High Court Punjab-Haryana High Court

Surinder Kumar vs State Of Haryana on 7 December, 2005

Punjab-Haryana High Court
Surinder Kumar vs State Of Haryana on 7 December, 2005
Equivalent citations: AIR 2006 P H 130
Author: V Mittal
Bench: H Bedi, V Mittal


JUDGMENT

Viney Mittal, J.

1. This judgment shall dispose of a bunch of Letters Patent Appeals which have been filed by then claim- ants against the judgment of the learned single Judge dated January 7, 1999. The claim made by the claimants is for enhancement of compensation for their acquired land. Against the aforesaid judgment of the learned single Judge, the State of Haryana has moved a bunch of review applications. In the review applications, the State of Haryana has sought review of the judgment of the learned single Judge claiming further reduction in the assessment of compensation. Since the learned single judge (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Swatantar Kumar) has since been transferred to Delhi High Court, therefore, the aforesaid review applications have also been placed before us for disposal. Because of the fact that we are already seized of the matter on account of the claim made by the claimants in the Letters Patent Appeals. The Advocate General, Haryana, who has appeared for the State of Haryana in the review applications has, at the outset, made an oral prayer that the aforesaid review applications be treated as cross-appeals. Learned Counsel appearing for the claimants have no objection to the aforesaid prayer of the State being allowed. Consequently we order that the review applications filed by the State of Haryana against the judgment of the learned single Judge shall be treated as cross-appeals and shall be deemed to have been filed on the date when the said review applications were filed. The office is directed to renumber the aforesaid review applications as Letter Patent Appeals. The present judgment shall also dispose of the aforesaid cross-appeals.

2. At the outset, it may be noticed that the aforesaid review applications (now treated as cross-appeals) have been filed by the State of Haryana after the expiry of limitation. Applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act have also been filed seeking condonation of delay. Learned Counsel appearing for the claimants have no objections if the prayer for condonation of delay made by the State of Haryana is allowed. Similarly some of the Letters Patent Appeals filed by claimants, out of the total bunch of cases, are also barred by limitation. Learned Advocate General, Haryana has also conceded that the aforesaid delay in filing the appeals be also condoned. As a result of the agreement between the learned Counsel for the parties, the delay in filing the review applications (now treated as cross-appeals) and also the delay in filing some of the Letters Patent Appeals by claimants is condoned.

3. A notification dated May 26, 1981 was issued by the State of Haryana under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Land measuring 250.51 acres situated in villages Patti Mehar, Saunda and Jandli in district Ambala was intended to be acquired for development and utilization of residential area as Sector-9 for Urban Estate, Ambala. Three separate awards were rendered by the Land Acquisition Collector. Award No. 4 was announced on June 27, 1984 whereby the acquired land, forming the aforesaid award, was assessed at the market value of Rs. 52,000/- per acre. Subsequently two more awards were pronounced as awards Nos. 11 and 12 on September 13, 1984. In these awards, the acquired land was classified in three categories. Whereas Chahi land was assessed at the rate of Rs. 34,500/- per acre, barani land was assessed at the rate of Rs. 27.520/- per acre and Banjar and Ghairmumkin land was assessed at the rate of Rs. 13,760/-,

4. The claimants remained dissatisfied with the market value of the acquired land assessed by the Land Acquisition Collector. They claimed references under Section 18 of the Act, The matter was consequently referred to the reference Court.

5. The aforesaid reference applications were also assigned to various Courts. Vide judgment dated October 9, 1991, in a bunch of reference petitions, the reference Court (Shri C.B. Jaglian) enhanced the market value of the acquired land and assessed the same at the rate of Rs. 57,000/- per acre (i.e. Rs. 11.77 per square yard). It may be noticed that the record of the case shows that these reference petitions pertained to award No. 4 whereby the market value of the acquired land was assessed by the Land Acquisition Collector at the rate of Rs. 52.000/- per acre. Subsequently, another reference Court (Shri M.S. Nagra) vide its judgment dated May 6, 1992 assessed the market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 3,38,800/- per acre (i.e. Rs. 70/- per square yard).

