REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2916 OF 2005
Siddamurthy Jayarami Reddy (D) by LRs. .... Appellants
Versus
Godi Jaya Rami Reddy & Anr. ....Respondents
JUDGMENT
R.M. Lodha, J.
The controversy in this appeal, by special leave, is
concerned with will dated May 21, 1920 executed by Bijivemula
Subba Reddy resident of Chennavaran, village Kattera Gandla,
Badwel Taluq, Cuddapah District. The question is one of
construction upon which the two courts – High Court and trial court –
are not in accord and, have taken divergent view.
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2. At the time of execution of the will, Bijivemula Subba
Reddy – a Hindu – was aged about 75 years. He had his wife
Subbamma, daughter Pitchamma, son-in-law Rami Reddy, widowed
sister Chennamma, widowed daughter-in-law and granddaughter
Lakshumamma living. His only son Sesa Reddy had died in 1917.
The testator was man of sufficient wealth. He had landed property
(wet and dry lands and wells) at various places, namely, in
Katteragandla, Rampadu, Varikuntla and Thiruvengala Puram. He
also owned few houses and plots of lands at different places. He
had moveable properties as well in the form of bonds, securities and
promissory notes. The will recites, as indeed is the undisputed fact,
that the testator, except one house situate at Kotha Laxmipally
village in which he had 1/3rd share, was the absolute owner of the
properties specified therein.
3. Pitchamma had no child although she had married 20
years before the execution of the will. The testator desired that his
daughter Pitchamma adopted a son with the consent of her husband
and his granddaughter Lakshumamma got married to the adopted
son of his daughter Pitchamma.
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4. The will is written in vernacular (Telugu). The
correctness of its English translation annexed with the appeal was
disputed by the respondents. The parties were then directed to
submit agreed translation of the will which they did and that reads as
follows:
“I, Bijivemula Subba Reddy son of Balachennu, resident of
Chennavaran village Kattera gandla, Badwel Taluq
Cuddapah District, cultivation, this the 21st day of May,
1920, with sound mind, free will executing the will.
Now I am aged about 75 years. My wife Subbamma
is living. I had one son by name Sesa Reddy. He died at
the age of 24 years, about three years back. He had one
wife and one daughter aged about 6 years by name
Lakshumma. I have one daughter by name Pitchamma. I
have given in marriage to one Rami Reddy adopted son of
Siddamurthi Duggi Reddy, Papireddypally village Rampadu
Majira., though she married about 20 years back, but she
has no issues.
She intended to take a boy in adoption with the
consent of her husband.
As I am old I could not [sic] able to run my family.
After the death of my son, since 15 years, the above
persons are looking after my family and my welfare.
I have also one widow sister by name Chennamma.
She is living with me since 30 years. She is also helping
me in all aspects. I intend to give my grand daughter
Lakshumamma to the proposed adopted son of my
daughter Pitchamma.
In the said event, I intend to give all my belongings,
moveable and immovable properties to the said Lachumma
and the adopted son of my daughter Pitchamma. But my
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daughter and her husband so far did not take any steps for
getting a boy in adoption. Now as I am sick and suffering
from fever and other ailments, I am doubting whether I can
perform the above said acts during my life time.
I own lands in Katteragandla Village, Rampadu
village, Varikuntla village, and Thiruvengala puram village,
both wet and dry lands and also wells. I also own a Midde
in Majira. I have one Beeruva in Pancha of my house. I
also have household articles, kallamettelu. I also have
lands in Papireddypally village of Rampadu Majira, two
plots and I have absolute rights in one of the same. I also
have one house in Kotha Laxmipally village, of Kathera
gandla majira and in that I have 1/3rd share. I also have
bonds and securities and promissory notes transactions.
As I have the above said moveable and immoveable
properties and as I am having absolute rights over the
same, none others have any rights whatsoever in the
above said properties. Therefore, I intend to execute the
will and the same shall come into force after my demise.
