JUDGMENT
Aniruddha Bose, J.
1. This appeal is directed against an order passed by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Durgapur (which we shall henceforth describe as “Tribunal”), passed under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the Act in short). The appeal arises out of an application made by the legal representatives of a deceased victim of an accident, and a sum of Rs. 50,000/- (rupees fifty thousand), has been directed to be paid to the claimants.
2. The victim, in this case, one Sanjeeb Kumar Santra had died in a motor accident on 5th August, 2001. Before the Tribunal, death of the victim in the accident and the involvement of the vehicle have been established. The only ground urged against the order of the Tribunal is that at the time of occurrence of the accident, there was no insurance coverage of the vehicle in question.
3. The appellant before us is the Insurance Company and they are seeking to deny their liability to meet the compensation amount as directed by the Tribunal. On behalf of the respondents (claimants), a preliminary point has been taken that the appeal is not maintainable as an order under Section 140 of the Act is not an appealable order.
4. On the point of insurance coverage, the case of the appellant is that the owner of the vehicle had submitted the proposal form on 3rd August, 2001, but the policy was issued with effect from 2.10 p.m. on 6th August, 2001, which was to last till the midnight of 5th August, 2002. The copy of the proposal form was made an exhibit. This proposal form bears signature of the proposer being the owner of the vehicle and the date of the signature is 3rd August, 2001. The payment, also appears to have been received on that date. The proposal form carries a statement in a separate box with the heading “Additional questionnaire for motor proposes with a break in coverage” to the effect that the insured had remitted the premium on 4.20 p.m. on 3rd August, 2001 and it was understood and agreed that the Insurance Company has no liability of whatsoever nature for any loss/ damage/liability arising out of any accident earlier to zero hour on 6th August, 2001.
5. It appears that this point was canvassed before the Tribunal, but considering the provisions of Section 64VB of the Insurance Act, the learned Tribunal came to a finding that the Insurance Company was liable to pay compensation. Before us, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that mere payment of the premium on a particular day automatically does not entail policy coverage from that date, but it is the option of the owner to seek coverage from any date subsequent to payment of premium. He submits that in the present case, he chose coverage of the vehicle from 6th August, 2001, and hence the Insurance Company cannot be saddled with the obligation in respect of an accident which occurred on 3rd August, 2001.
6. In support of his submission that the Insurance Company cannot be saddled with liability for an accident during the period not covered by a policy, he has relied on the following authorities:
(i) J. Kalaivani v. K. Shivshankar 2002 (1) TAC 839 (SC);
(ii) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Sita Bai ;
(iii) New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bhagwati Devi ;
(iv) Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sunita Rathi ;
(v) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lakshmi Pramanik ;
(vi) Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hamza 2005 (3) TAC 631 : 2004 AIR — Kant HCR 977 (Karnataka); and
(vii) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Inder Deo Ojha (2003) 3 TAC 14 (All).
7. On the other hand, the learned Advocate for the claimant has mainly argued that an appeal under Section 173 is not maintainable against the order for compensation directed under Section 140 of the Act. He has relied on a decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Bapu Onkar Chaudhari and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Tulsiram (2005) 1 ACC 762. He further argued that payment of premium to an agent starts policy coverage from the date of such payment, for which he relied on the cases of Bhai Nalkantha Khadi v. Jayantilal (1995) 2 ACJ 976 and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Inder Deo Ojha (2003) 3 TAC 14 (All). The third limb of his submission is that compensation awarded under Section 140 of the Act is in the nature of interim relief and the Supreme Court under normal circumstances ought not to interfere with such orders. The two authorities he has cited on this point are United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bana Devi (2004) 3 ACC 906 and Mubarik Sardar Mohammed v. Rashid Khan (2002) 2 TAC 102 (MP).
8. We propose to take up the point of maintainability of the appeal first. In this regard, the learned Advocate appearing for the claimant has relied on a special Bench decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay. Aurangabad Bench, in the case of Divisional Controller, Maharashtra State Transport Corporation v. Bappu Onkar Chowdhury, reported in 2004 ACJ 35. In this judgment, it has been held that an order passed under Section 140 of the Act is not an appealable order. On merit, the learned Counsel for the claimants has advanced substantial arguments to establish the obligation of the Insurance Company to meet the compensation is directed by the Tribunal.
