JUDGMENT
J.G. Chitre, J.
1. This appeal has been admitted on solitary substantial question of law which can be enumerated as mentioned hereunder :
“Whether dismissal of the suit for declaration and for injunction of electricity supply is illegal?”
2. The case of the appellant can be mentioned hereunder in brief for unfolding the dispute between a father and the daughter. The appellant Sabra Bano happens to be the daughter of Respondent No. 3 Mohammad Issac and she happens to be residing in one portion of the building owned by Respondent No. 3 Mohd. Issac situated in municipal limits of Ratlam Municipal Council. There was a litigation between Mohd. Issac and Mohd. Hanif, the husband of Sabra Bano instituted in Ratlam Civil Court of competent jurisdiction wherein Mohd. Issac had averred that Mohd. Hanif, the husband of Sabra Bano was occupying a portion of his building as tenant. That suit is still pending. During the pendency of that suit, it appears from the record that, the electricity supply being supplied to the portion in occupation of Mohd. Hanif and Sabra Bano was disconnected. A grievance was made in that context by Sabra Bano to appropriate Rent Controlling Authority of Ratlam. The said Authority declared that Sabra Bano was not the tenant of the said portion of the building occupied by both Mohd. Hanif and Sabra Bano.
3. The record shows that thereafter Sabra Bano made an application to concerned authority for the purpose of getting electricity supply under the scheme initiated by M. P. Govt., commonly known as “EK BATTT CONNECTION”. She got the electricity supply in the said portion of the house (hereinafter mentioned as tenement for convenience). For sometime, she used that electricity supply connection but thereafter it was disconnected by MPEB on account of a complaint made by Respondent No. 3 Mohd. Issac. Before that Sabra Bano had filed the present suit in the court of Civil Judge, Class II, Ratlam bearing Civil Suit No. 37-A/94.
4. In the matter of said suit Mohd. Issac was not impleaded as a party. He made an application to the Court making a prayer that he be impleaded as a party to the said suit as he happens to be owner of the said building. On his prayer he was impleaded as party in the said suit. Some interlocutory applications were moved and were decided by the court. But I.A. No. 6 led to the judgment which was under challenge before the District Court, Ratlam and now which is being assailed by the present second appeal. The trial Court dismissed the suit of the appellant and that judgment and decree was confirmed by the first Appellate Court.
5. Shri M. A. Bohra, learned counsel appearing for the appellant argued that Sabra Bano is the wife of Mohd. Hanif, who has been declared to be a tenant by Respondent No. 3, Mohd. Issac in the previous suit and she is the family member of Mohd. Hanif, alleged tenant of Mohd. Issac so far as tenement is concerned and therefore Sabra Bano has every right to get electricity supply connection under the Scheme “EK BATTI CONNECTION”. It is the argument of Shri Bohra that as she happens to be the wife of Mohd. Hanif, it is her right to get that electricity supply provided to her unobstructed. Shri Bohra further argued that the learned trial Court should have passed the decree in favour of Sabra Bano directing MPEB and Mohd. Issac to see that the said ‘EK BATTI CONNECTION’ provided to Sabra Bano does not get disconnected. Shri Bohra made a grievance that instead of passing a decree in her favour, the learned trial Court dismissed her suit holding that the said court did not have the jurisdiction to try the said suit. He continued the grievance further by submitting that the learned first Appellate Court also dismissed the appeal of Sabra Bano and confirmed the decree which has been passed by the trial Court. He prayed that said decree passed by the court below be set aside and the suit be restored and directed to be tried, heard and decided as per law. He further made a prayer that injunction be granted against Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 directing them that they shall not obstruct or disconnect ‘EK BATTI CONNECTION’ which was being enjoyed by Sabra Bano so far as tenement is concerned.
6. Shri Surjit Singh appearing for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 argued that MPEB has no concern with the dispute between Sabra Bano and her father Mohd. Issac or dispute between Mohd. Hanif, the husband of Sabra Bano and Mohd. Issac. Shri Surjit Singh further submitted that the MPEB would be supplying electricity supply in accordance with provisions of law only after obtaining no objection certificate from the owner of the building. He further clarified that Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 would be obeying the order passed by the court in this context.