6. The claimants remained dissatisfied with both the judgments passed by both the reference Courts. Consequently, a bunch of regular first appeals were filed in this Court. The State of Haryana also filed appeals qua the judgment dated May 6, 1992, rendered by the reference Court whereby the assessment had been made at the rate of Rs. 3,38,800/-. No appeal was, however, filed by the State of Haryana qua the judgment dated October 9, 1991 rendered by the reference Court. In the appeals filed by the claimants, they claimed that the acquired land was liable to be assessed at the rate of Rs. 300/- per square yard.

7. At this stage, it may be relevant to notice that during the pendency of the reference proceedings, another notification was issued by the State of Haryana on February 2, 1989, acquiring some more land in villages Saunda and Jandli for development of Sector-10 in the Urban Estate, Ambala. The aforesaid acquisition proceedings also resulted in filing of regular first appeals by the claimants as well as the State of Haryana in this Court. Vide judgment dated December 24, 1998, the learned single Judge assessed the market value of the aforesaid acquired land in the year 1989 at the rate of Rs. 2,91.800/- per acre i.e. Rs. 60.28 per square yard. It may be noticed that the aforesaid assessment of Rs. 2,91,800/- per acre was arrived at by the learned single Judge primarily basing his claim on the judgment dated October 9, 1991 passed by the reference Court of Shri Jaglian.

8. When the present bunch of first appeals was heard by the learned single Judge, he chose to rely upon the assessment made in the judgment dated December 24, 1998 in Regular First Appeal pertaining to the acquisition of 1989. On that basis the present claimants were also awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 2,91,800/-. The aforesaid judgment of the learned single Judge dated January 7, 1999 has been assailed by the claimants as well as by the State of Haryana in the present appeals. Another bunch of cases pertaining to the same acquisition was decided by the learned single Judge on January 14, 1999. Similar assessment was made in the aforesaid bunch of appeals as well. The claimants as well as the State of Haryana have now approached this Court through the various appeals in the aforesaid cases as well.

9. We have heard Shri M.L. Sarin, learned Advocate and the other learned Counsel appearing for the claimants and Shri H. S. Hooda, learned Advocate General, Haryana appearing for the State of Haryana at some length and with their assistance have also gone through the record of the case.

10. Learned Counsel for the claimants have primarily argued that there was an apparent error in the judgment of the learned single Judge inasmuch as the assessment of compensation qua the land of the claimants which had been acquired in the year 1981, has been made on the basis of the judgment rendered by the learned single Judge on December 24, 1998 in appeal arising out of acquisition proceedings pertaining to the year 1989 acquisition. It has been pointed out that while making the assessment in 1989 acquisition proceedings, teamed single Judge in his judgment dated December 24, 1998 had relied upon the judgment of the reference Court dated October 9, 1991 (Shri C.B. Jaglian’s judgment) which itself was subject-matter of appeals in the present appeals. On that basis, it has been argued that in fact while disposing of the appeals of the present claimants, learned single Judge had basically relied upon the assessment made by the learned reference Court itself. On the basis of the aforesaid fact, learned Counsel for the claimants have urged that the judgment of the learned single Judge was liable to be set aside. It has further been urged that the other instances which are in the nature of earlier awards qua. earlier acquisition proceedings, were available on the record and have not been taken into consideration by the learned single Judge. The learned Counsel have, accordingly, prayed that the appeals filed by the claimants were liable to be allowed and the claimants were entitled to higher compensation. Our specific attention has been drawn to Ex. P7 and Ex. P11 which are the site plans indicating the present acquired land and the other surrounding acquisition of the land for municipal park in the year 1973 for which assessment was made at the rate of Rs. 70/- per square yard by this Court in a judgment reported as 1980 Current Law Journal 334, Ext P21 whereby 79.41 acres of land in village Patti Mehar itself was acquired through notification dated January 30, 1973 for development of Urban Estate and a Division Bench of this Court had assessed the market value of the said acquired land at the rate of Rs. 70/- per square yard. Learned Counsel for the claimants have also placed reliance upon Ex. P2 through which assessment of the said acquired land measuring 68 kanals 15 marlas in village Patti Mehar, which had been acquired on May 30, 1978 for construction of an over-bridge over railway crossing, was made at the rate of Rs. 100 /-per square yard and some portion for Rs. 70/- per square yard. Lastly, learned Counsel have relied upon Ex. P9 whereby the reference Court had assessed three khasra numbers, which had been left due to an over sight and had been acquired for the construction of over-bridge through a notification dated October 17, 1978 on November 12, 1984 and which had been assessed at the rate of Rs. 200/- and Rs. 100/- per square yard. On the strength of the aforesaid evidence, learned Counsel have argued that the acquired land was also liable to be assessed in the light of the said documents at a much higher value than what has been assessed by the learned single Judge.

