JUDGMENT
Chaudhuri, J.
1. This application by a private party for re-vising the order of acquittal recorded by an appellate Court has been heard by us in our criminal revisional jurisdiction on a reference made by a single Judge of this Court. The learned single Judge was of the view that the appellate Court had not dealt with the evidence of a single witness, though it had undoubtedly stated in its judgment that it had closely scrutinised the statements of the witnesses.
The appellate Court’s judgment, it was further observed, did not also disclose any reason for not accepting the statements of the witnesses and a doubt was expressed as to whe-ther it was a judgment in accordance with law within the meaning of Section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Judge, however, referred the case to a Division Bench as he was confronted by two decisions of this Court, in one of which, in somewhat similar circumstances, a single Judge had declined to interfere with the order of acquittal while in the other another single Judge had set aside the order and sent back the case for re-hearing according to law.
In the former case Gulzar Chamar v. Ug-gam Chamar, AIR 1952 Pat 342 (A), Rama-swami, J. (as he then was), expressed the view that an application in revision by a private party against an order of acquittal could not be entertained except on some broad ground of exceptional requirement of public justice. The learned Judge further observed that the fact that the lower Court had not adequately discussed the prosecution evidence as to how the occurrence took place or how it reached the finding that the accused had acted in the right of private defence was not such a ground as to come within the rule of exceptional requirement of public justice.
The other case referred to by the learned referring Judge is the case of Raghunandan Bhagat v. Prabhu Singh, 1943 Pat WN 12 (B), decided by Rowland, J. In that case it was held that where the appellate Magistrate had not directed his mind to the evidence and circumstances on the record in a manner in consonance with the proper exercise of discretion, the appellate judgment of acquittal should be set aside and the appeal should be ordered to be reheard in accordance with law.
2. The facts shortly arc these. Two persons Soman Mallah and Badri Mallah took settlement of a ghairmazrua am tank from the proprietor of the village, one Bishambhar Babu, and grew makhana in it The allegation was that on 22-4-54 the opposite party came in a mob with the common object of destroying the makhana crop and uprooted the makhana plants.
They are also said to have committed theft of some bundles of wheat belonging to the proprietor which had been kept at a place near the tank. The opposite party denied the occurrence and alleged that they had been implicated falsely as there was ill-feeling between
the parties. They stated that they had uprooted a few plants of makhana only with a view to take water to their neighbouring fields for purposes of irrigation.
3. The learned Magistrate found that the Khalian showed that the tank had been recorded as a ghairmazrua am plot, but it did not indicate what right the villagers had to the use of the tank. He also referred to the evidence of the defence witnesses who stated that the landlords had never objected to anybody using the tank in any way he liked. On behalf of the opposite party it was contended before him that the landlord had no right to grow makhana plants and to enjoy the sale proceeds to the detriment of the irrigational and other rights of the villagers. The learned Magistrate, however, thought that the question raised was one which could only be decided by the Civil Court and was outside the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court. Regarding the rights of the tenants he remarked :
”If the tenantry of the village has acquired any right to keep the water free from any makhana plants, they have got a very good cause of action and they might approach the Civil Court to seek a declaration accordingly.”
Holding that the villagers had no right to uproot the plants which the proprietor had been growing for some time past through lessees the learned Magistrate convicted the opposite party.
4. In appeal the learned Sessions Judge held that the proprietor had the right to settle the tank with the lessees subject to the limitations laid down by a Bench of this Court in the case of Gaya Dutt v. Gopi Mahto, AIR 1947 Pat 242 (C). He also held that the makhana plants said to have been uprooted by the mob had been grown by Badri and Soman after they had obtained settlement of the tank from the proprietor.
The appellate Court then addressed itself to the question as to whether the prosecution case regarding the manner of occurrence was correct. It found that the parties, who were Mallahs, belonged to two opposing factions. It was of the view that some members of the opposite party having removed a few makhana plants with a view to facilitate passage of water for irrigational purposes the incident was magnified by Badri and Soman beyond proportion and a complaint was instituted against the members of the opposite party on account of the existing bad feeling.
The learned Sessions Judge found that the motive alleged by the prosecution had not at all been established. He then referred to the evidence of some of the prosecution witnesses, who had deposed as eye-witnesses to the occurrence, and held that their testimony could not be accepted as all of them were under the influence of Bishambhar Babu. Tge learned Sessions Judge stated that he had closely examined the statements of all these witnesses on the point of occurrence and was satisfied that their statements were not fit to be accepted. Holding that there was no reliable evidence to prove the manner of occurrence alleged by the prosecution he allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction of the opposite party.
