ORDER
T.S. Doabia, J.
1. This order be read in continuation of the order passed by this Court on September 13, 1995.
2. After the aforementioned decision was given a Letters Patent Appeal was preferred by the Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwavidyalaya, Jabalpur. This appeal was allowed as the Division Bench was of the view that instead of relegating the petitioner to the onerous litigation in a civil Court, the matter should be decided in the writ jurisdiction itself. The case was remanded with following observations :
“After careful consideration of the contentions advanced on behalf of the JNKV, we are of the opinion that in exercise of our powers in Letters Patent Appeal, it is open to us to uphold the decision of the learned Single Judge on the question of jurisdiction decided by him and yet, to remand the matter to the learned Single Judge for his decision on merits. We find no prohibition anywhere in any law for the course that we are adopting. We respectfully rely on the decision of the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court (supra) in adopting the course of remand of the matter to the learned Single Judge for decision of the whole writ petition on merits.”
Consequently, the appeal preferred by the appellant is allowed partlyand the order of the Learned Single Judge insofar as it directs the Civil Court to decide the civil suit on merits is hereby set aside. The case is remanded to the Learned Single Judge for decision of the writ petition on merits.
This is how this petition is taken up again.
3. A few further facts for disposal of this petition on merits be also noticed.
4. The petitioner Satbir Sharma, joined the services of the University on September 25, 1979. He was driving Jeep No. CPW-112. This met with an accident on January 25, 1982. Two employees of the University who were in the Jeep died in the accident. The petitioner was prosecuted for fash and negligent driving for an offence under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code. A judgment of acquittal was recorded on December 29, 1983. Separately a claim petition was preferred under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal passed an award on October 22, 1986. The dependents of the two deceased employees were given compensation. The petitioner along with insurance Company was held jointly and severally liable for payment of compensation. The University did not prefer any appeal but the petitioner did. This was however, dismissed by the Court on March 26, 1987. After this, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner asking him to show cause as to why his services be not dispensed with. This was basically done on the ground that the Tribunal had recorded a finding in its award in which he was held to be negligent. The petitioner wanted a full-fledged enquiry to be held. This was not done. The petitioner’s services were brought to an end in pursuance of the findings recorded by the Tribunal. The show cause notice which was issued to the petitioner reads asunder:
“This is to inform you that in Motor Accident Claim Case No. 4/82 decided by the Presiding Judge Shri S.K. Pande, DJ, Morena between the parties Smt. K.S. Devi and 3 Ors. v. J.N.K.V.V. and 2 Ors., the Ld. Judge found you guilty of rash and negligent driving causing an accident which resulted in death of one Nambudripad. This judgment of the court has become final as no appeal to the knowledge of the J.N.K.V.V. has been preferred.
That under these circumstances it is not de
sirable to continue in services of J.N.K.V.V.
as a driver :
If you have to state anything in respect of this judgment you are at liberty to send your representation failing which your services will stand terminated w.e.f. February 15, 1987 F.N. ”
5. The petitioner submitted a reply and pointed out that merely because an accident has taken place he cannot be removed from service. Ultimately an order was passed, copy of this is 2 annexure P-8 with the petition, this reads as under :
“Shri Satbir Sharma was found guilty of rash and negligent driving causing an accident which resulted in death of one Shri M.K.G. Nambudri in Motor Accident Claim Case No. 4/October 22, 1986. The judgment became final as no appeal to the knowledge of the J.N.K.V.V. was preferred against the said judgment.
Shri Sharma was served with a show cause notice dated January 13, 1987 who submitted his reply dated March 31, 1987. Although found guilty in Motor Accident Claim Case No. 4/82 decided on October 22, 1986 Shri Sharma instead of submitting any explanation to show cause had tried to justify his action merely by saying that the lawyer engaged by the University did not take proper interest and the case was not conducted effectively. Shri Sharma himself being a party to the proceedings should have engaged his own counsel. Further it is not open for the authorities or Shri Sharma to comment on the judgment which has become final. Acquittal in another criminal case No. 232/83 if any, will not wipe out the effect of strictures passed against Shri Sharma in claim case No. 4/82 finding him guilty of rash and negligent driving.
