PETITIONER:
THE STATE OF MADRAS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
A. VAIDYANATHA IYER
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
26/09/1957
BENCH:
KAPUR, J.L.
BENCH:
KAPUR, J.L.
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.
MENON, P. GOVINDA
CITATION:
1958 AIR 61 1958 SCR 580
ACT:
Appeal by special leave--Order of acquittal by the High
Court--Power of Supreme Court-Presumption-Prevention of
Corruption Act, (II of 1947), s. 4-Constitution Of India,
Art. 136.
HEADNOTE:
Respondent, an Income-tax Officer, called an assessee to his
house and took a sum of Rs. 800 from him. Immediately
afterwards a search was made and the respondent, after some
evasion, produced the money. The respondent's defence was
that he had taken the money as a loan and not as illegal,
gratification. The Special judge who tried the respondent
found him guilty under s. 16i, Indian Penal Code, and sen-
tenced him to six months simple imprisonment. On appeal,
the High Court acquitted the respondent. The State obtained
special leave and appealed.
Held, that the words used in Art. I36 of the Constitution
show that in criminal matters no distinction can be made as
a matter of construction between a judgment of conviction
and one of acquittal. The Supreme Court will not readily
interfere with the findings of fact given by the High Court
but if the High Court
(i) A.I.R. (1954) S.C. 680.
581
acts perversely or otherwise improperly interference will be
called for.
The findings of the High Court are halting and its approach
to the case has been erroneous as it disregarded the special
rule of burden of proof under s. 4 Of the Prevention of
Corruption Act (II Of 1947). The judgment of the High Court
shows that certain salient pieces of evidence were missed or
were not properly appreciated.
In this situation the Supreme Court can interfere in an
appeal by special leave.
Where it is proved that a gratification has been accepted,
the presumption under s- 4 Of the Prevention of Corruption
Act shall at once arise. It is a presumption of law and it
is obligatory on the Court to raise it in every case brought
under s. 4.
The evidence and circumstances in this case lead to the
conclusion that the transaction was not one of loan but of
illegal gratification.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 5 of
1957.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
the 6th September, 1955, of the Madras High Court in Crimi-
nal Appeal No. 498 of 1954 and Criminal Revision Case No.
257 of 1955, arising out of the judgment and order dated the
12th July, 1954 of the Special Judge, Coimbatore in C. C.
No. I of 1952..
H. J. Umrigar, H. R. Khanna and R. H. Dhebar, for the
appellants.
K.g. Krishnaswamy Iyengar and Sardar Bahadur, for the re-
spondent.
1957. September 26. The following Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
KAPUR J.-This is an appeal by the State of Madras from the
judgment and order of the High Court of Madras reversing the
judgment of the Special Judge of Coimbatore and thereby
acquitting the respondent who had been convicted of an
offence under s. 161 Indian Penal Code and sentenced to six
months simple imprisonment.
The respondent, Vaidyanatha Aiyer, was at all material times
the Income-tax Officer of Coimbatore and it is not disputed
that he was there in the beginning
582
of June 1951. According to the prosecution the respondent
in the end of September 1951 demanded from K.S. Narayana
Iyer (hereinafter referred to as the complainant) who is a
proprietor of a “Coffee Hotel” called Nehru cafe in Coimba-
tore with another similar hotel at Bhavanisagar a bribe of
Rs. 1,000.
The complainant had been assessed to income-tax all along
since 1942. During the course of assessment for the year
1950-51 it was discovered that he had failed to pay advance
income-tax. A notice was therefore issued to him on March
24., 1951 under s. 28 read with s. 18-A (2) of the Income-
tax Act. to show cause why a penalty should not be. imposed
for underestimating his income. For the assessment year
195152 also the complainant in the usual course filed his
return on August 11, 1951 and on a notice being issued to
him produced his accounts before the Income-tax Officer on
September 27, 1951. He again appeared before him on the
28th and the respondent told him that the ” penalty papers
had. not been disposed of and that the accounts of the
current year had also not been gone through ” and asked the
complainant to see him at his house on the following morn-
ing, which the complainant did. There he was told by the
respondent that if he wanted to have his return accepted and
to be helped in the matter of penalty proceedings he should
pay the respondent Rs. 1,000 as illegal gratification. The
complainant mentioned this fact to his manager and also that
he had been told by the Income-tax Officer that his accounts
were unsatisfactory. Because he was asked to do so the
complainant saw the respondent at the latter’s house on
October 6 or 7 and he asked the complainant if he had
brought the money and after some talk about the assessment
the respondent asked the complainant -to pay half the amount
as it was Deepavali time. There is evidence of a defence
witness also to show that towards the end of October 1951,
the complainant was seen coming from the house of the re-
spondent though the prosecution and the defence are not in
accord as to the purpose of this visit.
