ORDER
S.K. Chawla, J.
1. The State has filed this revision from an order of discharge.
2. An old man named Har Prasad, aged about 65 years, killed himself by getting himself crushed under a running train on 5-8-1984 near Khurai. He left a suicide note stating that non-applicants had insulted him and were further threatening him that they would enter into his house and kill him. He did not, therefore, want to live and because of fear from them, he was feeling helpless and was killing himself. It was the prosecution case that earlier on 21-7-1984, the non-applicants had trespassed into the house of deceased Har Prasad and had belaboured him. The police had registered for that incident Crime No. 244 of 1984 under Sections 147, 148 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code against the non-applicants. Non-applicant No. 1 Rupsingh is the younger brother of deceased Har Prasad while the rest belong to his faction. There was previous enmity between the deceased and Rupsingh over certain land and drainage water.
3. The Additional Sessions Judge, Khurai, to whom the case was committed, discharged the non-applicants of the offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code by the impugned order dated 26-12-1985. Aggrieved by that order, the State has filed this revision.
4. The definition of “abetment” of a thing contained in Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code will show that a person abets the doing of a thing, if he (i) instigates (ii) conspires or (iii) aids in the doing that thing. When deceased Har Prasad committed suicide under a running train on 5-8-1984, none of the non-applicants were admittedly present, muchless could they have instigated or conspired or aided the deceased in committing suicide at that time. Even when the non-applicants had on 21-7-1984 allegedly trespassed into the house of the deceased and beaten him, none, including the non-applicants, could have anticipated that 15 days afterwards, i.e., on 5-8-1984, the deceased would commit suicide. Hence the question of instigation or conspiracy or any kind of aid in the commission of suicide, which could not even be anticipated, was out of question at that time. Ordinarily it may be difficult to hold a person guilty of abetting the commission of suicide by another just because the person committing suicide was beaten by him and chose to commit suicide in the wake of beating. Otherwise’ startling results would follow. For example, a person may be suicide prone and may be driven to commit suicide just because he was rebuked or slapped by another. To hold the person rebuking or slapping guilty of the offence of abetting the commission of suicide would lead to startling results. Taking the case under consideration, by no stretch of imagination, could the non-applicants by committing house trespass and beating of the deceased on 21-7-1984, be said to have instigated or conspired or aided the commission of sucide by the deceased, which itself was most unanticipated and was committed 15 days afterwards.
5. With respect to commission of suicide by a married women, the Legislature has stepped in by enacting in the year 1983 a presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act. The presumption is that if suicide is committed by a married woman within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband had subjecting her to cruelty, the Court may presume having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide was abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. This presumption itself shows that but for it, it may be difficult to hold a person guilty of the offence of abetting the commission of suicide of another just because the latter was subjected to cruelty and committed suicide thereafter. But in the case of commission-of suicide by a married woman if certain conditions are fulfilled, the Legislature now allows a presumption about abetment of suicide to be drawn against the husband or any relative of the husband vide Section 113A of the Evidence Act.
6. In view of the foregoing discussions it is clear that there was absolutely nothing to indicate even prima facie that the non-applicants in any manner abetted the commission of suicide by deceased Har Prasad. The learned Additional Sessions Judge was, therefore, not wrong in discharging the non-applicants. There is no force in this revision. It is dismissed.