ORDER
S.K. Jha, C.J.
1. The Order passed in this Misc. Appeal shall also govern the disposal of Misc. Appeal No. 350/90 between the same parties.
2. In both the appeals, the same point is involved and the common question arising in the two appeals which has been referred by the Division Bench consisting of Dharmadhikari and Issrani, JJ. for decision by a Larger Bench is whether an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act pending in the Civil Court prior to the date of constitution of the Arbitration Tribunal, i.e. 1-3-1985, would be saved by the provisions of Section 20(2) of the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983? Hence this Full Bench for a decision of the aforementioned question of law.
3. A Division Bench consisting of B.C. Varma, J. as he then was, and Rampal Singh, J. by its judgment and Order dated 24-8-1987, in M.A. No. 168 of 1985, M/s Firm Trilok Chand Garg v. State of Madhya Pradesh had taken the view that the arbitration proceedings pending before any Tribunal within the meaning of Section 20(2) of the M.P.Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the Adhiniyam), (Act No. 29 of 1983), means that an application filed before the Court under sub- section (1) of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 awaiting the decision of the Court for a decision to refer the matter for arbitration, could not be said to be an arbitration proceeding pending before any Tribunal or Court within the meaning of the Adhiniyam. The Division Bench referring these cases to this Full Bench, has doubted the correctness of the aforesaid decision and taken the view, broadly speaking, that even an application under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act which was pending in any Court before the date on which the Tribunal was constituted under the Adhiniyam, would be saved by Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Adhiniyam.
4. In order to test as to which of the two views is correct, we need to refer to some relevant provisions of the Adhiniyam as well as the Arbitration Act. The Adhiniyam (Act No. 29 of 1983) prescribes in Sub-section (3) of Section 1 that it shall come into force on such date as the State Government may, by notification, appoint. Such appointed date is the 1st March, 1985, as is evident from the M. P. Rajpatra Asadharan (M.P. Gazette Extraordinary), dated 18-2-1985. Section 3 of the Adhiniyam states that the State Government shall, by notification, constitute an Arbitration Tribunal for resolving all such disputes or differences pertaining to works contract or arising out of or connected with execution, discharge or satisfaction of any such works contract and in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Adhiniyam, the State Government constituted an Arbitration Tribunal with effect from 1st March, 1985 itself which is also evidenced by the Gazette Extraordinary, of the same date and same number, being M. P. Gazette Extraordinary, dated 18-2-1985. So far all practical purposes, the two relevant dates are the same, namely, the appointed date from which the Adhiniyam came into force, and the date on which the Tribunal was duly constituted under the Adhiniyam.
5. In Section 2 of the Adhiniyam, ‘dispute’ has been defined as meaning a claim of ascertained money valued at Rs. 50,000.00 or more relating to any difference arising out of the execution or non-execution of a works contract or part thereof, and a works contract has been defined to mean ‘an agreement in writing for the execution of any work relating to construction, repair or maintenance of any building or superstructure, dam, weir, canal, reservoir, tank, lake, road, well, bridge, culvert, factory, workshop, power house, transformers of such other works of the State Government or Public Undertaking as the State Government may, by notification, specify in this behalf at any of its stages entered into by the State Government or by an official of the State Government or Public Undertaking or its official for and on behalf of such Public Undertaking and includes an agreement for the supply of goods or material and all other matters relating to the execution of any of the said works.’
6. The other provisions relevant for our purpose are Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 20 of the Adhiniyam. Section 20(1) lays down ‘as from the date of the constitution of the Tribunal and notwithstanding anything contained in Arbitration Act, 1940 (No. 10 of 1940) or any other law, for the time being in force, or in any agreement or usage to the contrary, no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain or decide any dispute of which cognizance can be taken by the Tribunal under this Act.’ (Italics is ours for the sake of emphasis).
7. Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Adhiniyam which is the saving clause from the bar of the jurisdiction of a Civil Court, runs in these terms :
“Nothing in Sub-section (1) shall apply to any arbitration proceeding either pending before any arbitrator or umpire or before any Court or authority under the provisions of Arbitration Act, or any other law relating to arbitration, and such proceedings may be continued, heard and decided in accordance with agreement or usage or provisions of Arbitration Act or any other law relating to arbitration in all their stages, as if this Act had not come into force.”
Thus it will be seen that as from the date of the constitution of the Tribunal, namely 1-3-1985 which is also the appointed date for the enforcement of the Act, if there is any dispute of which cognizance can be taken by the Tribunal under the Act, cognizance of such a dispute by any Civil Court is barred.