The following are the terms of the will.
1) After my demise, my grand daughter,
Lachumamma who is the daughter of my
son shall have absolute rights in my
entire properties.
2) As my grand daughter is minor, till she
attains the age of majority and attains
power to manage the above said
properties, I hereby appoint my son in
law Siddamurthy ramireddy as executor
of the will till then.
3) According to the will of my grand
daughter Laxmamma, in case to marry
the adopted son of my daughter, it shall
be performed.
4) As I am having my wife Subbamma,
Widow daughter in law, Pitchamma, and
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my widow sister Chennamma, the
present guardian, Ramireddy and my
grand daughter Laxmumma, after
attaining majority, shall look after the
above persons. If they do not satisfied
(sic) with the above arrangements, they
shall enjoy my property with limited rights
and necessary arrangements shall be
made by the guardian and after him and
my grand daughter Laxmamma after
attaining majority.
5) In case, as God’s grace is not in favour of
my aforesaid proposals, namely if my
daughter did not take any boy in adoption
and if the said boy will not accept to
marry my grand daughter Laxmamma, I
intend to give my aforesaid properties,
1/3rd share to my daughter Pitchamma
and her husband who is also my son in
law Ramireddy together. The remaining
2/3rd share is given to my grand daughter
Laxmumma.
Accordingly I executed the will and they have
the right to partition and they shall enjoy the
properties after division with absolute rights during
their life time and thereafter their legal heirs”
5. Bijivemula Subba Reddy died within few months of the
execution of the will. After few years of death of the testator,
Pitchamma wanted to adopt Godi Venkat Reddy as her son but
her husband Rami Reddy did not agree to that adoption. Rami
Reddy left the Village Chennavaran, his wife Pitchamma and settled
in other village – Pappireddypally. Rami Reddy then married with
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Subbamma. Out of the wedlock of Rami Reddy and his second
wife, two sons were born : (i) Siddamurthy Jayarami Reddy and (ii)
Siddamurthy Rami Reddy.
6. Lakshumamma married Godi Venkat Reddy somewhere
in 1926 and out of that wedlock one son Godi Jayarami Reddy was
born. Unfortunately Godi Venkat Reddy died within three years of
marriage. Godi Jayarami Reddy has one son Godi Ramachandra
Reddy. Rami Reddy died in 1939; Pitchamma died in 1953 and
Lakshumamma died in 1971.
7. In 1980, the two sons of Rami Reddy, born out of
wedlock of his second wife Subbamma, filed a suit for partition of the
schedule properties – the properties bequeathed by Bijivemula
Subba Reddy vide his will dated May 21, 1920 – claiming 1/3rd share
therein under that will. They also claimed rent and profits. The case
of the plaintiffs was that they and the defendants were members of a
composite family and were in joint possession and enjoyment of the
properties of Bijivemula Subba Reddy and as per the will they were
entitled to 1/3rd share. During the pendency of the suit, one of the
sons died and his legal representatives were brought on record.
The plaintiffs are the present appellants.
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8. The defendants traversed the claim of the plaintiffs and
set up the plea that there was a dispute between Pitchamma and her
husband Rami Reddy over the adoption of Godi Venkat Reddy; Rami
Reddy left the house somewhere in 1924 and settled in Village
Pappireddypally. It was averred that Rami Reddy married a second
wife and not only abandoned Pitchamma but also abandoned his
rights to the property given under the will. Pitchamma then looked
after the family in the absence of any male member, managed the
properties and got the patta of these properties transferred in the
name of Lakshumamma and bequeathed her share in the property by
a will in 1953 to Lakshumamma.
9. The defendants also set up the plea that Lakshumamma
purchased few properties mentioned in the schedule from her own
resources in 1955. They gave the details of those properties. They
further set up the case that Lakshumamma after executing the will on
March 6, 1953 partitioned the properties between herself and first
defendant. By way of additional written statement, the plea of res
judicata was raised. The defendants are the respondents herein.