11. On the other hand, learned Advocate General, has argued that the assessment of compensation by the learned single Judge itself was on the higher side inasmuch as through an award dated May 6, 1992 the reference Court had awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 3,38,800/- i.e. Rs. 70/- per square yard whereas through an earlier award dated October 9, 1991, another Presiding Officer of the reference Court had assessed the portion of the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 57.000/- per acre i.e. Rs. 11.77 per square yard. Learned Advocate General has argued that there was no warrant for the higher assessment at a later point of time since the earlier award also pertained to same acquisition. In these circumstances, learned Advocate General has contended that the compensation awarded by the learned single Judge was liable to be further reduced.

12. We have given our thoughtful and anxious consideration to the rival contentions of the learned Counsel. We have also minutely gone through the record of the case.

13. It is apparent from the perusal of the judgment of the learned single Judge that the assessment of compensation has been made on the basis of an earlier judgment rendered by the learned single Judge in the case of State of Haryana v. Jagir Kaur (R.F.A. No. 716 of 1995 decided on December 24, 1998). It is also apparent from the record that the aforesaid appeal arose out of acquisition proceedings through which the land had been acquired in the year 1989. It is further clear from the perusal of the aforesaid judgment dated December 24, 1998 (an extract thereof has been reproduced by the learned single Judge in the judgment under appeal as well) that in Jagir Kaur’s case reliance had been placed by the State of Haryana on the two awards rendered by the reference Court whereby the acquired land had been assessed at the rate of Rs. 57,000/- per acre. It is these very awards which were the subject-matter of appeal before the learned single Judge in the bunch of appeals before him. Thus, while assessing the market value of the acquired land in the bunch of appeals, learned single Judge has primarily based his reliance upon the judgment of the reference Court itself. A judgment which was in appeal itself could not be made the basis of its own judgment by the appellant Court. Thus, there is an error apparent on the face of the record when learned single Judge relied upon the aforesaid awards. The assessment of compensation in the bunch of appeals was liable to be made independent of the aforesaid judgments under appeal and on the basis of the evidence which was available on the record. In these circumstances, we have chosen to re-examine the evidence available on the record.

14. A perusal of the site plans Ex. P7 and Ex. P11 indicates the location of the acquired land and the entire surroundings. The distance of the acquired land from various localities and other developed places is also indicated. Some land was acquired in the year 1973 for construction of a municipal park. The assessment of the acquired land was made by this Court at the rate of Rs. 70/- per square yard and the judgment is reported as 1980 Current Law Journal 334. Although we find that the land of the municipal park was at some distance from the present acquired land but the aforesaid assessment for the said land which had been acquired in the year 1973 furnishes some indication of the prevalent price in the vicinity of the acquired land. However, we find that a big chunk measuring 79.71 acres was acquired in village Patti Mehar itself for development of an Urban Estate through notification dated January 30, 1973. A Division Bench of this Court assessed the market value of the aforesaid acquired land at the rate of Rs. 70/- per square yard. The aforesaid judgment is available as Ex. P21 on the record. The location of the aforesaid Urban Estate vis-a-vis the present acquired land is clearly indicated in the site plans and it is apparent that the present acquired land is very near to the aforesaid land acquired for Urban Estate. As a matter of fact, the distance between the aforesaid Urban Estate and the present acquired land is less than 300 yards. Thus, we find that the aforesaid judicial precedent should furnish a good yardstick for assessment in the present acquisition proceedings. It has been argued by the learned Advocate General that the aforesaid Urban Estate was situated across the railway lines and on the side which wad already fully developed and, therefore, could not be taken into consideration for assessing the market value for the acquired land which was situated on the other side of the railway line, where there was no development. However, we find that in the year 1978, land was acquired for over-bridge over the railway crossing. The aforesaid acquired land in the year 1978 was also assessed vide Ex. P2 at the rate of Rs. 100/- per square yard and some land at the rate of Rs. 70/- per square yard. Subsequently, through Ex. P9 three khasra numbers which had been left due to over sight and were required for construction of over-bidge were assessed at the rate of Rs. 200/- per square yard and Rs. 100/- per square yard. It is, thus, clear that after the construction of the over-bridge any disadvantage which was attached to the site where the present acquired land was situated stood wiped out. After the construction of the over-bridge the entire land: on two sides of railway line had equal potential. We further find that right from the time when the land which had been acquired for municipal park and for urban estate and even for over-bridge, a uniform pattern for assessment was adopted by the Courts and all the acquired lands were assessed at the rate of Rs. 70/- per square yard or above. The said assessment could definitely offer a bench mark for assessment in the. present cases as well.