7. Shri S. C. Bagadia, learned counsel for Respondent No. 3 argued that by no stretch of imagination Sabra Bano can be treated as tenant. If at all any body can be claimed as tenant, he is Mohd. Hanif and he can make a grievance in this context before Rent Controlling Authority, Ratlam in view of provisions of sections 38 and 45 of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as Rent Act). He further pointed that such grievance was made by Sabra Bano before Rent Controlling Authority and that has been rightly dismissed and, therefore, Sabra Bano had no legal right to file a suit which has been filed by her in the nature of present suit. He argued further that when the trial Court was deciding Ex. P. 6 it rightly concluded that the suit which has been brought by Sabra Bano by concealing material facts deserved to be dismissed and has been dismissed by the trial Court at appropriate stage. In that context he has placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in the matter of T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal reported in AIR 1977 SC 2421 wherein Supreme Court has held that –
“If on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he (Judge) should exercise his power under Order VII, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clear drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X, Civil Procedure Code. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial Courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Ch.XI) and must be triggered against them.”
8. After examining the judgment and decrees passed by the trial Court as well as by the first Appellate Court as a whole, this court has to conclude that after the plaint was accepted by the court and after the written statement was filed by the Respondents Nos. 1, 2 3, vide I. A. No. 6 an objection was raised challenging the jurisdiction of the trial Court. When such situation arises, it becomes the duty of the court to adjudicate on the issue of law if raised by any of the contesting party keeping in view the observations of Supreme Court in the matter of T. Arivandandam vs. T. V. Satyapal (supra). If the court finds that the suit has been brought by concealing important facts and facets from the notice of the court, in such case the court has to inform itself about the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 read with provisions of Order XIV, Rule 1, Sub-Rules 1, 2, 3 and 4. The court has to thereafter inform itself by provisions of Order XIV, Rule 2 and record its judgment on the situation presented before it abegging an appropriate verdict.
9. In the present matter it was the duty of the appellant Sabra Bano to inform the court about the following facts –
(i) That there was a suit pending before Civil Court at Ratlam filed by Respondent No. 3-Mohd. Issac (her own father) against her own husband Mohd. Hanif alleging that he was the tenant of the tenement.
(ii) Sabra Bano had herself moved an application before Rent Controlling Authority, Ratlam making a grievance about disconnecting of the electricity supply provided to the tenement.
(iii) The Rent Controlling Authority had dismissed her application declaring that she was not the ‘tenant’ of the tenement.
(iv) Sabra Bano should have informed the court that though she was not ‘tenant’ of tenement she had obtained the said electricity supply connection under the scheme ‘EK BATTI CONNECTION’.
Sabra Bano did not inform the court about these facts and, therefore, she was guilty of concealing these material facts from the notice of court.
10. When Sabra Bano was making a prayer to the court for getting ad interim injunction in her favour and against the respondents directing the respondents not to disconnect the said electricity supply, it was her duty to inform the court that after obtaining the said connection, she used that electricity supply for the purpose of getting light in the tenement from other number points. A litigant coming to the court for the purpose of equitable relief in the nature of injunction has come with clean hands and has to bring all necessary relevant facts to the notice of the court. If he does not do that, he puts himself in the risk of being exposed to legal consequence of such defaults or concealments.
11. In the present matter when an objection was raised preliminarily touching the jurisdiction of the court, it was the duty of the court to adjudicate over that preliminary issue as early as possible and in the present matter the trial Court has done the same. The order of the trial court shows that the trial Court heard the parties before passing this order.
12. Learned counsel Shri Bohra had submitted that the appellant was entitled to have electricity supply under Scheme ‘EK BATTI CONNECTION’ initiated by the State Government and in fact she had obtained such a connection from MPEB. However, that was disconnected on account of complaint made by Respondent No. 3.
13. Shri Bagadia and Shri Surjit Singh pointed that the said scheme is for slum dwellers for helping them to get the electricity connection in their huts. They pointed out that the said scheme has no relevance so far as “PAKKA” constructions are concerned. According to them the said scheme was not applicable at all to the suit building and tenement. They further submitted that the tenant can have such electricity supply through the owner of the building only. Shri Surjit Singh submitted that the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are ready to provide the electricity supply to the tenant or lawful occupants provided the building owner does not have any objection for that.