583
The Circle Inspector, Munisami P. W. 12, claims to have
received complaints while at Madras about the respondent
being corrupt and his ” indulging in corrupt practices”.
He then came toCoimbatoreandgot into touchwith the complain-
ant and asked him if he had paid anybribetotherespoiident.
The complainant mentioned to the Inspector about the demand
of a bribe by the respondent. At the instance of the In-
spector the complainant appeared before the Tehsildar-Magis-
trate who recorded his statement P-17 wherein the whole
story of the demand of the bribe has been set out. The
Inspector then gave ten one hundred currency notes -to the
complainant after their numbers were taken down in Ex. P-
17. The complain ant then went to the office of the accused
but no money was accepted on that day because the respondent
had received an anonymous letter Ex. P-18 warning, him of
the trap which was being laid by the Malayalam people. The
respondent naturally got very annoyed with the complainant
and sent him. away. The same evening the complainant was
told that he was required to go to the house of the respond-
ent on the following morning which he did at 8 a. m. The
respondent told him that he should take no notice of the
anonymous letter which must have been sent by his enemies
and asked him to pay some money. The complainant paid a sum
of Rs. 200 which on his return he entered in his kacha
account book which the High Court has rejected without
sufficient reason. On the evening of November 15, the
complainant again went to the house of the respondent and
the latter told him that he would pass final orders and that
money should be paid. The record, P-7 and P-7 (a), shows
that an order was dictated on November 13 although there is
no proof or even indication that the complainant knew about
it. The complainant was given 8 one hundred rupee notes by
the Inspector and the complainant paid them to the respond-
ent on the morning of November 17 at the latter’s house. On
this occasion the complainant accompanied by his manager P.
W. 14 had gone towards the house of the respondent along
with the Magistrate and Circle Inspector and Venkates, lyer
584
P. W. – 14 in a car which was stopped three or four blocks
away from the house of the respondent and only the complain-
ant and his manager went into the respondent’s house and
paid the money. Two or three minutes later the Inspector P.
W. 12 and the Magistrate P. W. 13 and one Sesha Ayyar who
had joined the party en route also came into the house on
receiving the signal from the complainant. They disclosed
their identity to the respondent and told him that they had
information that he had received Rs. 800 from the complain-
ant as illegal gratification and asked him to produce the
money which he had received from the complainant. The
respondent did not say anything and got up from the chair on
which he was sitting and tried to go into the house but was
prevented from doing so by the Inspector and he then pro-
duced the money from the folds of his dhoti. While the
mahazar was being prepared the respondent said that he bad
received this money as a loan from the complainant who
denied this and said it had been paid as a bribe. A tele-
gram was then sent to the Superintendent of Special Police
Establishment and under his orders a case was registered and
the investigation was then taken up by a Deputy Superintend-
ent of Police who searched the house of the respondent on
November 19 but no pronote seems to have been received or
taken into possession on that date. A pronote with four
anna stamps affixed was later produced in the court by the
respondent on July 17,1952 during the course of his state-
ment under s. 342 Criminal Procedure Code but it was not
mentioned to the Magistrate P. W. 13 by the respondent.
The charge against the respondent was that he had obtained
from the complainant Rs. 800 as gratification other than
legal remuneration as a motive for the reward for showing
favour to him in the exercise of official functions and had
thereby committeed an offence punishable under s. 161 of the
Indian Penal Code read with a. 4 of the Prevention of Cor-
ruption Act (Act II of 47).