5. Mr. S. N. Sahay, appearing for the petitioner, has contended that the learned Sessions Judge’s treatment of the case was wholly unsatisfactory. It is pointed out that although he disbelieved the evidence of. most of the prosecution witnesses he nowhere indicated what actually their statements in Court were. Comment was also made on the learned Sessions Judge’s failure to specifically refer to the evidence of three witnesses, viz., Soman Mal-lah, Badri Mallah and the Assistant Sub-Inspector who had visited the scene of occurrence.
The last-named witness, it is submitted, had found some circumstantial evidence on the spot supporting the prosecution case regarding uprooting of makhana plants and the removal of wheat bundles. Contending that the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge does not conform to the standard laid down by law learned counsel has urged that this is a fit case in which the order of acquittal should be set aside and the appeal sent back to the Court below for being re-heard.
In support of his contention learned counsel strongly relies upon the decision of Rowland, J., in 1943 Pat WN 12 (B). Reliance is placed by learned counsel also on the case of Shaikh Basu v. Raika Singh, 18 Cal WN 1244 : (AIR 1915 Cal 235 (1))(D), where Sharfuddin and Teunon, JJ., set aside an order of acquittal on the ground that the trying Magistrate had wholly omitted from his judgment a portion of the evidence which had corroborative value.
In this connection learned counsel referred also to the observations of Beg, J., in Baldeo v. Deo Narain, AIR 1954 All 104 (E), where the learned Judge pointed out that the third requirement laid down in Section 367, viz., the reasons for the decision, was an important ingredient of, a judgment and that compliance with law in this regard should not be merely formal but substantial and real.
6. Mr. Baldeva Sahay, appearing for the opposite party, contended, on the other hand, that the law was quite clear that the High Court would not interfere with an order of acquittal at the instance of a private party except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice required such interference for the correction of a manifest illegality. In support of this proposition he has cited a large number of authorities.
The earliest case where this proposition was authoritatively laid down is the one decided by Jenkins, C. J. and Teunon and Fletcher, JJ., in Feujdar Thakur v. Kasi Choudhuri, AIR 1915 Cal 388 (F). In that case Jenkins, C. J., laid down that although a High Court had jurisdiction to set aside on revision an order of acquittal at the instance of a private prosecutor it should ordinarily exercise this jurisdiction sparingly and only where it was urgently demanded in the interests of public justice.
Referring to the decisions of certain other High Courts his Lordship made the following observations :
“The pronouncements of the High Courts of Madras, Bombay and Allahabad consistently support the view that as a general rule it is expedient not to interfere in revision, at the instance of a private person, with an acquittal after trial by the proper tribunal and that applications for that purpose should be discouraged on public grounds.”
The decisions of all these High Courts on which reliance was placed are set out in the body of the judgment. It was pointed out that this too was the view that prevailed in the Calcutta High Court until recent times. His Lordship’s attention was drawn to some cases of the Calcutta High Court where the matter had been differently regarded in some recent cases. With regard to those cases the observation of the learned Chief Justice was as follows :–
“If there has been any conscious departure in more recent cases from the rule of prudence which prevailed in the authorities I have cited, I cannot agree with it.”
Teunon, J., who was a member of this Bench, however, expressed a different opinion. He was of the view that as Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was drawn in the widest terms no previous decisions could in any manner fetter the way in which the Court should exercise the discretion vested in it under the section. In view of this difference of opinion the case was laid before Fletcher, J., a third Judge. Fletcher, J., entirely agreed with the Chief Justice and pointed out that all the High Courts in India had for many years past consistently held that the Court ordinarily ought not to set aside an order of acquittal at the instance of a private prosecutor under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
7. The decisions of this Court have almost consistently followed the law as laid down by Jenkins, C. J. and Fletcher, J., in the case of AIR 1915 Cal 388 (F). The earliest case of this Court to which our attention has been drawn is the case of Gulli Bhagat v. Narain Singh, AIR 1924 Pat 283 (G), where Mullick and Macpherson, JJ., quoting the observations of Jenkins, C. J., held that the power of interference in revision, with orders of acquittal, should be most sparingly exercised and only in cases where it was urgently demanded in the interests of public justice.
