly directed that notification under Sec 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 be issued in respect of the lands in question. Along with this noting of the Lieutenant Governor of 5.6.1985 is attached the report (under Section 5A) of the Land Acquisition Collector. The said report clearly mentions that 380 objections were filed by the interested persons in the land which was the subject matter of the notification. A list of the persons who filed their objections was also set out in the said report. In this list at serial No. 137 the name of Runwell India Pvt Ltd is mentioned and at serial No 341 the name of Sri Kishori Lal son of Khushiram is also mentioned.
15. It was further pointed out by the learned senior counsel that Sri Kishori Lal and Runwell India Pvt Ltd had, in 1987 itself, filed a writ petition No. 2645 of 1987 challenging the notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which was issued on 7.6.1985 in respect of the subject land as also the notification dated 25.11.1980 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Along with the said the writ petition No 2645 of 1987 the petitioners also annexed as a part of Annexure B-4 (colly), copies of the section 5A. objections. The Section 5A objection in respect of Village Chhatarpur, Shahoorpur, Satbari etc., of Shri Kishori Lal is at pages 135 to 148 of CW 2645/1987. These objections are dated 23.12.1980. The Section 5A objections in respect of village Chhatarpur, Shahoorpur, Satbari etc. of Runwell India Private Limited is at pages 166 to 178 of CW 2645/1987, but does not bear a date.
16. On the other hand, the counsel for the respondent has merely reiterated the stand taken in the counter affidavit that objection was not submitted by the petitioners in Balak Ram’s case. He says that insofar as village Chattarpur is concerned Balak Ram’s case makes a reference to 380 objections whereas in fact if one were to peruse the list it shows that the last entry is 380/1. This, according to him, means that the list has been forged and that the section 5A objections which had been filed in the said the four writ petitions are forged and/or fabricated documents.
17. In the Counter Affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent, it is stated that a preliminary enquiry was conducted in the matter vide P.E.-5(A)/2002-DLI dated 5.7.2002 and that after due verification, it was revealed that there was material for deeper probe into the matter and accordingly, the said FIR was registered on 7.11.2002, inter alia, against the petitioner.
18. Since we had called for the Investigation File and had perused the same it would be instructive to notice certain facts which were not disclosed in the counter affidavit of the Respondent. The said preliminary enquiry which was registered on 5.7.2002 was preceded by a Source Information Report dated 30.10.2001 submitted by Mr. Vivek Priyadarshi, Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI, SPE, SIG, New Delhi. Thereafter, the Joint Director (DLI) vide his noting dated 21.12.2001 was of the opinion that a open enquiry be first conducted on the basis of the Source Information Report and that the issuance of a preliminary enquiry/registration of case could be decided later on.
19. Accordingly, on 18.2.2002, a Verification Report was submitted by Shri Om Prakash, Inspector, CBI, ACB, New Delhi wherein he was of the opinion that it would be very difficult to prove the manipulations of the documents and criminal conspiracy of Mr. Sanjay Poddar (petitioner herein) with the officials of Land and Building department and others, but that responsibility must be fixed for misplacing of the original permanent records of the Land and Building Department of NCT of Delhi.
20. A second verification report was called for and Verification Report dated 24.6.2002 was prepared by Om Prakash, Inspector, CBI, ACB, New Delhi. In this Verification Report of 24.06.2002, it was again concluded that in view of the circumstances explained therein, it would be very difficult to prove the falcification of records and criminal conspiracy of Mr. Sanjay Poddar (petitioner herein) until the original record pertaining to the file processed by LAC Mehrauli, was made available. It was further noted therein that the record keeper of the Land and Building Department (where records of such objections were kept) had stated that the said records were not traceable in the office. It was recommended that, to fix the responsibility of misplacing the relevant records and delay in submission in the writ petition by Mr. Sanjay Poddar, non-calling of comments from the other respondents and filing of counter affidavit without perusal of original record, a self-contained note be sent to the department or a preliminary enquiry be registered.
