High Court Kerala High Court

The Commissioner Of Income Tax vs M/S. Uralungal Labour Contract on 29 October, 2009

Kerala High Court
The Commissioner Of Income Tax vs M/S. Uralungal Labour Contract on 29 October, 2009
       

  

  

 
 
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

ITA.No. 1722 of 2009()


1. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,CALICUT.
                      ...  Petitioner

                        Vs



1. M/S. URALUNGAL LABOUR CONTRACT
                       ...       Respondent

                For Petitioner  :SRI.JOSE JOSEPH, SC, FOR INCOME TAX

                For Respondent  : No Appearance

The Hon'ble MR. Justice C.N.RAMACHANDRAN NAIR
The Hon'ble MR. Justice V.K.MOHANAN

 Dated :29/10/2009

 O R D E R
                                                                                   C.R.
                    C.N.RAMACHANDRAN NAIR &
                               V.K.MOHANAN, JJ.
               ....................................................................
                 I.T. Appeal Nos.1722 & 1738 of 2009
               ....................................................................
               Dated this the 29th day of October, 2009.

                                      JUDGMENT

Ramachandran Nair, J.

The connected appeals are filed by the Revenue against the

orders of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal upholding respondent’s

claim for deduction/exemption under Section 80P(2)(vi) of the Income

Tax Act. We have heard Senior Standing Counsel Sri.P.K.R.Menon

appearing for the appellant.

2. Respondent is a Co-operative Society, all of it’s members being

workers. The Society is engaged in civil construction work and is also

said to be engaged in purchase and sale of construction materials like

sand. In the return filed for 2003-2004, respondent did not make any

claim of deduction or exemption under Section 80P(2)(vi). However,

when the return was taken for scrutiny assessment and notice received

under Section 143(2), the assessee’s representative raised a claim of

exemption/deduction available to the assessee under Section 80P(2)(vi)

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of the Act as the purpose of constitution and functioning of the Society

is “collective disposal of labour of it’s members” qualifying for

deduction under the above provision. The Assessing Officer allowed

the assessee to raise the claim of deduction/exemption, but rejected the

claim on the ground that assessee is engaged in civil construction work

and also in purchase and sale of sand and other construction materials.

However, when assessment was challenged in first appeal on merit, the

first appellate authority namely, the C.I.T.(Appeal), held that assessee

was not entitled to raise the claim of deduction without filing a revised

return which in fact it did not file. However, for the assessment year

2004-2005, the claim for deduction was made in the return itself and

though the assessing authority declined the relief claimed, based on it’s

order for the year 2003-2004, the C.I.T.(Appeal) in first appeal granted

relief for the year 2004-2005 holding that respondent is engaged in

collective disposal of labour entitling it for deduction under the

abovereferred provision. The assessee filed appeal before the Tribunal

for the year 2003-2004 and Department filed appeal before the

Tribunal for 2004-2005. The Tribunal after hearing both sides allowed

the claim of deduction on merits for both years and the technical

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objection raised by the department that claim for the year 2003-2004 is

not maintainable for the reason of non-filing of revised return, was

also turned down holding that appellate authorities have the authority

to entertain the claim of deduction made by the assessee.

3. Senior counsel appearing for the appellant contended that

assessee has not claimed deduction under Section 80P(2)(vi) in the

original return filed for the year 2003-2004 and no revised return was

also filed when assessment was taken up for scrutiny. However, we

find no substance in this contention because the claim was raised

through a letter filed by the representative appearing for the assessee

before the Assessing officer and the Assessing Officer in fact accepted

the same, considered the case on merits and completed the assessment.

Even though Senior Counsel for the appellant has relied on the decision

of the Supreme Court in GOETZE (INDIA) LTD. V.

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX reported in (2006) 284 ITR 323

and contended that without filing a revised return assessee is not

entitled to put forward a claim of deduction, we do not think the

decision has any application because making a claim through a letter in

the assessment proceeding virtually amounts to revision of the return

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already filed and on facts in this case, we find that the Assessing

Officer without raising any objection admitted the claim and

considered the same on merits. Once the claim is entertained and

decided by the Assessing Officer on merits, we do not think the

department is entitled to canvass the position that the claim cannot be

entertained for want of a revised return. This is because if the

Assessing Officer had raised objection against raising the claim

through a letter, assessee would have been able to file a revised return a

that stage and maintain the claim within the norms covered by the

decision of the Supreme Court. We, therefore, uphold the finding of

the Tribunal that the technical objection raised by the department is not

tenable.

4. So far as the merits of the case is considered, even though no

specific question is raised in the appeals filed, Senior Standing Counsel

for the appellant submitted that this is an omission and department

wants to amend the appeal to cover such a question also. We do not

think any written amendment is required for this court to permit the

counsel to raise a question of law, if it is substantial question of law

warranting decision by this court under Section 260A of the Income

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Tax Act. We, therefore, permitted the counsel to raise this question

orally and argue on merits. However, after going through the

Tribunal’s order and after considering the constitution and nature of

activities of the respondent-Society, we feel the Society is entitled to

deduction under Section 80P(2)(vi) on the entire income because in the

first place, all the members of the Society are workers and they engage

themselves in the execution of civil works undertaken by them. There

is no case for the department that Society consists of any member other

than construction worker and there is also no case that all the member-

workers are not engaged in the activities of the Society which is

execution of civil construction work. A workers’ Society undertaking

civil construction work and executing the work by themselves rightly

answers the activity referred to in Section 80P(2)(vi) i.e. collective

disposal of labour of the members of the Society. If members of the

Society are engaged in construction activities, then the Society itself

should be held to be engaged in collective disposal of labour of it’s

members. Therefore, the income earned from construction work

qualifies for deduction under Section 80P(2)(vi) of the Act. The

remaining issue is only with regard to the trading done in construction

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materials like sand which are stated to have been purchased and sold by

the Society. Here again, the transactions are incidental in nature and

the members themselves are engaged in handling of the goods in the

course of purchase and sale of the same. Construction material

involved is also sand where the labour involved is substantial and the

income earned is also not found to be attributable to profit in trading

and not attributable to labour inputs. We, therefore, hold that the

Tribunal rightly granted deduction on the entire income of the Society

under Section 80P(2)(vi) of the Act. Consequently the appeals are

dismissed.

C.N.RAMACHANDRAN NAIR
Judge

V.K.MOHANAN
Judge
pms