ORDER
U.L. Bhatt, C.J.
1. This order shall dispose of L.P.A. No. 28/94 (Rana Pratapsingh v. Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors.) and L.P.A. No. 29/94 (Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. v. Rana Pratapsingh). The writ petitioner and respondents in this writ petition (M.P. No. 1558/89) have filed these appeals.
2. We have heard Shri G.M. Chaphekar with Shri K.N. Puntambakar and Shri Samvatsar, appearing for the appellant in L.P.A. No. 28/94 who is a respondent in L.P.A. 29/94 and Shri Kulkarni, who appeared for the appellants in L.P.A. No. 29/94, who are respondents in L.P.A. 28/94.
3. The writ petitioner, an employee of the Cotton Corporation of India Limited (a Public Undertaking), was removed from service as a result of disciplinary action. The order was passed by the Chairman-Cum-Managing Director on April 11, 1989. The employee preferred an appeal before the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors considered and dismissed the appeal by a resolution dated December 18, 1989. The dismissed employee filed a Writ Petition challenging the dismissal on various grounds.
4. The Learned Single Judge took the view that there are infirmities on account of non-supply of the copy of enquiry report, non- hearing by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director before interfering with some of the findings of the Enquiry Officer, failure of the Appellate Authority in not giving opportunity of hearing to the appellant, failure of the Appellate Authority to pass speaking order and the conduct of the Chairman-cum-Managing Director in presiding over the meeting of the Board which considered the appeal and set aside the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority and allowed the Writ Petition with costs. Both the sides are aggrieved.
5. It is contended for the Writ Petitioner that the Chairman-cum- Managing Director was not the Disciplinary Authority at the time of imposition of punishment. The Board of Directors in 1983 revised the scheme of delegation of powers. According to the revised scheme, in regard to the employee up to managerial personnel including Manager and its equivalent rank, Chairman-cum- Managing Director is the Disciplinary Authority and the Board is the Appellate Authority and Review Authority. The scheme was further revised with effect from August 10, 1988 according to which the three Authorities are General Manager (Personnel). Director and Chairman-cum-Managing Director. Long before the revision, disciplinary action had been initiated by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, who was at the relevant time the Disciplinary Authority. In the circumstances, we find no infirmity in the C.M.D. passing the order and the Board exercising appellate power.
6. The Enquiry Officer, who considered the four charges framed against the Writ Petitioner, after due enquiry found him guilty of charges 2 & 3 and found that charges 1 & 4 were not established. The Disciplinary Authority on a consideration of the record of enquiry held that there were sufficient materials in support of charges 1 & 4 also and found the delinquent guilty of all the charges. This was done without issuing a notice to the delinquent and without giving him an opportunity to show cause or opportunity of hearing. The Learned Single judge opined that there was violation of principles of natural justice. The rules do not provide for such an opportunity being given at that stage by the Disciplinary Authority nor is there any established principle of natural justice warranting adoption of such procedure. This view has been upheld by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. S.S. Koshal A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 2901. Hence the view taken by the Learned Single Judge is not correct.
7. Learned Single Judge also found infirmity in the original order of punishment since a copy of the Enquiry Officer’s report was not furnished to the delinquent at the appropriate time. Learned Single Judge placed reliance on the decisions in Union of India v. Mohammad Ramzan Khan (1991-I-LLJ-29)(SC) and Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar (1994-I-LLJ-162)(SC). The earlier decision no doubt upheld the right of the delinquent to secure copy of the report at the appropriate time, but it is made clear that the declaration of law will have only prospective effect w.e.f. November 20, 1990. This has been held so by the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in the latter decision. This view has also been followed in Union of India and Ors. v. I.S. Singh A.I.R. 1994 S.C 2090. Therefore, the view that the Disciplinary action is vitiated on account of failure to supply a copy of the report at the appropriate stage is not sustainable.
8. Three aspects remain for consideration, namely bias on account of Disciplinary Authority presiding over the meeting of Board which acted as the Appellate Authority, failure to pass speaking order and failure to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent by the Appellate Authority. The law in regard to the last of the questions is settled, as clearly laid down to Ramachandra v. Union of India and Ors. (1986-II-LLJ-334)(SC), which is relied upon by the Learned Single Judge. In this view though the quashing of the order of the Disciplinary Authority is not sustainable, the quashing of the order of the Appellate Authority is quite in order. At the same time we cannot but express our view that it may not be appropriate to expect an Administrative Appellate Authority to write a judgment in the manner which a Court can or is expected to write.
9. It is brought to our notice that the agenda which was considered at the meeting of the Appellate Board contained all the details of the findings, the contentions in the appeal and the detailed comments made by the Disciplinary Authority and the Board had occasion to scrutinise the agenda which specifically refers to the above matters. The Board resolution indicates that it applied its mind on all the aspects of the matter. Therefore, the contention of absence of application of mind or failure to pass a speaking order cannot pass matter. The view taken in this regard by the Learned Single Judge cannot stand.
10. We do not want to pronounce on the contention regarding bias; it is sufficient to ensure that the Disciplinary Authority does not preside over the Board Meeting while considering the appeal.
11. For the reasons indicated above, we set aside the impugned order in part to the extent the impugned order quashes the order of the Disciplinary Authority and confirm the impugned order in part, namely to the extent it quashes the order of the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority will consider the appeal in accordance with rules after giving an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent. The Chairman-cum-Managing Director (if he is the same person who passed order of removal, who exercised powers of Disciplinary Authority in this) will avoid presiding over the meeting of Board of Directors when it considers the appeal of delinquent. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. In the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their costs in the Writ Petition as well as in these appeals.