ORDER
V.K. Agrawal, J.
1. Order dated 29-4-2000 in case No. 2-A-90(7)/97-98 by Rent Controlling Authority on an application of the plaintiff/respondent under Section 23-A (b) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act: 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’ for short), directing eviction of defendants/petitioners from the tenanted premises, has been assailed in this revision.
2. Undisputably the defendants/petitioners are tenants in the non-residential accommodation Shop No. 176 situate at Hanumanganj Ward, Katni. The plaintiff/respondent is their landlord. Plaintiff/respondent served a notice dated 5-6-97 through her counsel on the defendants/petitioners terminating their tenancy. Reply dated 24-6-97 thereof was sent by the defendants/petitioners.
3. The Plaintiff/respondent in her application averred that she requires the suit accommodation for her own business and that she has no other suitable accommodation for earning here livelihood except the suit premises in question in the city of Katni. Since the defendants/petitioners despite notice dated 5-6-97 terminating their tenancy did not vacate the suit premises, hence application under Section 23-A of the ‘Act’ for eviction of defendants/ petitioners, was filed.
4. The defendants/petitioners denied the averments as above. They denied that the suit accommodation was bonafide required by the plaintiff/respondent. According to them, the plaintiff/respondent is an old lady, aged about 70 years. She has no experience of business and she resides with her sons. It was also averred by the defendants/petitioners that the plaintiff/respondent had a very big shop located on the main road, adjoining the suit shop. According to the defendants/petitioners, the plaintiff filed the application for eviction on false grounds, and prayed that the same be dismissed.
5. The learned Rent Controlling Authority by the impugned order held that the suit accommodation is required bona-fide by the plaintiff/respondent and accordingly allowed her application directing the defendants/petitioners to vacate the suit premises.
6. Learned counsel for petitioners submitted that the plaintiff/respondent has neither properly pleaded that she required the suit accommodation nor the alleged requirement has been duly proved. It has been submitted that the learned Rent Controlling Authority has not considered the material and evidence of parties in proper prospective and has rather casually allowed the application of the plaintiff/respondent. It has been submitted that the plaintiff/respondent has suitable alternative accommodation which is adjoining the suit shop itself, and that the plaintiff/respondent has admitted that she is carrying on ‘sari’ business in the said shop. In view of the above, her averments that the suit accommodation is required by her for the business of restaurant, stands negatived. It was, therefore, submitted by the learned counsel for the defendants/petitioners that the impugned order directing eviction of defendants/petitioners from the suit premises deserves to be set- aside.
7. As against this, the learned counsel for plaintiff/respondent submitted that she is an old widow and requires the suit accommodation for starting her business of restaurant. It has been submitted that she was earlier carrying on the said business, but since she did not have sufficient space for carrying out the said business, she had to close it down, and that she would again start her restaurant, after obtaining possession of suit accommodation. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent submitted that the learned Rent Controlling Authority was justified in holding that plaintiff/respondent bona-fide required the suit premises and it was therefore justified in allowing the application of the plaintiff/respondent for eviction of defendants/petitioners.
8. In view of the rival contentions as above the question is : as to whether the plaintiff/respondent had duly pleaded and established that she bona-fide requires the suit accommodation for the purpose of continuing or starting her business, and that she has no other suitable non-residential accommodation of her own at Katni, for the purpose ?
9. It may be noted at the outset that the plaintiffs’ pleading regarding requirement are recited in paras 2 and 3 of the application filed before the Rent Controlling Authority.
The said paras read as below :
“2. That she is widow having absolutely no source of income except from a Katni Restaurant, in which she wanted to get set up her own business of extension of the restaurant after getting it vacated from N/As which she was closed down because of paucity of sufficient accommodation for Kitchen and washing of plates room.
3. That she has no other suitable accommodation except the premises in question in the city elsewhere.”
10. Perusal of para 2 above would indicate that the averments as above are vague and do not properly spell out the requirement. The averments as above do not specifically recite as to whether the plaintiff/respondent intends to start her business or wishes to extend her business of restaurant.
11. Learned counsel for petitioners in the above context submitted that the plaintiff/respondent in fact started her restaurant business in the accommodation adjoining the suit shop, but had to close down, because there was no sufficient space for cleaning utensils and for running the kitchen thereof. However, no specification of the accommodation, which is already available with the plaintiff/respondent was given in her pleadings.
12. Coming to the evidence in the case, plaintiff/respondent Smt. Kamla Devi Nayak (AW/1) in her statement stated that she had a shop adjoining the suit shop. She has also admitted that the said shop in her possession, is situated on the main road. She further admitted that the upper story of the said shop is also in her possession. There are four rooms in the upper story in the said accommodation, in which she is residing. The said accommodation is shown in the map attached with her application under Section 23-A of the ‘Act’. The said accommodation available with the plaintiff/respondent appears to consist of three separate rooms in the ground floor, admeasuring 14′ X 12’6″, 10′ X 12’6″ and 10′ X 12’6″ feet. Thus, a much larger accommodation than the suit accommodation is already available with the plaintiff/respondent. It is further admitted by the plaintiff/respondent that she is running ‘sari’ business in the said accommodation and is having lucrative income therefrom, and that she is entirely satisfied and happy with the said business.
13. In view of the above admissions, it is clear that the plaintiff/respondent has much larger accommodation, total area of which is 38′ X 12’6″ feet, and that the said accommodation located on the main road, in which she is having a flourishing ‘sari’ business, and that she is entirely satisfied with her present business and earning. It may also be noticed that the suit accommodation consists of a single room only admeasuring 9′ X 8′ feet and is thus much smaller than the accommodation already available with the plaintiff. It is also noticed that the plaintiff/respondent Smt. Kamla Devi Nayak (AW/1) had stated that she had opened her restaurant in the vacant portion of the alternative accommodation (presumably the portion in which the plaintiff/respondent is running ‘sari’ shop), but had closed down the same, because there was no place for oven (Bhatti). It may further be noticed that the plaintiff has not stated a word that she wishes to start or carry out the business of restaurant in the suit accommodation.