The explanation of the respondent was that be men tioned to
the complainant about his money difficulties
585
when accidentally he met him on the road towards the end of
August or beginning of September 1951. The complainant
offered to lend him Rs 1,000/-. At that time he was not
aware that the complainant had an assessment pending before
him. It was the complainant who told him on November 15
when he met him again that the anonymous letter was the
“‘work of his enemies” and promised to advance the loan as
previously promised and he also suggested that the respond-
ent should execute a pronote for Rs. 1,000 which would be
attested by Venkatesa Ayyar to which he (the respondent) was
agreeable. The complainant paid Rs. 800 on the morning of
November 17 and promised to pay Rs. 200 in the evening. The
respondent had the pronote ready and offered to hand it over
in the morning but the complainant said he would take it
when ” he left the house “.
The learned Special Judge accepted the story of the prosecu-
tion and after a careful analysis of the evidence found the
respondent guilty of the offence charged and sentenced him
to -six months simple imprisonment.
On appeal being taken to the High Court the learned Single
Judge reversed the judgment and acquitted the respondent.
It will be convenient to give here the main findings of the
learned judge in his own words:
(i)” It is true that at the time when the money was accepted
by The accused, the proceedings in relation to assessment of
income tax on P. W. 8 were pending before the accused.
Naturally, therefore, if in such circumstances, the accused
should receive money from an assessee, the suspicion is
readily aroused that the money must have been paid only as
an illegal gratification. On going through the judgment of
the learned trial Judge, I formed the impression that he was
totally influenced by such suspicion.”
(ii)” The result is that if the version of P. W. 8 and
thatof the accused are balanced, the probability seems
totilt the scale in favour of the accused’s version. In any
case, the evidence is not enough to show that the explana-
tion offered by the accused
586
cannot reasonably be true, and so, the benefit of doubt
must go to him.”
(iii)” But this was not a case of ordinary lendee, but an
Income-tax Officer whose favour was needed by the lender.
(iv)”Evidence shows that in November, 1951, the accused was
in need of a sum of Rs. 1,000 and, for that purpose, has
asked P.W. 8 for a loan.”
(v)” In my view, the evidence does not necessarily make out
a case that the accused must have accepted the money only as
a bribe. ”
(vi)” I do not therefore feel certain that the taking of a
loan with an obligation to repay it with interest, would
fall within the meaning of the term I gratification’. ”
The extent of the power of the Supreme Court to interfere
with a judgment of acquittal was raised before us by the
respondent’s counsel and it was contended that the jurisdic-
tion exercised by this court under Art. 136 was the same as
that exercised by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Coun-
cil and reliance was placed on a minority judgment by Venka-
tarama Aiyar J. in Aher Raja Khima v. The State Of Saurash-
tra(1) where the learned judge after discussing the various
Privy Council judgments and quoting a passage from the
judgment of this court in Pritam Singh v. The State(2)
observed:
” The preceding article referred to in the opening passage
is clearly article 134. Article 134(1) confers a right of
appeal to this court in certain cases, in terms unqualified,
on questions both of fact and law, and if the scope of an
appeal under Article 136 is to be extended likewise to
questions of fact, then article 134(1) would become super-
fluous. It is obvious that the intention of the Constitu-
tion in providing for an appeal on facts under Article
134(1)(a) and (b) was to exclude it under Article 136, and
it strongly supports the conclusion reached in Pritam Singh
v. The State (3)that like the Privy Council this Court would
not function as a further court of appeal on facts in crimi-
nal cases. ”
(I) [1955]2 S.C.R. 1285, 1301.
(2) [1950] S.C.R. 453, 458,
587
The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramakrishna Ganpatrao Limsey
(1) was also referred to by counsel for the respondent and
it was contended that the Supreme Court should not interfere
with the order of the High Court merely on the ground that
it took a different view of the facts. That was an appeal
which had been brought on a certificate by the High Court
and not by Special Leave of this Court. That judgment was
considered by a Constitution Bench in State of Madras v.