14. Keeping in view the provisions of Rent Act and relevant enactment in respect of supply of electricity, the appellant cannot have the electricity supply without permission of the owner of the building i.e. Respondent No. 3. The learned counsel Shri Bohra submitted that appellant is the daughter of Respondent No. 3 and she is staying in the tenement along with her husband, who is shown to be a tenant in the suit pending in the Civil Court, Ratlam which has been filed by none else but Respondent No. 3. It is his argument that being the family member of Mohd. Hanif, the alleged tenant of Respondent No. 3, the appellant has right to get electricity supply in the said tenement. I am unable to agree with him for the reasons stated hereunder :
If the appellant claims to have the electricity supply in the tenement where she is residing as the daughter of Respondent No. 3, being the head of the family, the said electricity supply cannot be obtained from Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 unless consented to by Respondent No. 3. If she wants to have such electricity supply to tenement otherwise than the daughter of Respondent No. 3, it cannot be obtained unless Respondent No. 3, the owner of the building, permitts her and Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to do so. The family members of the tenant cannot have the right of getting electricity supply in the tenement keeping aside the said tenant and the owner of the building, independently. The court cannot compel MPEB and its concerned officers to provide such electricity supply to such persons against relevant legislation.
15. In view of provisions of section 45 of Rent Act, civil court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit in which a grievance has been made in respect of non-supply of electricity to the appellant by Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. When such grievance was made, it has been dismissed by Rent Controlling Authority, Ratlam. When that was so, the appellant (original plaintiff) attempted to secure such a relief by improper way and that too concealing material facts from the notice of the court of Civil Judge, Class II, Ratlam which dismissed her suit.
16. When a litigant getting dismissed from a competent court on account of non-possession of locus standi files the suit in another form and that too by concealing material facts, the court has to nip out such mischievous and frivolous litigant at the bud. In addition to provisions of Order XIV, Rule 4 the court has to use provisions of section 151 of Civil Procedure Code in such cases. The court cannot tolerate such tricks being played in the court and dragging adversaries litigation after litigation, unnecessarily finding out substanceless causes. A litigant cannot be permitted to drag the adversary from one court to other court, by mischievously arranging the averments, cause of actions cleverly concealing material facts. Such suits need to be decided and dismissed by framing preliminary issues if requested by the parties or suo motu by the courts if such mischiefs and tricks come to the notice of the court.
17. The first Appellate Court has considered all necessary facets touching the controversy qua the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. After elaborate discussion the learned first Appellate Court had dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant. I do not find any fault in the approach of the learned first Appellate Court while deciding the first appeal. The decree passed by the first Appellate Court, therefore, is correct, proper and legal.
18. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of T. Arivandandam vs. T. V. Satyapal (supra), the appellant deserves a strict action from the court. Her attempt of approaching the court of Civil Judge, Clause II, Ratlam for getting the said relief deserves to be not only deprecated but condemned. A punishment may be in terms of provisions of section 35A of Civil Procedure Code or other legal provisions. However, I do not propose to take such action against the appellant because the record shows that the appellant is the daughter of Respondent No. 3 and she is residing in the said building along with her husband and children. In this connection a submission which has been made by Shri Bohra needs to be also given appropriate consideration which shows that appellant had come to stay in the said house because she was not keeping good health at Bombay. It appears to be a frustration in the mind of such ailing daughter against her father which needs to be dealt with sympathetically, properly by the concerned relatives of the family.
19. Thus, I come to the conclusion that the trial Court has rightly dismissed the application for injunction sought against Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and has rightly dismissed the suit of the plaintiff by deciding preliminary issue in respect of the jurisdiction. I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that first Appellate Court has rightly confirmed the said decree. It being so, this appeal deserves to be dismissed with costs. The fee of lawyers appearing for Respondents shall be Rs. 151/- (One hundred fifty one. A token money exemplary one, for a woman litigant in the situation in which the appellant happens to be).