14. From the above, it would appear that not only her pleadingg regarding alleged requirement of the suit shop to run a restaurant are vague, but she has also not stated a word in support of the alleged requirement of the suit shop for the said purpose. In the circumstances, it cannot be inferred that she needed the suit accommodation for starting her restaurant business.
15. As observed by the Supreme Court in K.S. Sundararaju Chettiar v. M.R. Ramachandra Naidu, (1994) 5 SCC 14], the bona fide requirement of landlord is required to be considered objectively with reference to the material on record and it is necessary to determine the real intention of the landlord on the basis of evidence adduced.
16. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent has submitted that even if the plaintiff has not made a specific statement regarding her need, the same should be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. It has further been submitted in the above context that since the plaintiff/respondent had stated that she was earlier carrying on a restaurant business in the adjoining shop and has closed it down, it should be inferred that she requires the suit accommodation for the said business as has been pleaded in para 2 of the plaint.
17. Learned counsel for respondent in support of his contention as above, relied on an observation in Smt. Rukmanibai since deceased by L.Rs and Ors. v. Hajarimal Dhokalchand Chandak and Ors. (AIR 1999 SC 3089), wherein it was observed that bona fide requirement is not a fact which could only be established by the landlord. However, it may be noted that in that case the landlady had pleaded the requirement of the suit accommodation for starting the business of her son Bhikachand. In the said suit though the landlady did not examine herself but her son Bhikachand for whose need the suit was filed, had been examined and had substituted plaintiff’s averments regarding the need as above. In the aforementioned circumstances it was observed that since Bhikachand who was also the general power of attorney holder of her mother-the landlady, and for whose business the suit accommodation was required, did come into the witness-box to support the case of personal requirement; hence the non-examination of the landlady herself would not disentitle her to the relief of eviction.
18. However, in the instant case as noticed above, the facts are entirely different and the landlady- the plaintiff/respondent though examined herself, but has not stated a word in support of her plea that she wants to start a business of restaurant in the suit premises. Hence, the observations as above in the case of Rudmani Bai (Supra) would be of no avail to the plaintiff/ respondent.
19. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent also submitted that the circumstances as putforth by the plaintiff/respondent should lead to the inference that the suit accommodation was required bona-fide. It has been submitted that it was not the mere whim or fancy of the plaintiff/respondent to have the suit accommodation, but her requirement was real and genuine. As noted earlier the plaintiff/respondent has not stated that she requires the suit accommodation for starting her business of restaurant. It is also clear that she is already carrying on a flourishing sari business from which she is having earning to her entire satisfaction. She has not stated a word that she intends closing down the sari business. In the circumstances, it cannot be inferred that she requires the suit accommodation for either starting or extending the business of restaurant.
20. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent has submitted that the landlord is the best judge for considering as to which accommodation is to be best suited for his requirement. It was therefore urged that simply because the plaintiff/respondent had started her business in the adjoining shop to the suit accommodation, it would not disentitle her from a decree of eviction of her tenants in the suit shop. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent relied upon Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery and Co. (AIR 2000 SC 534), wherein reference was made to the decision in Smt. Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishna [(1996) 5 SCC 353]. It was observed therein that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement in the residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. However, it is noticed that in the above case the landlord though admitted that he had several other shops and houses belonging to him, but he made a categorical statement that the houses and shops were not vacant and that suit premises was suitable for his business purpose.
21. In the instant case, as noted earlier the position is entirely different. The plaintiff/respondent laid claim for eviction of the suit shop, on the vague premises that she wants to extend or start her business of restaurant. In her statement however, she did not support her need as above. Instead she admitted that she is running a ‘sari’ business in the adjoining shop which is much larger in dimension than the suit shop. She has not pleaded or stated that the suit shop is required for extending her business. In the circumstances, in the absence of proper pleading and proof, that she requires the suit accommodation for starting her restaurant business, she could not succeed in her prayer for eviction.
22. It is, therefore, clear that the requirement as set up in pleadings is not supported by the statement of plaintiff/respondent. Her statement also does not indicate that she wants to extend her business of ‘sari’ and for that purpose she requires the suit accommodation. It is true that normally evidence should not be reappreciated or reappraised in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (AIR 1999 SC 2507), it was laid down that the Court would not normally enter into appreciation or reappreciation of evidence, merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts. However, this Court is obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of ‘whether it is according to law’, and for that limited purpose it may enter into reappraisal of evidence, that is, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectively could have reached that conclusion on the material available. In the instant case, as noticed earlier, it is found that the learned Rent Controlling Authority, in total disregard to the pleadings and material as placed on record, has chosen to record a finding that the plaintiff/respondent requires the suit accommodation for starting her business. Such a finding obviously cannot be sustained.
23. Therefore, the requirement was neither properly pleaded nor was it duly established. Hence, the case vaguely set up by the plaintiff/respondent in her petition that she wants to carry on restaurant business in the suit premises, cannot be accepted on its face value, without any evidence whatsoever. The contentions of the learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent cannot be accepted.
24. In view of the above, it is a fit case in which the revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) of the ‘Act’ deserves to be exercised.
25. In the result, this revision is allowed, the impugned order is set-aside. The application for eviction under Section 23-A of the ‘Act’ filed by the plaintiff/respondent stands dismissed.