8. It is common ground that in the instant appeals, the works contracts were in the same terms for purposes of the arbitration agreement and the dispute also was one which has been defined as aforementioned in Section 2(1) of the Adhiniyam involving more than Rs. 50,000.00. In other words, admittedly the claim in each of the cases was above Rs. 50,000.00 or more relating to the difference arising out of the execution of the works contract and the application by the respondent firm was made under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act prior to 1-3-1985. If such a dispute had arisen on and from 1st March, 1985, the cognizance of it by a Civil Court would be barred under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Adhiniyam.
9. For purposes of ascertaining the meaning of the term ‘any arbitration proceeding pending in a Court’ we will have to fall back upon the language of Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Adhiniyam which expressly lays down that the dispute must be one of which cognizance can be taken by the Tribunal under the Act. If any application were to be filed on 1-3-1985 or on any date thereafter, evidently filing of such an application and the entertainment thereof by the Civil Court would be barred by the language of Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Adhiniyam and if there is no such bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, the arbitration proceedings under Section 20(1) of the Adhiniyam would be deemed to be pending before the Court, albeit in the shape of merely an application for reference to arbitration under Sub-section (1) of Section 20. Apart from anything else, on the language of the statute itself expressum facit cessare.. Sub-section (1) of Section 20 will be attracted to bar the cognizance of any dispute by the Civil Court if on the date such an application is made by which a dispute is sought to be referred by the Civil Court to arbitration. Irrespective of the fact as to whether the Court has passed any order in terms of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act or not, the cognizance of the suit is not barred by Civil Court as the Tribunal had not been duly constituted before 1-3-1985. If on the contrary, after the Tribunal had already come into existence on and from 1-3-1985, any such application under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act will also be barred as it would be embraced within the sweep of the language of the Adhiniyam barring the jurisdiction of the Civil Court from taking cognizance of any dispute of which cognizance can be taken by the Tribunal.
10. Apart from the express language of the statute which has to be given due effect to, by virtue of the well known legal maxim construction ut res magis valeat quam pereat, which is the golden rule of construction of a statute, we must give effect to each and every word of the statute beneficial in its operation and so as to see that an Act ought not to be so construed as to convict the legislature of having used any language rendering it redundant, otios or a surplusage. The authorities are not required for such well known canons of interpretation of statutory law. Even construction ut res magis valeat quam pereat can be invoked only in cases of ambiguity.
11. Here, however, what we find is that the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and that there cannot be any two opinions with regard to dispute of which cognizance can be taken by the Tribunal of which Civil Court is barred under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Adhiniyam and obviously, therefore, any such dispute of which the cognizance of the Civil Court is not barred under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 is saved by operation of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Adhiniyam or even irrespective thereof. The primary rule of construction in such cases is to intend the legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of the legislature, but the intention of the legislature must be deducted from the language used. Where the language is plain and admits but of one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise as every word of the statute has to be given a meaning and the meaning of a section may be determined, not so much by reference to other provisions of the statute as by the scheme of the Act regarded in general.
12. That apart, with great respect to the learned Judges who have referred this case to this Full Bench, we are in full agreement with their view that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not to be readily inferred. Under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. A statute, therefore, expressly or by necessary implication, can bar the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in respect of a particular matter. The mere conferment of special jurisdiction on a Tribunal in respect of the said matter does not, in itself, exclude the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. The statute may specifically provide for ousting the jurisdiction of Civil Courts; although even if there was no such specific exclusion, if it creates a liability not existing before and gives a special and particular remedy for the aggrieved party, the remedy provided by it must be followed. But there is also an equally well settled principle governing the scope of the Civil Court’s jurisdiction in a case where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy. Even in such cases, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is not completely ousted. A suit in a Civil Court will always lie to question the order of a Tribunal created by a statute, even if its order is expressly or by necessary implication, made final, if the Tribunal abuses its power or does not act under the Act, but in violation of its provisions. Such questions, however, do not arise in the present appeals. On the express language of the statute, it would bear repetition, it must be held that the view taken by Dharmadhikari and Issrani, JJ., with respect, is the correct view and the interpretation put upon the language of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Adhiniyam by the Bench consisting of B. C. Varma, J. as he then was, and Rampal Singh, J. does not lay down the correct position in law.
13. The point referred for decision to this Full Bench is accordingly answered. The appeals shall now be placed before the Division Bench for final decision. We shall, however, make no order as to costs on this reference in view of the diversion in opinions in two, Division Bench decisions.