Gurviah Naidu & Co., Ltd. (2) and S. R. Das, Acting C.J.,
delivering the judgment of the court pointed out that that
was a decision of a bench of three judges and not of a
Constitution bench and the observation that there was no
provision corresponding to s. 417 of the Criminal Procedure
Code only emphasised that this Court should not in appeal by
Special Leave interfere with the order of acquittal passed
by the High Court merely for correcting errors of fact or of
law. Gurviah Naidu’s case (2) was an appeal against a
judgment of acquittal and this court reversed the judgment
saying:-
” In our view, the High Court erred in holding that the
prosecution had failed to establish their case and in ac-
quitting the accused.
This case negatives the contention that under Art. 136
interference by this court with findings of High Courts in
judgments of acquittal is not intended. Even in State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramakrishna Ganpatrao (1) Mahajan J. was
of the opinion that the Supreme Court can interfere where
the High Court “acts perversely or otherwise improperly or
has been deceived by fraud. ”
In Pritam Singh v. The State (3) Fazl Ali J. after a careful
examination of Art. 136 along with the preceding articles
stated the scope of the appeal under Art. 136 to be:-
” Generally speaking, this court will not grant special
leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and special
circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice
has been done and that the case in question
(i) A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 20.
(2) A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 158, 161.
75
(3) [1950] S.C.R. 453. 458.
588
presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review
of the decision appealed against.
Even the Privy Council in laying down the permissible limits
for review in criminal matters included things ” so irregu-
lar or so outrageous as to shock the very basis of justice
“. See Mohinder Singh v. The King (1).
An instance of this principle is the decision of the Privy
Council in Stephen Seneviratne v. The King (2) which will be
discussed later in this judgment and which has been approved
of by this court.
Interpreting the following words of s. 205 of the Government
of India Act, 1935, “any judgment, decree or final order of
a court ” and ” it shall be the duty of every High Court in
British India to consider in every case “, Lord Thankerton
in King Emperor v. Sibnath Bannerji (3) said :–
“The purpose of the provision is to confer a right of appeal
in every case that involves a substantial question of law as
to the interpretation of the Act or of any Order in Council
made thereunder. ”
One of the questions for decision in that case was whether
an appeal lay in cases of habeas corpus. Lord Thankerton
there observed :
” In the absence of an express exception of habeas corpus
cases, and having in view the terms and purpose of the
section, their Lordships are unable to limit tile terms of
the section by mere construction so as to exclude these
cases from its operation. ”
In Art. 136 the use of the words ” Supreme Court may in its
discretion grant special leave to appeal from any judgment,
decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or
matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the terri-
tory of India ” show that in criminal matters no distinction
can be made as a matter of construction between a judgment
of conviction or acquittal. In Bhagwan Das v. The State of
Rajasthan(4) the following, observation of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in Stephen Seneviratne v.
The King(2) at p. 299:
(1) (I932) L.R. 59 I.A. 233, 235.(3) (1945) L.R. 72
I.A. 241, 255.
(2) A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 289.(4) A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 589.
589
“.. …… there are here no grounds on the evidence, taken
as a whole, upon which any tribunal could properly as a
matter of legitimate inference, arrive at a conclusion that
the appellant was guilty……. ”
was quoted with approval and after an examination of all the
facts and circumstances of the case the Supreme Court re-
versed the judgment of conviction by the High Court under
Art. 136. The question for decision in the present case is
whether it falls within the limits laid down in the above-
mentioned cases. This court will not readily interfere with
the findings of fact given by the High Court but if the High
Court acts perversely or otherwise improperly interference
will be called for.
The findings of the High Court in the present case are, to
say the least, halting, and the approach to the whole ques-
tion has been such that it falls within what Mr. Justice
Mahajan in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramakrishna Ganpatrao
(1) described as ” acting perversely or otherwise improperly
“. Although the learned High Court Judge has in the begin-
ning of the judgment mentioned the presumption which arises
under s. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947),
the following passage in the judgment:
” in any case, the evidence is not enough to show that the
explanation offered by the accused cannot reasonably be
true, and so, the benefit of doubt must go to him, ”
is indicative of a disregard of the presumption which the
law requires to be raised under s. 4. The relevant words of
this section are:
” Where in any trial of an offence punishable under s.