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10. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court
framed diverse issues; the parties let in oral as well as documentary
evidence and the trial court heard the counsel for the parties.
11. The trial court in its judgment dated December 22, 1986
negated the plaintiffs’ claim that they and the defendants were
members of a composite family and the subject properties were in
their joint possession and enjoyment. However, the trial court did
hold that under the will dated May 21, 1920 Pitchamma and Rami
Reddy got 1/6th share each in the properties of the testator. While
concluding so, the trial court held that there was no condition
imposed in the will by the testator that his daughter Pitchamma and
son-in-law Rami Reddy must adopt a son and her granddaughter
should marry the adopted son of Pitchamma and her husband. It was
only a pious wish of Bijivemula Subba Reddy that his daughter
Pitchamma adopted a son with the consent of her husband and that
his granddaughter Lakshumamma should marry the adopted son of
Pitchamma and her husband. The trial court further held that the
plaintiffs were not claiming the property directly as legatees under the
will but as legal heirs of Rami Reddy and Pitchamma since will had
come into force and was acted upon after the death of Bijivemula
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Subba Reddy and, accordingly, Pitchamma and Rami Reddy got 1/6th
share each. The trial court also held that the property acquired by
Pitchamma by way of bequest under the will was a separate property
and after her death, it devolved upon her husband’s heirs (i.e.
plaintiffs) and, thus, plaintiffs were entitled to 1/3rd share in the
schedule properties. The trial court negated the plea of adverse
possession set up by the defendants and passed a preliminary
decree for partition in favour of plaintiffs with regard to their 1/3rd
share.
12. The defendants (present respondents) challenged the
judgment and decree passed by the trial court in appeal before the
High Court. The High Court formulated three points for determination
in the appeal viz; (i) whether Rami Reddy failed to comply with the
obligations cast on him under the will dated May 21, 1920 executed
by Bijivemula Subba Reddy and he abandoned the family and if so,
whether his legal heirs (Plaintiffs) could claim his share in the
property of the testator; (ii) whether will executed by Pitchamma in
1953 was genuine, true and bona fide and (iii) whether the
defendants have acquired rights in the schedule properties by
adverse possession.
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13. The High Court held that it was obligated upon Rami
Reddy under the will to maintain the dependants of the testator and
act as an executor of the will. Rami Reddy failed to discharge both
obligations – in maintaining the dependants of the testator and in
acting – as executor. The High Court, thus, concluded that Rami
Reddy could not claim any property under the will. The High Court
overturned the finding of the trial court as regards the will executed
by Pitchamma and held that the will executed by her in 1953 was
genuine and true. As regards plea of adverse possession set up by
the defendants–although negated by the trial court–the High Court
held that there was ouster of the plaintiffs 60 years back and there
was no semblance of any enjoyment of property by the plaintiffs’
predecessors-in-title along with the defendants jointly. Consequently,
the High Court by its judgment dated April 20, 2003 reversed the
judgment and decree of the trial court and allowed the appeal
preferred by the defendants.
14. It is from the judgment of the High Court that present
appeal by special leave arises.
15. Mr. R. Sundaravaradan, learned senior counsel for the
appellants argued: The importation of Section 57 and Section 141 of
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Indian Succession Act, 1925 (for short, `the 1925 Act’) is wholly
inappropriate since the present case is concerned with the muffussil
will of a Hindu dated May 21, 1920 with regard to the properties
situate outside the city of Madras. The muffussil wills (executed
before 1927) do not require the formalities of execution, attestation
and revocation to be carried out in the manner required by the 1925
Act. The parties did not join issue about the truthfulness of the will
and there was only dispute about its construction and
implementation. Even if it be assumed that Section 141 of the 1925
Act is attracted, the same has been complied with; the attesters were
already dead.
