ORDER
S.K. Kulshrestha, J.
1. This revision is directed against the judgment dated 27-3-1996 of the learned VIth Additional Sessions Judge, Jabalpur passed in Sessions Trial No. 7/92, by which the learned Judge has acquitted the respondents of the charges under Sections 307, 294, IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act also the alternative charge under the above Sections read with Section 34 of the IPC.
2. It was alleged that on 20-10-1991 at about 7.40 p.m., the respondents had caused injuries to Mayabai (P.W. 1) and her husband Uttam Singh (P.W. 4) after abusing them in the public place with a view to cause death of Uttam Singh (P.W. 4) by striking him with Farsa (axe). As per prosecution case, the complainant Uttam (P.W. 4) and accused Motilal lived in adjoining houses and there was estrangement between the two. On the date of the incident, when the complainant Uttam (P.W. 4) was in his house alongwith his wife Mayabai, daughter Laxmi and son Leeladhar, the accused abused them and challenged them to come out and when Uttam (P.W. 4) came out of the house to see as to what was happening followed by his wife Mayabai (P.W. 1), the accused Motilal with a Farsa (axe) in his hand, with a view to cause his death, struck blows on his neck and hand. When Jankibai came to save Uttam Singh, she was also assaulted. Uttam Singh sustained seven injuries. The report of the incident was lodged at Police Station, Ranjhi, which was recorded by Station House Officer, R.S. Tiwari (P.W. 6). Injured were sent for medical examination and treatment of their injuries and the reports (Ex. P/9-A and Ex. P/10-A) were received. After further investigation, the respondents were prosecuted. However, on trial, the respondents were acquitted by the impugned judgment, which the complainant has assailed by the present revision.
3. Learned Counsel for the complainant submits that the judgment of acquittal has resulted in gross miscarriage of justice as the persons who have caused injuries in an open place have been let off with complete impunity. Learned Counsel further submits that the report of the incident was lodged immediately after the incident which clearly indicated that there being no time for embellishment, the stark facts of the case were placed before the investigating machinery. Under these circumstances, according to the learned Counsel, the Trial Court ought not to have acquitted the respondents.
4. Shri Raman Patel, learned Senior Counsel, per contra, has pointed out that as discussed in Paragraph 5 of the impugned judgment, the respondents had received injuries in the same transaction of serious nature which though capable of being noticed, have not been explained by the prosecution witnesses although they were themselves facing prosecution for the same pursuant to the report (Ex. D-3) lodged before any report was lodged against them by the appellants herein. Non-explanation of the injuries of the accused clearly shows that prosecution has suppressed the genesis of the incident and in any case, it has made probable the right of private defence in favour of the accused.
5. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal can not be overturned in revision against acquittal merely on the ground that another view on the basis of the evidence brought on record is possible and that the facts could have been examined from another perspective. Even error of law also does not vitiate the judgment unless it is shown that it has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Nothing has been brought to our notice to show that there has been misreading of the evidence or that the finding of the learned Sessions Judge was absurd or palpably wrong.
6. On examination of the facts of the case, we find that the defence has duly exhibited the report (Ex. D-3) (FIR), which was lodged prior to the FIR lodged by the applicants (complainants) which shows that without any loss of time and embellishment, the incident was reported to the authority. The respondents have also exhibited their injury reports (Ex. D-1 and Ex. D-2), which clearly record incised injuries sustained by the respondents in the same transaction. Injury sustained by Jankibai, (Ex. D-1) is a serious injury measuring 4″ x 2″ on her breast and it is an incised wound. We do not comprehend that such an injury would have gone unnoticed. Therefore, it was necessary for the prosecution to have explained these injuries.
7. The Apex Court in Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1976 SC 2263), has enumerated the consequences of the non-explanation of the injuries of the accused. The non-explanation of the injuries shows that either the prosecution has suppressed the genesis of the incident or the accused had acted in the right of private defence if he raises such a plea or that it does not affect the prosecution at all. Had the injuries been insignificant and latent we could have understood the argument of the learned Counsel for the applicants that injuries were not such as could have been noticed by the prosecution witnesses. Thus, in the present case, only the first two consequences follow and applying the yardstick laid down, we find that the Court below has in no way erred in acquitting the respondents of the charge against them. In this view of the matter, we find no substance in the present revision against acquittal.
Accordingly, the revision is dismissed.