21. A note by the SP (KP) dated 25.6.2002 recorded that in the absence of the relevant documents, it would not be possible to prove the charge of falcification of documents and criminal conspiracy and that the verifying officer had proposed to conduct a preliminary enquiry to enquire into and/or clarify the remaining points. He, however, noted that in the absence of any records, he had doubts about the outcome of the preliminary enquiry and at the most it might be possible to point out the officers/staff responsible for non-availability of documents.
22. In the nothings of 1.7.2002 the DIG (ACB) while approving the registration of a preliminary inquiry directed that “the PE may be registered against Shri U.P. Singh, OSD (litigation) and other officials/persons to find out the records and to fix the responsibility for the list placed in record showing the name of the objectors and also to verify whether any favor is being shown to litigants.” It is thereafter that the said preliminary enquiry was registered and conducted.
23. From the above it would be clear that the scope of the preliminary enquiry was to find out the records and to fix the responsibility for the list placed in the record showing the name of the objectors and as to whether any favor was being shown to the litigants. This did not include the allegation of conspiracy or falcification/forgery of documents on the part of the petitioner herein. Perhaps, this was so because of the consistent nothings of various officials including the verifying officer that the allegation of falcification of records and criminal conspiracy on the part of the petitioner would be extremely difficult to establish in the absence of the original records. The preliminary enquiry was conducted and the said FIR was registered.
24. The counsel for the respondent also drew our attention to two decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan La, and State of Kerala Vs. O.C. Kuttan, 1999 Crl. LJ 162 SC (para 6) to show the extent and scope for interference by the High Court in respect of quashing of an FIR. 25. The legal position as regards preliminary enquiry is quite well settled inasmuch as the Supreme Court in its decisions in State of UP Vs. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, , P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras, and State of Haryana v.. Bhajan Lal , has concluded that in the absence of any prohibition in the Criminal Procedure Code, express or implied, it is open to the police officer to make preliminary enquiries before registering an offence and making a full scale investigation. In Sirajuddin's case (supra) the Supreme Court, while considering the case of registration of an FIR against a public servant, was of the opinion that before an FIR is lodged against such an individual there must be "some suitable preliminary investigation" of the allegations by a responsible officer. The Supreme Court warned of the danger of registering an FIR straightaway as, "such a report would do incalculable harm not only to the office in particular but to the department he belonged." Division Bench decisions of this Court in the case of Madhuresh v. CBI, Cri LJ 2820 and in the case of VM Singh v. State, 1998 I AD (Delhi) reiterated the aforesaid conclusion. In VM Singh's case (supra) this Court also held that where the information itself did not disclose commission of a cognizable offence no duty was cast upon the police to register a case. It further held that if the information was vague, the police would be within its right to say that the information did not disclose commission of an offence and thus could refuse to register a case or withhold the registration of the case and in the meantime, a preliminary enquiry could be held to find out about the commission of a cognizable offence. 26. A Division Bench of this Court, after a review of, inter alia, the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, in the case of Sanjiv Kumar v. Commissioner of Police and Others, 2002 III AD (Delhi) 921 came to the following conclusions:- "(i) Whenever it is brought in writing or otherwise that a cognizable offence has been committed in terms of the decisions in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) a First Information Report should be recorded. (ii) If the information given is not clear or creates a doubt as to whether it discloses a commission of a cognizable offence some enquiry can proceed before registration of the offence. (iii) In case of a complaint of such nature made against public servants if it is doubtful or similarly if it is found that ex facie there is some un-truth in the same, an enquiry can be conducted before registration of the case. (iv) the enquiry need not partake that of an investigation. It only is a preliminary enquiry that can be held." 27. From the above decisions, it is clear that the object of holding a preliminary enquiry before registration of a case is to see whether there is some truth in the allegations contained in the FIR. As stated in the Supreme Court decision in Sirajuddin's case (supra) which has been quoted with the approval in Bhajan Lal's case (supra), a suitable preliminary enquiry would be necessary in order to prevent incalculable harm if the FIR were to be straightaway registered. It is clear, therefore, that the preliminary enquiry must, be a "suitable" preliminary enquiry and must not be a mere eyewash or be conducted in mechanical fashion without application of mind. 28. In the present case, which involves serious allegations against an advocate of this Court, it was rightly felt by the CBI that verification reports be called for even before a preliminary enquiry be conducted. The allegations and, in particular, the allegation with regard to placing of forged documents in Court records could easily be objectively verified by simply inspecting the court records. It was, therefore, imperative for the verifying officers and/or the officer conducting the preliminary enquiry to simply inspect the Court Records to ascertain the truth about the existence of Section 5A objections in earlier proceedings. This did not involve any sophisticated forensic techniques or gathering of evidence from disparate sources. All that was required of the verifying officer or the officer conducting the Preliminary Enquiry was to see the files of CW 1639/85 and CW 2645/1987 which were part of the record of this Court. This admittedly was not done. Had this been done it would have disclosed, as indicated below, that ex facie no cognizable offence was made out against the petitioner. This is apart from the question that scope of the preliminary enquiry itself did not include the question of forgery or fabrication on the part of the petitioner.