16. It was vehemently contended by Mr. R. Sundaravaradan
that the property vested in the executor in 1920 on the death of
testator and Section 141 of the 1925 Act, even if applicable, could not
divest such vesting in title. Dealing with the expression “take the
legacy” in Section 141, it was argued by learned senior counsel that
the said expression means taking possession of legacy and not
vesting of the legacy. He submitted that the word “executor” used
in the will has been used in loose sense of the term; Rami Reddy was
the son-in-law of the testator, he was looking after and managing the
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lands and, therefore, the legacy bequeathed to him was not because
he was to be the executor in strict sense but because he was the
testator’s son-in-law and manager.
17. Learned senior counsel submitted that there is no legal
evidence of mismanagement, malversation or misappropriation and
a vague allegation that the executor has not done his job required no
serious consideration. He argued that the marriage of Rami Reddy
with Subbamma was with the consent of Pitchamma and there was
no legal impediment for a Hindu to have a second wife before Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 or Bigamy Prevention Act, 1949 especially
when Pitchamma was barren and it is indeed a legal requirement
based on Shastric injunction to have progeny so that religious
efficacy of satisfying the souls of forefathers is completed. Learned
senior counsel contended that there was no voluntary and conscious
abandonment by Rami Reddy and the High Court was in clear error
in holding so.
18. Mr. R. Sundaravaradan criticized the findings of the High
Court on the plea of adverse possession set up by the defendants
and genuineness of the will executed by Pitchamma in 1953 in favour
of Lakshumamma.
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19. Mr. P.S. Narasimha, learned senior counsel for the
respondents, on the other hand, supported the judgment of the High
Court.
20. Indian Succession Act, 1865 (for short, `the 1865 Act’)
was enacted to provide for intestate and testamentary succession in
British India. Section 331 of the 1865 Act, however, excluded its
applicability to intestate or testamentary succession to the property of
any Hindu, Muhammadan or Buddhist and it further provided that its
provisions shall not apply to any will made, or any intestacy occurring,
before January 1, 1866.
21. By the Hindu Wills Act, 1870 (for short, `the 1870 Act’),
statutory provisions were made to regulate the wills of Hindus,
Jainas, Sikhs and Buddhists in the Lower Provinces of Bengal and in
the towns of Madras and Bombay. Inter alia, Section 2 thereof
provided as follows :
“S. 2. The following portions of the Indian Succession Act,
1865, namely,–
sections forty-six, forty-eight, forty-nine, fifty, fifty-
one, fifty-five and fifty-seven to seventy-seven (both
inclusive),
sections eighty-two, eighty-three, eighty-five, eighty-
eight to one hundred and three (both inclusive),
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sections one hundred and six to one hundred and
seventy-seven (both inclusive),
sections one hundred and seventy-nine to one
hundred and eighty-nine (both inclusive),
sections one hundred and ninety-one to one hundred
and ninety-nine (both inclusive),
so much of Parts XXX and XXXI as relates to grants
of probate and letters of administration with the will
annexed, and
Parts XXXIII to XL (both inclusive), so far as they
relate to an executor and an administrator with the will
annexed,
shall, notwithstanding anything contained in section
three hundred and thirty-one of the said Act, apply–
(a) to all wills and codicils made by any Hindu,
Jaina, Sikh or Buddhist, on or after the first day of
September one thousand eight hundred and seventy,
within the said territories or the local limits of the ordinary
original civil jurisdiction of the High Courts of Judicature at
Madras and Bombay; and
(b) to all such wills and codicils made outside
those territories and limits, so far as relates to immoveable
property situate within those territories or limits:”
22. The 1925 Act which came into force on September 30,
1925 has eleven parts. Part VI has twenty three chapters. Section
57 to Section 191 are covered by Part VI. Section 57 provides thus:
“S.57. Application of certain provisions of Part to a class of
Wills made by Hindus, etc. – The provisions of this Part
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which are set out in Schedule III shall, subject to the
restrictions and modifications specified therein, apply–
(a) to all Wills and codicils made by any Hindu,
Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina on or after the first day
of September, 1870, within the territories which
at the said date were subject to the Lieutenant-
Governor of Bengal or within the local limits of
the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High
Courts of Judicature at Madras and Bombay;
and
(b) to all such Wills and codicils made outside
those territories and limits so far as relates to
immoveable property situate within those
territories or limits; and
(c) to all Wills and codicils made by any Hindu,
Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina on or after the first day
of January, 1927, to which those provisions are
not applied by clauses (a) and (b):]
Provided that marriage shall not revoke any such Will
or codicil.”
Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 57 of the 1925 Act are pari materia to
clauses (a) and (b) of Section 2 of the 1870 Act. Clause (c) is a new
provision.
23. As noticed above, present case is concerned with the will
executed in 1920. The will is admittedly a muffussil will as it has
not been executed within the local limits of ordinary original civil
jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Madras. Clause (a) of
Section 57 is apparently not attracted. The subject will also does not
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relate to immoveable properties situate within the local limits or
territories as set out in clause (a). In this view of the matter, clause
(b) is also not attracted. Clause (c) does not get attracted, as it
applies to wills and codicils made on or after January 1, 1927.
24. Since the subject will is not covered by any of the clauses
of Section 57, Part VI of the 1925 Act is not applicable thereto.
Section 141 which falls in Chapter XIII of Part VI of the 1925 Act that
provides – if a legacy is bequeathed to a person who is named an
executor of the will, he shall not take the legacy, unless he proves the
will or otherwise manifests an intention to act as executor — is, thus,
not applicable to the subject will. As a matter of fact, both learned
senior counsel were ad idem that Section 141 of the 1925 Act, as it
is, has no application at all.
25. We may also state that although the statutory provisions
concerning construction of wills from Sections 74 to 111 of the 1925
Act do not apply but the general principles incorporated therein
would surely be relevant for construction of the subject will.
26. It is well settled that the court must put itself as far as
possible in the position of a person making a will in order to collect
the testator’s intention from his expressions; because upon that
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consideration must very much depend the effect to be given to the
testator’s intention, when ascertained. The will must be read and
construed as a whole to gather the intention of the testator and the
endeavor of the court must be to give effect to each and every
disposition. In ordinary circumstances, ordinary words must bear
their ordinary construction and every disposition of the testator
contained in will should be given effect to as far as possible
consistent with the testator’s desire.
27. The above are the principles consistently followed and,
we think, ought to be guided in determining the appeal before us.
What then was the intention of this testator? The only son of the
testator had predeceased him. At the time of execution of will, he
had his wife, widowed sister, widowed daughter-in-law, daughter and
minor granddaughter surviving; the only other male member was his
son-in-law – Rami Reddy. He intended to give all his properties to
the granddaughter but he was aware that after her marriage, she
would join her husband’s family. The testator intended that his entire
estate remained in the family and did not go out of that and having
that in mind, he desired that his daughter adopted a son with the
consent of her husband and his granddaughter married the adopted
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son of his daughter. He, therefore, stated, “I intend to give all my
belongings, moveable and immoveable properties to the said
Lakshumamma and the adopted son of my daughter Pitchamma”.
He expressed in unequivocal terms, “after my demise, my
granddaughter Lakshumamma who is the daughter of my son shall
have absolute rights in my entire properties”.
28. The testator gave two very particular directions in the will
that until Lakshumamma attained the age of majority and attained
power to manage properties; (one) Rami Reddy shall act as an
executor till then and (two) the executor shall look after the female
members in the family, namely, his wife Subbamma, widowed
daughter-in-law, daughter Pitchamma, widowed sister Chennamma
and granddaughter Lakshumamma. Rami Reddy, thus, was
obligated to carry out the wishes of the testator by managing his
properties and looking after the minor granddaughter Lakshumamma
till she attained majority and also look after other female members in
the family.
