Surtan And Ors. vs Kanhaiyalal And Ors. on 19 April, 1993

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188
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Surtan And Ors. vs Kanhaiyalal And Ors. on 19 April, 1993
Equivalent citations: 2 (1993) ACC 635
Author: A Tiwari
Bench: A Tiwari


JUDGMENT

A.R. Tiwari, J.

1. This Miscellaneous Appeal, filed under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, is directed against the Award dated 5.3.1983 passed by the Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jhabua in Claim Case No. 1/80. The claimants were granted an amount of Rs. 3,000/- as compensation. They have come up in this Court for enhancement.

2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that truck bearing registration No. GTY 3838 is owned by the respondent No. 1. At the relevant time, it was being driven by the respondent No. 2, Shantilal. It was also insured with the respondent No. 3. On 13.10.1979 the respondent No. 2 drove the aforesaid truck rashly and negligently and knocked down Mariya daughter of appellants/claimants, aged 12 years, who succumbed to the injuries on the spot. The claimants filed the claim petition seeking compensation of Rs. 35,000/-. The respondents denied their liability and contended their impeccability. The Tribunal, after evaluation of evidence, found that the respondent No. 2 was guilty of negligent and rash driving and he committed the act resulting in injuries and eventual death. The Tribunal, thus, came to the conclusion that the respondents were jointly and severally liable to pay compensation of Rs. 3,000/- together with interest at the rate of 4% p.a. Feeling aggrieved by the inadequacy, the claimants have preferred this appeal.

3. I have heard Shri G.K. Neema learned Counsel for the appellants/claimants. None appears for the respondents No. 1 and 2 and 3 to oppose this appeal.

4. Shri Neema submitted that the amount of compensation awarded in this case is too low, and is also against the intention of the Parliament as regards the compensation payable even in case of ‘no fault liability’. He submitted that although, the concept of ‘no fault liability’ is introduced in the Act subsequent to the date of accident in the instant case, it would be just and proper to apply the same principle even in such cases so as to make the Award appear reasonable. Shri Neema also submitted that the rate of interest allowed in this case is also low and deserves to be enhanced.

5. I have considered the submissions and perused the record. I have done this very carefully. No assistance was available from the other side. In para 7 of the Award it is stated that deceased Mariya was of 12 years of age. She was a labourer and was able to earn Rs. 5/- per day. It is speculated that she would have stayed in the parental home for about four years more and thereafter would have gone to the matrimonial home after her marriage, thus on attaining the age of 16 years.

5A. The aforesaid approach overlooked even the provisions of law. A Child marriage is prohibited under the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929. It is made punishable under Section 5 of this Act. Section 2(a) defines ‘the child’ as under :

(a) “a child” means person who, if a male, has not completed twenty-one years of age, and if a female, has not completed eighteen years of age.

It is significant to note that the provision about this age was substituted by Clause (a) by the Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act (2 of 1978) on 1.10.1978. The judgment in this case was delivered on 5.3.1983. In fixing the quantum of damages, the aforesaid aspect has been totally overlooked. However, this exercise is now not necessary because even otherwise, the concept of ‘no fault liability’ itself deserves to be kept in mind. At present the quantum of compensation, even as interim measure of no fault liability is indicated by law to be Rs. 25,000/-, and this intendment needs to be applied while deciding this appeal. It is, therefore, not necessary to dilate on the calculations or to enter into nicety of law or scrutiny of evidence.

6. In Deviji S/o Ganpat and Ors. v. Anwarkhan S/o Mustaq and Ors. it is held as under:

The provision of Section 92-A of the Act is a piece of welfare legislation, has to be interpreted liberally and its intendment and analogy can be applied by the High Courts while deciding appeals or cases, on the principle that compensation on merits, which is largely based on guess work, must be in accord with the principle that compensation for loss of life, if not more, has to be at least Rs. 15,000/-. Hence, without going into the calculation of dependency and the multiplier adopted by the learned Tribunal which, in my opinion, is not correct as it can be safely presumed that a member who has got large members to support, having low income, cannot afford to spend much on himself and on his wife. I need not dilate on the calculations but, as stated above, I rely on the authorities of this Court in cases of Shamsher Khan (Supra) and Ruhnabai (Supra) for awarding the compensation of Rs. 15,000/- instead of Rs. 4,200/- as awarded by the learned Tribunal.

7. In the result, I hold that the claimants/appellants are entitled to receive the amount of compensation at least Rs. 25,000/- so as to be in accord with the legislation intent.

8. As regards the rate of interest, the rupee has suffered considerable devaluation and there is a mandate of the Apex Court to award interest at the rate of 12% p.a. Whatever be the cause for delay, the Award of interest has to be at the rate of 12% p.a. from the date of application. In II (1988) ACC 337 : 1988 MPLJ 346 (DB) State of M.P. v. Asha devi and Ors. it is held as under:

The learned Tribunal has awarded the interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of the application, but it is against the mandate of the Apex Court. Minimum interest in compensation cases now a days has to be awarded @ 12% p.a. from the date of application. See cases of Narcinva V. Kamat and Anr. v. Alfredo Antonio Doe Martins and Ors. II (1985) ACC 34 : 1985 ACJ page 397 SC 1987 ACJ page 15 SC Jagbirsingh and Ors. v. General Manager, Punjab Roadways and Ors. and also Division Bench Cases of this Court reported in 1987 ACJ 98 and 429.

9. It is, thus, clear that even the rate of interest is low. It deserves to be enhanced.

10. In the circumstances, this appeal is partly allowed and the Award is modified directing that the respondents shall pay the amount of Rs. 25,000/- as compensation to the appellants/claimants, instead of Rs. 3,000/- together with interest @ 12% p.a. from the date of the application i.e. 10.1.1980 (the date on which the application was received by the Tribunal), instead of 4% p.a. till the realisation of this amount.

11. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs of this appeal. Counsel’s fee Rs. 500/- if certified. Memo of costs be prepared.

12. The appeal, thus, stands allowed in part. The record of the Court is directed to be returned to the Tribunal immediately.

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