9. The provisions relating to appeal against an award of the Claims Tribunal is contained in Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which is reproduced below:
173. Appeals.– (1) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2) any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:
Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court:
Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.
(2) No appeal shall lie against any award of Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less that ten thousand rupees.
10. This provision is contained in Chapter XII of the Act, which carries the title “CLAIMS TRIBUNALS”, Sections 165 to Section 176 of the Act comes within the purview of this chapter. This chapter mainly provides for constitution of the Claims Tribunals and the procedure regulating the disposal of such applications. Proviso to Section 168 of the Act specifically stipulates that claim for compensation under Section 140 would be guided by the provisions of Chapter X. Section 144 of the Act, which is again within Chapter X gives overriding effect to the provisions of that Chapter over any other provision of the Act, or any other law.
11. We are also reproducing below the provisions of Section 168 of the Act:
168. Award of the Claims Tribunal.– On receipt of an application for compensation made under Section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and subject to the provisions of Section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner of driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be:
Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation under Section 140 in respect of the death or permanent, disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death, or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X.
(2) The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award.
(3) When an award is made under this section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days of the date of announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct.
12. Chapter X of the Act to which we have referred to earlier in this judgment, provides for special provision for making, what could be termed as, interim award in the cases of death or permanent disability. The maximum sum which could be awarded as compensation as interim compensation under the provisions of this Chapter is Rs. 50,000/-. Sections 140 and 144 of the Act, which come within the ambit of this Chapter and are of substantial importance for disposal of the preliminary point, are reproduced below:
140. Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault.–(1) Where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death, or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under Sub-section (1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of (fifty thousand rupees) and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of (twenty-five thousand rupees).
(3) In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.
(4) a claim for compensation under Sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (2) regarding death or bodily injury to any person, for which the owner of the vehicle is liable to give compensation for relief, he is also liable to pay compensation under any other law for the time being in force:
Provided that the amount of such compensation to be given under any other law shall be reduced from the amount of compensation payable under this section or under Section 163A.
144. Overriding effect.– The provisions pf this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force.
13. The question, which essentially falls for determination in the present proceeding, is as to whether an order for compensation in a proceeding for no-fault liability in Chapter X of the Act comes within the ambit of the expression “award”, within the meaning of Sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Act.
14. The Act does not define the expression “award”. There is also no reference to the expression “award” under Chapter X of the Act. However, Rule 339 under Chapter X of the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, 1089. which deals with proceeding for no-fault liability compensation, the expression “award” is used. The said Rule is reproduced below ;
339. Judgment and award of compensation under Section 40 of the Act.– (1) The Claims Tribunal shall proceed to award the claim of compensation under Section 140 of the Act on the basis of
i) registration certificate of motor vehicle involved in the accident;
ii) insurance certificate or policy relating to the insurance of the vehicle against third party risk;
iii) Panchanama and First Information Report;
iv) Post Mortem Report or Death Certificate or Certificate of injury from the Medical Officer; and
(v) The nature of the treatment given by the Medical Officer who has examined the victim.
(2) Where compensation is awarded to two or more persons, the Claims Tribunal shall also specify the amount payable to each of them.
(3) The Claims Tribunal in passing an order for compensation shall direct the owner or insurer of the vehicle involved in the accident to pay the amount of compensation to the claimant within two weeks from the date of such order.
(4) The Claims Tribunal shall, as far as possible dispose of the application, for compensation within forty-five days from the date of receipt of such application.
15. We have carefully considered the various provisions of the said Act and the Rules as also the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Maharashtra State Road Corporation (supra).
16. In this judgment, considering various authorities, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench held:
The scheme under Section 140 of the Act is very special and extraordinary, by which certain benefits are conferred on the heirs of deceased and the person who has suffered permanent disability. Therefore, the provision of appeal is not made in Chapter X. The appeal would defeat the very purpose of beneficial legislation. Therefore, Section 173 of the Act cannot be resorted to. However, Section 174 of the. Act falling under Chapter XII can be resorted to for the purpose of execution of the peremptory award passed under Section 140 of the Act. Because the extraordinary beneficial provision is respected thereby and It is in consonance with the intention of legislation for the purpose of providing immediate relief. The award passed under Section 140 of the Act is not an appealable award under Sections 166, 168 read with Section 173 of the Act.
17. We have considered this judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay, and also independently applied our mind to the subject-controversy having regard to the provisions of the said Act in the light of West Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules.