29. The entire foundation of the allegation as disclosed in the said FIR insofar as the petitioner is concerned is that the petitioner was involved in a conspiracy with the other accused in forging/fabricating Section 5A objections on the part of the Runwell India Private Limited and of utilising these forged documents in the said three writ petitions to obtain the orders of this Court. Thus, if it can be shown by the FIR and the judicial record available that there could not have been any forgery and/or fabrication on the part of the petitioner, then the entire case against the petitioner would fall. It is, therefore, imperative to consider the factum that in Balak Ram’s case (supra) the name of Runwell India Private Limited figures in the list of objectors. This is an undeniable fact as it is a part of the Court record in CW 1639/1985 as stated above. Furthermore, in the writ petition filed in 1987 (being CW 2645/1987) by the said Runwell India Private Limited and others the very objections which are said to have been fabricated and placed in the writ petitions 3236/2001, 3237/2001 and 3239/2001 are on record. We have compared the language of the objections filed in the 1987 writ petitions and those filed in the said writ petitions of 2001. They are identical. There is, therefore, much substance in the submission of the learned Senior Counsel who appeared on behalf of the petitioner that the documents in question could not have been fabricated in 2001 when they were already in existence in 1985 and 1987 and were a part of a the judicial record of this Court. It would also be pertinent to note that in 1987 when these very objections which are purported to have been forged and/or fabricated were part of the Court record in CW 2645/1987, the petitioner was not even an advocate as he had been enrolled only in 1989. This discloses very clearly that firstly, there is no legal evidence whatsoever in support of the allegation against the petitioner and secondly the evidence collected and/or available on record does not disclose the commission of any offence or make out a case against the petitioner and thirdly that the allegations made in the FIR are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person could ever reach the conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the petitioner. When the section 5A objections already formed part of the Court record in 1985 and in 1987, the allegation in the F.I.R. that the same were forged / fabricated subsequently is clearly absurd and inherently improbable. In 1987 the petitioner was not even an advocate much less an advocate representing the Land & Building Department. There is no question of his forging / fabricating any document when the same already insisted in the Court record in 1987. Even if it is accepted as alleged in the F.I.R. that the section 5A objections are forged / fabricated, they were already in existence in 1987. Hence, petitioners’ involvement in the alleged conspiracy of forging / fabricating the same is clearly ruled out. No prudent person on the basis of these facts can ever reach the conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the petitioner.
30. These are considerations which clearly fall within the parameters which have been prescribed by the Supreme Court in several decisions including the decision in Hazari Lal Gupta Vs. Rameshwar Prasad, and which have been summarised in para 108 of the decision in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) which reads as under:
“108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulate and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1)Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2)Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3)Where the uncontroverter allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code of the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.”
31. We are aware of the above caveat signalled by the Supreme Court to the effect that the power of quashing criminal proceedings should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. However, we find that the present case is one which falls within this category of cases where the power of quashing a criminal proceeding must be exercised for the reasons aforesaid.
32. Accordingly, we allow the petition, quash and/or set aside the RC No. DAI/2002/A/0062 dated 7.11.2002 qua the petitioner. It is, however, clarified that insofar as the other accused are concerned, we have not expressed any view on merits nor have we made any directions in respect of them.