29. The clause, however, upon which the appellants’ are
claiming the rights in the properties of Rami Reddy is the clause that
reads “…if my daughter did not take any boy in adoption and if the
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said boy will not accept to marry my granddaughter Lakshumamma, I
intend to give my aforesaid properties, 1/3rd share to my daughter
Pitchamma and her husband, who is also my son-in-law Rami Reddy
together. The remaining 2/3rd share is given to my granddaughter
Lakshumamma”.
30. Mr. R. Sundaravaradan, senior counsel for the appellants
is right in contending that the above clause in the will is not a
repugnant condition that invalidates the will but is a defeasance
provision.
31. In Mt. Rameshwar Kuer & Anr. v. Shiolal Upadhaya and
Ors.1, Courtney-Terrell, C.J., speaking for the Bench, explained the
distinction between a repugnant provision and a defeasance
provision thus :
“The distinction between a repugnant provision and a
defeasance provision is sometimes subtle, but the general
principle of law seems to be that where the intention of the
donor is to maintain the absolute estate conferred on the
donee but he simply adds some restrictions in derogation
of the incidents of such absolute ownership, such
restrictive clauses would be repugnant to the absolute
grant and therefore void; but where the grant of an
absolute estate is expressly or impliedly made subject to
defeasance on the happening of a contingency and where
the effect of such defeasance would not be a violation of
any rule of law, the original estate is curtailed and the gift
over must be taken to be valid and operative.”
1 A.I.R. 1935 Patna 401
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32. The distinction between a repugnant provision and a
defeasance provision explained in Mt. Rameshwar Kuer1 has been
followed subsequently. In our view, Patna High Court rightly explains
the distinction between a repugnant provision and a defeasance
provision.
33. The question, however, upon which the fate of this appeal
depends is : whether Rami Reddy became entitled to any legacy by
virtue of the defeasance clause under the will at all.
34. The testator was clear in his mind that after his death, his
granddaughter should have absolute rights in his entire properties.
He has said so in so many words in the will. However, he
superadded a condition that, should his daughter Pitchamma and
son-in-law Rami Reddy not adopt a son or if his daughter and son-
in-law adopted a son but that boy did not agree to marry his
granddaughter, then 1/3rd share in his properties shall go over to his
daughter Pitchamma and her husband Rami Reddy. The bequest to
the extent of 1/3rd share in the properties of the testator in favour of
Pitchamma and her husband Rami Reddy jointly was conditional on
happening of an uncertain event noted above. As a matter of fact and
in law, immediately after the death of testator in 1920, what became
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vested in Rami Reddy was not legacy but power to manage the
properties of the testator as an executor; the legacy vested in
Lakshumamma, albeit, defeasibly to the extent of 1/3rd share. The
only event on which the legacy to Lakshumamma to the extent of
1/3rd share was to be defeated was upon happening of any of the
above events. Mr. R. Sundaravaradan, learned senior counsel, thus,
is not right in contending that on the death of testator in 1920, the
legacy came to be vested in Rami Reddy and once vesting took
place, it could not have been divested.
35. It has come in evidence that Pitchamma wanted to adopt
Godi Venkat Reddy as her son, but her husband – Rami
Reddy – did not agree to that and as a result thereof Godi Venkat
Reddy could not be adopted by Pitchamma. On the issue of adoption
of Godi Venkat Reddy, a serious dispute ensued between Pitchamma
and her husband. Rami Reddy left the family of the testator and the
village Chennavaran somewhere in 1924 and went to nearby village
Pappireddypally where he married second time. It may be that there
was no legal impediment for Rami Reddy to have a second wife
before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 or Bigamy Prevention Act of
1949 when no child was begotten from Pitchamma yet the fact of the
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matter is that he abandoned the family of the testator. There is no
merit in the submission of Mr. R. Sundaravaradan that abandonment
was not voluntary and conscious.