18. We find from the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Act that the legislature has provided right of appeal to any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal. But in our opinion, this provision cannot cover compensation granted under the provisions of Section 140 of the Act.
19. Such a construction, in our opinion, is compatible with the legislative intent, as would be evident from the scheme of the Act. The substantive provisions concerning “No-fault liability” is contained in Chapter X. This Chapter specifically deals with the cases of No-Fault liability, and provides for interim measure of compensation to the kin of the deceased or the victim, if he suffers from any permanent disability. In Sub-section (1) of Section 141, it has been provided that the right to claim compensation under Section 140 of the Act shall be in addition any other right. The only embargo imposed by the Act on an applicant for claim under the no-fault liability cases is that such claimant would not be entitled to stake claim for substantive compensation under Section 163A of the Act on similar no-fault liability principle. Then such claimant would have to take recourse to claim for compensation under Section 166 of the Act.
20. Under the provisions of Section 144 of the Act, this chapter has been given supremacy over the other provisions of the Act. Provisions of Chapter XII, on the other hand lays down the mechanism and procedure for obtaining compensation. Proviso to Section 168 of the Act, (falling within Chapter XII) reiterates the overriding effect of Chapter X, in respect of a claim for compensation under Section 140 of the Act.
21. Since substantive right to receive interim compensation in the form of non-fault liability is derived by a claimant under Chapter X, and such right is preserved under the proviso to Section 168 of the Act, we are of the view that the provisions relating to appeal, as contained in Section 173 of the Act, cannot be made applicable to compensation awarded under Section 140 of the Act. In the decision of Maharashtra State Road TransportCorporationn (Supra), the Hon’ble Special Bench of the Bombay High Court, considered a contrary view taken by a five-Judge bench of the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chintaman . In this judgment, the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh held that an order for compensation under the provisions of Section 140 of the Act is an award, and hence an appeal would lie therefrom under Section 173 of the Act. We are, however, unable to agree with this interpretation of law. The provisions of this Chapter X is composite and self-contained, not dependant on any other provisions of the Act, This is apparent from the provisions of Section 144 of the Act. The procedural provisions for making claim under Section 140 is contained in Chapter XII of the Act. Proviso to Section 168 of the Act reinforces this position.
22. The appeal provision against an award is contained in Section 173 of the Act, which we have reproduced in the earlier part of the judgment. Under this Section, appeal is provided for against an “award” of a Claims Tribunal. An order for compensation under Section 140 of the Act also may come within the ambit of the expressions “award”, and the provisions of Rule 339, to which we have referred to already, also describes such order as award. But in our view, use of the expression “award” in respect of an order under Section 140 of the Act is in a generic sense only. So far as the appellate provision under Section 173 of the Act is concerned, the expression “award” excludes an order for compensation under Section 140. The provision for appeal is a substantive right, and can relate to an award passed for a claim proceeding under Section 163A or Section 166 of the Act. But as regards the No fault liability claim under Chapter X of the Act, the provisions of Chapter XII have been made applicable only for procedural purposes. The substantive right to receive compensation flows from and is contained under the provisions of that Chapter only, which has been insulated from other provisions of the Act by introduction of the non-obstante provision in Section 144. The right of appeal contained in Section 173 of the Act cannot be transplanted on to Chapter X just because the procedure for applying for and obtaining of the no-fault liability claim has been provided in Chapter XII. The proviso to Section 168 of the Act, in our opinion, would be rendered otiose in that event.
23. We are in respectful agreement with the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay (Aurangabad bench) in the case of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (supra) on this point.
24. The ratio of the authorities relied on by the learned Counsel for the insurance company is that the policy coverage operates from the time of commencement of the policy. On this point, the Tribunal has considered the facts and has arrived at Its own finding as to the time of commencement of the policy. As we have already held that an appeal under Section 173 of the Act does not lie against an order for compensation granted under Section 140 of the Act, we are not inclined to re-examine the Tribunal’s finding on this count. That may be examined in the proceeding under Section 168 of the Act. The authorities relied on the learned Counsel for the claimant on the other points in our opinion is not required to be considered at this stage, in view of our finding on maintainability of the appeal. These points are left open for being decided in the proceeding, if any, under Section 166 of the Act.
25. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed.
26. There shall, however, no order as to costs.
27. I agree.