161 …………….it is proved that an
accused………. person has accepted……………. any
gratification (other than legal remuneration)………from
any person,it shall be presumed unless thecontrary is
proved that he accepted ……………… that gratifica-
tion as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in the said
section 161 …………………..”
Therefore where it is proved that a gratification has been
accepted, then the presumption shall at once arise
(i) A.1.R. 1054 S.C. 20.
590
under the section. It introduces an exception to the gener-
al rule as to the burden of proof in criminal cases and
shifts the onus on to the accused. It may here be mentioned
that the legislature has chosen to use the words’ shall
presume’ and not ‘may presume’, the former a presumption of
law and latter of fact. Both these phrases have been de-
fined in the Indian Evidence Act, no doubt for the purpose
of that Act, but s. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is
in part materia with the Evidence Act because it deals with
a branch of law of evidence, e.g., presumptions, and there-
fore should have the same meaning. ” Shall presume” has
been defined in the Evidence Act as follows:
” Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall
presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved unless
and until it is disproved. ”
It is a presumption of law and therefore it is obligatory on
the court to raise this presumption in every case brought
under s. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act because
unlike the case of presumptions of fact, presumptions of law
constitute a branch of jurisprudence. While giving the
finding quoted above the learned judge seems to have disre-
garded the special rule of burden of proof under s. 4 and
therefore his approach in this case has been on erroneous
lines.
The judgment also shows that certain salient pieces of
evidence were missed or were not properly appreciated.
At the time when the penalty notice was issued under s. 28
of the Income-tax Act the respondent was not the Income-tax
Officer at Coimbatore but by June 6, he had been posted at
Coimbatore and the note on the Penalty File dated June
6,1951:
“put up proposal to I.A.C. for levy of standard penalty,”
was made by him. Although this proposal was made on June 6,
1951, it is not clear as to what final orders were passed in
these proceedings and when. At least there is nothing to
indicate that any intimation was given to the complainant in
regard to this matter. The complainant has stated on oath
as P.W. 8:-
591
” I alone went to the accused on 28th September, 1951. He
then told me that the penalty paper was not disposed of and
that the accounts for the current year had not also been
gone through.”
On the day following this the respondent asked the complain-
ant for illegal gratification of Rs. 1,000. Counsel for the
respondent contended that there was no occasion for the
respondent to say anything about the penalty proceedings
because as far as he was concerned the recommendation had
already been made by him but the real question is whether
the complainant was told as to what had happened or had any
knowledge of this. He states that he had none and there is
nothing to indicate that he bad.
The respondent has then stated that the complainant was
known to him since 1942 when he, the respondent, was the
Head Clerk of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of In-
come-tax and that is the reason why towards the end of
August or the beginning of September when be casually met
the complain. ant on the road, he told him that he was in
financial difficulties and the complainant offered him a
loan of Rs. 1,000 to be returned in easy instalments and
that he did not know at that time that the complainant was
an assessee before him. This statement of the respondent
has -been accepted by the High Court without considering the
following important facts. Notice was issued to the com-
plainant and he filed his return on August 11, 1951. The
notice must have been issued to the complainant under a.
22(2) of the Income-tax Act by the respondent himself as he
was at that time the Income-tax Officer. So it is difficult
to believe his statement about his not knowing that the
complainant was an assessee before him and it is improbable
that the respondent would mention his financial troubles to
a more or less casual acquaintance who has neither been
shown to be a banker, nor a money lender nor a wealthy
person. The complainant has stated that he visited the
respondent on 6th or 7th October, 1951, when he asked him if
he had brought the money. The complaint replied that he had
no money to spare as he had purchased a house
592
and he also asked him if the respondent had finished the
assessment. The latter’s reply was that he would look into
the matter and also told him that the complainant might pay
half the amount (of the illegal gratification) before the
deepavali time.. This statement the respondent has denied
but the statement of the complainant as to his having no
money as he had purchased a house has not been seriously
challenged in cross-examination.
The complainant had been asked to produce the accounts and
be did produce them on September 27. The notes made by the
respondent in P-7 and P-7(a) show that the accounts of the
complainant were not being accepted in regard to Coimbatore
Hotel. The portion of the order was :-
” All the defects that are usual in hotel accounts exist
here.”