This view of law was reiterated by Mullick and Macpherson, JJ., in Siban Rai v. Bhagwant Dass, AIR 1926 Pat 176 (H). Although in 1943 Pat WN 12 (B), Rowland, J., had in exercise of his criminal revisional jurisdiction set aside an order of acquittal recorded by an appellate Magistrate on the ground that he had not directed his mind to the evidence and circumstances on the record in a manner consonant with the proper exercise of discretion the same learned Judge had in an earlier case, Bakhori Gope v. Abdul Halim, AIR 1941 Pat 362 (I), made the following observation :
“This Court always acts with great reluctance in allowing a petition for revision against an order of acquittal and only when it is shown that such interference is essential to avoid or remedy a clear failure of justice. There is a regular procedure lor challenging an acquittal by a Criminal Court through the means of an appeal, by the local Government and the local Government has not thought fit. to prefer any appeal in the present instance,”
The question was again considered in Cantonment Board of Dinapore v. Dwarka Prasad, 1941 Pat WN 596 (J). In that case Manohar Lall and Meredith, JJ. (as he then was), once more emphasised that the power of interference in revision with the order of acquittal should be most sparingly exercised and only in cases where it was urgently demanded in the interest of public justice.
Their Lordships in this case referred among others to another case, Abdul Manir v. Kadir Khan, 1937 Pat WN 220 : (AIR 1937 Pat 110) (K), in which Rowland, J., had expressed the same opinion. Reference was also made to the case of Chairman, Purulia Municipality v. Bishun Sao, AIR 1928 Pat 193 (1) (L) as also to the decision of Rowland, J., in AIR 1941 Pat 362 (I). In 1943 Pat WN 12 (B), no question appears to have been raised regarding maintainability of an application by a private party for setting aside an order of acquittal.
8. We next come to the case of AIR 1952 Pat 242 (A), where Ramaswami, J, (as he then was), relying upon AIR 1924 Pat 283 (G), AIR 1926 Pat 176 (H) and the observations of Jen-kins, C. J., in AIR 1915 Cal 388 (F), held that an application in revision by a private party against an order of acquittal could not be entertained except on some broad ground of exceptional requirement of public justice.
It is worthy of note that in this case, just as in the case with which we are concerned, the contention of the applicant mainly was that the judgment of the appellate Court was not in accordance with law since there was no discussion of the evidence adduced on behalf of the parties nor did it contain reasons in support of a particular finding.
9. This view of law regarding the circumstances under which the High Court can exercise its revisional jurisdiction to set aside an order of acquittal has been approved by the Supreme Court in a series of decisions. In D. Stephens v. Nosicolla, AIR 1951 SC 196 (M), it was laid down that the revisional jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under Section 439 was not to be lightly exercised, when it was invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Government had a right of appeal under Section 417 and that such power could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice required interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice.
Their Lordships further emphasised that this jurisdiction was not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower Court had taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on record. See also Harihar Chakravarty v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 SC 266 (N) and Dhirendra Nath Mitra v. Mukunda Lal Sen, (S) AIR 1955 SC 584 (O).
10. Alter the review of the case-law the question that arises for consideration is whether the applicant in the present case has shown any circumstance why it should be held that the interest of public justice requires that the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge should be interfered with. From the findings arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge it would appear that the Mallahs on whose complaint the prosecution was lodged in the present case were mere tools in the hands of the proprietor of the village. The prosecution obviously was an attempt on the part of the proprietor to enforce his right to the tank which admittedly was recorded as a gairmazrua am plot to the exclusion of the general public of the village.
The learned Judge found that the case as laid in Court had not been proved. He was of the view that the story of the complainant was improbable, that the allegations were highly exaggerated, that the motive alleged was unfounded and that the witnesses were mostly creatures of the proprietor. Having regard to the nature of the dispute and the circumstan-ces relied upon by the learned Judge it is impossible to hold that public justice will suffer if this Court does not interfere with the order of acquittal.
11. In the last resort, Mr. S, N. Sahay, argued that the case was of great public interest because if the defect in the form of the judgment was condoned Courts exercising appellate jurisdiction were likely to get away with the impression that they were at liberty to dispose of an appeal by recording any kind of perfunctory judgment. I am not prepared to hold that the attack of learned counsel on the form and contents of the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge is wholly justified.
I am bound to recognise the force of the contention that the learned Judge should have elaborated his reasons with a fuller discussion of the evidence of the witnesses, but his failure to do so, however, is hardly sufficient to justi-fy interference with his order. As has been laid down in Abdul Rahman v. Ernperor, AIR 1935 Cal 316 (P), Section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be interpreted reasonably and so long as the appellate Court below writes a judgment from which the High Court can gather what the decision of the appellate Court really is, that in the majority of instances ought to be sufficient. See also Tippanna Mushappa Karingar v. Emperor, AIR 1932 Bom 473 (Q).
It is possible for the High Court in the present case reasonably to arrive at an understanding of what has been found in the Court below and that being so it is not necessary and still less is it obligatory upon us to hold that the proceedings in appeal ought to be quashed and the matter re-heard by the appellate Court.
12. In the result, the application must be dismissed and the rule discharged.
Jamuar, J.
13. I agree.