36. Rami Reddy neither continued as a guardian of minor
granddaughter Lakshumamma nor looked after the testator’s wife,
widowed daughter-in-law, widowed sister and daughter. The female
folk were left in lurch with no male member to look after. He took no
care or interest in the affairs of the family or properties of the testator
and thereby failed to discharge his duties as executor.
37. In view of the predominant desire that his granddaughter
should have his properties and that his properties did not go out of
the family, the testator desired that his daughter adopted a son with
the consent of her husband and his granddaughter married that boy.
The conditional legacy to Rami Reddy (to the extent of 1/3rd share
jointly with Pitchamma) was not intended to be given to him if he
happened to be instrumental in defeating the testator’s wish in not
agreeing to the adoption of a son by his (testator’s) daughter. Such
an intention might not have been declared by the testator in express
terms but necessary inference to that effect can safely be drawn by
reading the will as a whole. In the circumstances, the legacy to the
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extent of 1/3rd share cannot be held to have ever vested in Rami
Reddy jointly with Pitchamma as it was he who defeated the adoption
of son by the testator’s daughter. As a matter of fact by his conduct,
Rami Reddy rendered himself disentitled to any legacy.
38. Not only that Rami Reddy did not discharge his
obligations under the will of looking after the family and managing
the properties as an executor but he was also instrumental in
frustrating the adoption of son by the testator’s daughter. Much
before the defeasance clause came into operation when
Lakshumamma married Godi Venkat Reddy who could not be
adopted as son by Pitchamma, Rami Reddy had already left the
testator’s family for good and abandoned the legacy that could have
come to him under that clause.
39. The plea, of the appellants, that Rami Reddy’s family
from the second wife and the testator’s family was a composite family
and the properties were joint family properties of the plaintiffs and the
defendants, has not been accepted by the trial court as well as High
Court. We have no justifiable reason to take a different view on this
aspect.
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40. Importantly, Rami Reddy during his life time – although he
survived for about 19 years after the death of the testator – never
claimed any legacy under the subject will.
41. All in all, on the construction of the will and, in the
circumstances, it must be held, and we hold that no legacy came to
be vested in Rami Reddy and he did not become entitled to any
interest in the estate of the testator and, therefore, the plaintiffs did
not acquire any right, title or interest in the properties of Bijivemula
Subba Reddy.
42. In view of the above, the challenge to the findings of the
High Court on the plea of adverse possession set up by the
defendants and the genuineness of the will executed by Pitchamma
in 1953 pale into significance and needs no consideration.
43. In fairness to Mr. R. Sundaravaradan, learned senior
counsel for the appellants, it must be stated that he cited the following
authorities: (Katreddi) Ramiah and another v. Kadiyala Venkata
Subbamma and others [A.I.R. 1926 Madras 434]; Balmakund v.
Ramendranath Ghosh [A.I.R. 1927 Allahabad 497]; Ratansi D.
Morarji v. Administrator-General of Madras [A.I.R. 1928 Madras
1279]; Bhojraj v. Sita Ram and others [A.I.R. 1936 Privy Council 60];
24
Ketaki Ranjan Bhattacharyya and others v. Kali Prasanna
Bhattacharyya and others [A.I.R. 1956 Tripura 18]; P. Lakshmi Reddy
v. L. Lakshmi Reddy [(1957) SCR 195]; AL. PR. Ranganathan
Chettiar and another v. Al. PR. AL. Periakaruppan Chettiar and
others [A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 815]; Darshan Singh and others v. Gujjar
Singh (Dead) By LRs. and others [(2002) 2 SCC 62]; Govindammal v.
R. Perumal Chettiar and others [(2006) 11 SCC 600] and
Govindaraja Pillai and others v. Mangalam Pillai and another [A.I.R.
1933 Madras 80]. However, in view of our discussion above, we do
not think we need to deal with these authorities in detail.
44. In the result, appeal fails and is dismissed with no order
as to costs.
…………………….J.
(Aftab Alam)
………………….. J.
(R.M. Lodha)
NEW DELHI,
APRIL 1, 2011.
25