ORDER
T.S. Doabia, J.
1. The statutory requirement is that a petition preferred under Chapter III- A of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 1961 Act), for specified categories should be disposed of within six months. This litigation has taken almost ten years to conclude. In spite of this, the present petitioner-tenant did not produce his entire evidence. He sought for more time. After giving number of opportunities and after observing that last opportunity is being given, the Rent Controlling Authority proceeded to decide the matter on 9th of July, 1996. It has come to the conclusion that the tenanted premises are required bona fide by the landlord. The accommodation is partly residential and partly commercial. The need of the landlord has been found to be genuine under both the heads. It is against the above order, passed by the Rent Controlling Authority (hereinafter referred to as the RCA), the present revision petition has been preferred under section 23-E of the 1961 Act.
2. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has made available the copy of the petition preferred under section 23-A of the 1961 Act and also the pleadings taken by him by way of defence. The statement of landlord and his witnesses as also the statement of the present petitioner have been placed on the record.
3. A perusal of the petition preferred under section 23-A of the 1961 Act, indicates the following facts :
(i) that, the landlord/respondent retired from Government Service on 31st of December, 1985;
(ii) that, he wanted to spend the evening of his life at Vidisha;
(iii) that, he stated that at Vidisha, there is no another residential or commercial accommodation available with him, and therefore, he wanted to have the vacant possession of the premises said to be in the possession of the present petitioner; and
(iv) that, the premises were required for residential purpose and also for running a hosiery business.
4. It is as indicated above, the present petitioner filed his reply. A plea was taken that the respondent-landlord is having accommodation at Bhopal. It was also pleaded that some accommodations were got vacated and these were rented out. It was further pleaded that the real purpose of initiating this litigation is to seek eviction and to re-let or re-built with a view to have higher rent. It was also pleaded that the present petitioner is an old man and having weak eye-sight. He is doing the business of watch repairing and he should be allowed to continue in the present premises.
5. It be seen that the petition was filed on 12th of June, 1986. This factor is being mentioned because there is no evidence on the record led by the present petitioner which may indicate that any premises were let out after the date of retirement that is 31st of December, 1985 or after 12th of June, 1986 that is the date on which the petition was filed by the respondent-landlord.
6. The statement of the landlord be seen in this regard. He has stated that he has retired from Government service. He has stated that he has no other accommodation available with him. He has stated that he wants to stay at Vidisha and not at Bhopal.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner made reference to the statement made by the landlord in which he admitted that some premises were let out seven years ago. The statement of the landlord was recorded on 31st of August, 1987. As such, letting out in the year 1980 would have no relevancy. Again, in another portion of the statement it has been indicated that two premises measuring 12′ x 13′ and 9′ 9″ x 18′ are available and these are adjacent to the shop in question. It is on these premises, an argument has been raised that some accommodation is lying vacant and the landlord should use the same.
8. So far as the statement of tenant is concerned. That may also be examined. In his examination-in-chief, all that he has stated is that there was some talk between the landlord and tenant that some accommodation would be made available to him. This talk is said to have been taken place in the year 1991. The statement of the tenant was recorded on 9th of April, 1994.
9. I am of the view that the requisite ground for seeking eviction under section 23-A of the 1961 Act has been duly made out by the respondent-landlord. He has established that there is no other accommodation available with him which is suitable for residential and commercial purposes. The accommodation said to be vacant is part of the premises regarding which eviction is being sought.
10. It is settled law that the Courts are not to substitute its own view with regard to the need of the landlord. The reasonable view to be taken is that if the need of the landlord is genuine then the Courts would not superimpose its own view with a view to determine the reasonable need of the landlord.
11. The genuineness of the need is to be seen and this need is never static. It varies from person to person, place to place and from profession to profession. The meaning to be given to the term need or requirement should neither be artificially extended nor its language should be unduly restricted as such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act. At the same time the proposition that the landlord is the sole arbitrator of his need is not be accepted as the only view on the matter. There is no doubt that the subjective choice exercised in a reasonable manner by the landlord should normally be respected by the Court. Where the need for additional accommodation is proved the court is not to dictate the landlord to continue in the same premises. See : Precision Steel and Engineers v. Prem Deva, AIR 1982 SC 1518.
12. The term bona fide represents something more than a desire or wish to occupy. It is quite clear it does not convey the idea of absolute necessity in the sense that there would be no other possible alternative for the landlord for meeting his requirement except by occupying his property. The Rent Control Legislation is primarily meant for protecting the tenants against the tactics of greedy and unscrupulous landlords who are taking advantage of the difficulties and helplessness of the tenants and extract exorbitant rents from them. It does not appear to be designed to penalise the owners by enabling them from occupying their own property when they bona fide require it. There is adequate provision in the Act safeguarding against a possible abuse of the privilege or the right of eviction on their part.
13. In Rekhachand Doorgar v. J.R.D.’Cruz, AIR 1923 Cal. 223, Buckland J. observed that ‘I do not think it is enough that a plaintiff in order to defend a plea under the Calcutta Rent Act should merely say that he desires the premises bona fide for his occupation. The word in the Act is not desires but requires. This is my opinion involved something more than a mere wish and it involves an element of need to some extent at least.”
14. Thus, the term “bona fide requires” connotes something more than desire to have something and much less than absolute necessity. This matter has also been dealt with and considered in Bhogi Lal M. Devya v. S.R. Subramanian Iyer, AIR 1954 Mad. 514.
15. In view of the above, I find no merit in this revision petition. The same is dismissed. The tenant/petitioner is, however, granted three months time to vacate the premises in question. This is subject to the condition that the petitioner would deposit upto date rent and also giving an undertaking before the RCA that he would hand over the vacant possession to the landlord at the end of three months period stipulated above. Let the undertaking be given within a period of ten days from today. There would be no order as to costs.