In regard to Bhavanisagar hotel the note stated: :–
” Purchases are not fully supported and sales are reckoned
from till takings.”
On October 1, 1951, the assesses had filed his written
statement and also some other documents. Nothing more seems
to have been done till November 7, when the relevant part of
the note on the file is:
“I have been keeping this in order to compare the results
with other nearby hotels.”
As to why no enquiries could be made in the whole of this
period is not clear from the assessment record and it ]ends
support to the prosecution case that the respondent was
making approaches to the complainant to get money from him.
The respondent during the pendency of assessment proceedings
of the complainant allowed the complainant to visit him at
his house and even paid visit to his cafe. Even according
to the findings of the High Court the complainant was
“needing the favours” of the respondent who on his own
showing was himself in dire need of a thousand rupees as
he had succeeded in collecting only a thousand rupees by
November2, and needed twice that amount for his son’s premi-
um or security as he chooses to call it. No importance was
attached to this aspect of the case by the learned
593
judge of the High Court. In our opinion the learned trial
judge correctly appreciated this part of the prosecution
case and his judgment is not, as tile High Court has said,
coloured by nere suspicion.
On November 6, 1951, Circle Inspector Munisami contacted the
complainant and arrangement was made for Rs. 1,000 to be
paid by the complainant to the respondent and the money was
actually taken by the complainant and offered to the re-
spondent on November 8 which the respondent did not accept
as he had received an anonymous letter Ex. P-18 which was
dated November 6, 1951 in which the respondent had been
warned that Malayalam people were attempting to “ruin him”.
In spite of this warning the respondent continued to have
truck with the complainant and actually accepted Rs. 800
from him. It is true that when soon after the money was
paid and the Inspector P. W. 12 and the Magistrate P.W. 13
arrived at the house of the respondent and asked him about
this money he stated that he had taken it as a loan but in
the context it assumes a different complexion. The state-
ment of the Magistrate P.W. 13 was:-
” While the mahazar. was being prepared the accused volun-
teered and told me that he had received the 800 rupees as a
loan from P.W. 8-the complainant.”
This witness had also stated that when he went into the
verandah of the house, he asked the respondent whether he
had received an illegal gratification from the complainant
and also asked him to produce the money. The accused did
not say anything but got up from the chair and tried to go
inside the house which he was prevented from doing by the
Inspector P. W. 12. The witness added:
” The accused was seen trembling and meddling with something
under the towel. I asked the accused to remove the towel.
The accused removed the towel. I saw some bulging at his
waist in the dhoti be was wearing. I asked him again to
produce the currency notes. He produced them from the folds
of the dhoti be was wearing. When producing the currency
notes the accused did not say anything.”
594
No real cross-examination was directed against these por-
tions of the statement of the Magistrate P.W. 13 nor has the
High Court correctly appreciated them or given them due
weight. The respondent produced before the Special First
Class Magistrate on July 11, 1952, an unsigned promote for
Rs. 1,000 executed by him in favour of the complainant.
That promote was not found in the house when the search was
made by the Deputy Superintendent of Police on November 19,
1951, and it is not explained why the promote should have
been made for Rs. 1,000 when actually the amount paid was
only Rs. 800 and why the respondent offered to give this
promote to the complainant without receiving full considera-
tion.
These salient features of the case do not seem to have been
properly appreciated or given due weight to by the High
Court and in our opinion the learned judge’s approach to the
question whether the sum of Rs. 800 was an illegal gratifi-
cation or a loan is such that the judgment falls within the
words of Mahajan J. in Ramakrishna’s case (1), i.e. that the
High Court has acted perversely or otherwise improperly.
The evidence and the circumstances lead to the conclusion
that the transaction was not one of loan but illegal grati-
fication.
In view of the finding that the sum of Rs. 800 was a bribe
and not a loan it is not necessary to consider whether in
this case the loan would be an illegal gratification within
s. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947) or
not.
We would, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judg-
ment and order of the High Court of Madras and restore that
of the Special Judge of Coimbatore convicting the respondent
of the offence he was charged with. The respondent must
surrender to his bail bond.
Appeal allowed.
(i) A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 20,
595