The services of Shri Sharma stand terminated w.e.f. April 2, 1987 A.N.”
It is seen that in the criminal Court the petitioner was acquitted. The claims Tribunal recorded a finding that petitioner was negligent. The question arises as to whether this was enough to remove the petitioner from service.
6. It is settled Jaw that an employer is within its rights to take notice of the conduct which led to an adverse order being passed by a Court. It is the conduct which can be made the basis for taking disciplinary proceedings against an employee. In this regard, it would be pertinent to refer to the decision given by a Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Om Prakash v. Director, Postal Services, AIR 1973 P & H. 1. In this case the question was as to how the authorities should proceed when departmental action is sought to be taken after a verdict is recorded by a criminal Court but benefit of probation is given. It was held that it is the conduct which is relevant factor and should be taken note of. The view expressed by this Court in Prem Kumar v. Union of India, 1971 Lab. IC. 823 was followed. It would be apt to notice some of the conclusions drawn by the Full Bench. These are :
“(a) the departmental punishment or dismissal from service is not an essential and automatic consequence of conviction on a criminal charge.
(b) the authority competent to take discipli- nary action against a servant convicted on a criminal charge has to consider all the circumstances of the case and then to decide.
(i) Whether the conduct of the delinquent official which led to his conviction is such as to render his further retention in public service undesirable;
(ii) If so, whether to dismiss him or to remove him from service, or to compulsorily retire him; and
(iii) If the said conduct of the official is not such which renders his further retention in service undesirable, whether the minor punishment if any, should be inflicted on him.
(c) to retain in service or to remain in serv
ice is not a qualification, but a right in certain
circumstances subject to the relevant consti
tutional or statutory provisions and service
rules.
(d) the liability to be departmentally punished for conduct which has led to the conviction of the employee does not attach to the conviction, but attaches to the original conduct (misconduct) which constituted the offence of which the official has been convicted.
(e) Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act does not wash away or obliterate the conduct of the employee which has led to his conviction and does not, therefore, give him any immunity against departmental proceedings nor exonerates him from his liability to departmental punishment for such conduct if it amounts to misconduct under the relevant service rules; the original misconduct of a servant does not merge with his conviction so as to become non existent after conviction.”
The above decision was approved by the Supreme Court in the case reported as (1976-I-LLJ-68). The Divisional Personal Officer, Southern Railway and Anr. v. T.R. Challapan.
7. Thus if in case of a conviction the employer is supposed to again give a fresh look and consider the conduct which led to conviction the position cannot be worse when an employee is acquitted. Even if it be presumed that on account of a finding recorded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, something is to be said against an employee even then the case of such an employee cannot be at a footing worse than an employee who has been convicted. Thus it is ultimately the conduct which led to adverse finding having been recorded by a judicial authority which is to be taken note of. This has not been done in the present case. Not only this the plea of the employee that he was not at fault should have been taken into consideration. Again, the question as to whether this was a case which required extreme step to be taken should have been gone into. This has again not been done. The principle of natural justice has not been observed at all. Thus I am of the view that the order annexure P-8 cannot be sustained because :
(i) the conduct of the action which led to an adverse finding having been recorded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has not been gone into.
(ii) as to what is the effect of an order of acquittal having been passed in the case. This again has not been gone into. There were two verdicts one by the criminal Court and other by the Tribunal which was to be given preference and why should have been elaborated;
(iii) Whether the fault on the part of the petitioner was such which required the extreme step of snapping the relationship of master and servant has also not been gone into;
(iv) the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity to put across his point of view;
(v) No opportunity was given against proposed punishment.
This petition is accordingly allowed. The petitioner would stand reinstated with all consequential benefits.