15. Learned Counsel for the claimant-appellants have vehemently argued that if the land of the Urban Estate which had been acquired in the year 1973 could be assessed at the rate of Rs. 70/- per square yard, then the present acquired land, which had been acquired through notification dated May 26, 1981 was liable to be assessed at a, much higher value. Learned Counsel have argued that the accepted principle was to award an increase of 12% per annum. Consequently learned Counsel have claimed that the claimants were entitled to an increase of 96% over and above Rs. 70/- per square yard.

16. We have thoughtfully considered the aforesaid contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants. Although we find that the appellants are entitled to some increase over and above the assessment for the land acquired in the year 1973 but still keeping in view the location of the land of the Urban Estate as well as the present acquired land, as indicated in the site plans Ex. P7 and Ex. P 11, we find that the land of the Urban Estate did enjoy certain better potentiality and, as such, was entitled for little higher compensation than the present acquired land. In these circumstances, to award an increase of 96% over and above the assessment of Rs. 70/- per square yard, would be on the higher side. Keeping in view the overall location of the present acquired land and also keeping in view the development all around, and more specifically the construction of the over-bridge, we find that the present acquired land can very safely be assessed at the rate of Rs. 110/- per square yard.

17. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we allow the appeals filed by the claimant-landowners and hold that the claimant-landowners would be entitled to market rate of Rs. 110/- per square yard for their acquired land. The claimants would also be entitled to all other statutory benefits as per the amended provision of the Act, as per their entitlement. Necessarily it would follow that the appeals filed by the State of Haryana would stand dismissed.

18. Before parting with this judgment, it would be relevant to notice that when State of Haryana had filed the review application before the learned single Judge, then vide an order dated July 19, 2000, the execution proceedings were stayed. Subsequently on March 27, 2001, the following order was passed :

Learned Advocate General, Haryana, appearing for the State submitted that the Government shall own responsibility if the claimant(s) suffer any money loss on account of non-payment of compensation, at this juncture in view of the stay order of this Court more particularly keeping in view the fact that tax at source had already been deducted by the Government and deposited with the income tax authorities. The consideration of the present application on merits will invite the same contentions which are to be considered by the Court for deciding the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act as well as the review application filed under Order 47, Rules 1 and 3 of Civil Procedure Code.

In view of the statement of the learned Advocate General, the ad interim stay granted by this Court shall continue till disposal of the application. It will be more in the interest of justice to continue the ad interim order as the application has already been fixed for final disposal on 18-4-2001.

In view of the position stated above, it is directed that the executing Court where the State has deposited the amount would create fixed deposit receipt in the name of the Court in a nationalised bank immediately and for doing so the registry of this Court shall inform the executing Court telephonically/telegraphically.

19. In these circumstances, we direct that the amount of the aforesaid fixed deposits along with the interest accrued thereupon shall be released to the claimants. The amount of interest which has accrued upon the aforesaid fixed deposits shall not be taken into consideration while making the payment of compensation or other benefits to the claimants, as directed by this Court in the present appeals.